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AL-GHAZALI'S

TAHAFUT AL-FALASIFAH

[INCOHERENCE OF THE PHILOSOPHERS]

TRANSLATED INTO ENGLISH

by

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TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE

THE present work began in 1948 as part of a comprehensive plan for the translation of Islamic classics under the auspices of the Muslim Educational Conference, Aligarh, India. Prof. M. M. Sharif, then the Chairman of the Philosophy Department, Muslim University, Aligarh, was appointed as my guide. Soon after, I left Aligarh, and Prof. Sharif left India. Therefore, I could not submit to him more than the first few pages (i.e., 1-35) of the translation. Prof. Sharif's departure not only deprived me of his invaluable guidance, but also left the Muslim Educational Conference in an uncertain frame of mind. Consequently, I decided to have our contractual relationship terminated; but the translation continued.

When in 1953 I came to study at the Institute of Islamic Studies, McGill University, Montreal, Canada, the first draft of this work was complete. The Institute organised a Ghazālī Seminar, at which my readings from that first draft served a twofold purpose. On the one hand, they enabled the members of the Seminar to acquaint themselves with Ghazālī's chief philosophical work. On the other hand, they enabled me to revise my translation in the light of the comments made by the 'auditors.' Prof. Faḍl al-Raḥmān of the University of Durham, England, and Dr. A. G. O'Connor of the University of Montreal were the two members of the Seminar who also kindly read (or audited) the revised version, as I could make it ready for them by slow degrees. It was at this stage that the Institute obtained for us a proof copy of Dr. Simon Van den Bergh's English translation of Ibn Rushd's *Tahāfut al-Tahāfut* (since published under the auspices of the Gibb Memorial Trust and the International Commission for the Translation of Great Works: Oxford University Press, 1954). It gives me very great pleasure to acknowledge the use I have made of Dr. Van den Bergh's scholarly work (*vide* the Note on pp. 309-10 which now may be taken to refer to the published work as well).

When revised and supplied with an Introduction and Notes, this work was submitted to, and accepted by, the McGill University (1945) as my M.A. thesis. That a work

originally undertaken outside McGill should have been accepted as a Thesis, or that I should have so compelety revised it as to make of it quite a new thing, is due to the interest taken in this work by Prof. W.C. Smith, Director of the Institute of Islamic Studies. Prof. Smith has also kindly tried to help me to find a publisher. It is through his good offices that the work has been accepted for publication by the Pakistan Philosophical Congress. It is a great honour for me thus to be connected with, and sponsored by the Congress, even as the sense in which that organisation has connected itself with Gahzālī does honour to it. Nor is it a mere coincidence that this honour should have been done to me by the Philosophical Congress of Pakistan upon the recommendation of its President, Prof. M. M. Sharif, who had been my guide, and was one of the architects of the great plan once entertained by the Muslim Educational Conference at Aligrah.

Ṣabīḥ Aḥmad Kamālī

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March 11, 1958

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INTRODUCTION

In the Name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful

WE BESEECH God, in the name of His greatness which transcends all limits, and His munificence which outruns all measures:

To pour upon us the light of guidance, and to remove from us the darkness of ignorance and wrong-doing;

To make us like those who saw truth as truth, and chose to follow it; and those who saw falsehood as falsehood, and decided to eschew it;

To bestow upon us the felicity which He has promised to His saints and prophets;

To initiate us, on our departure from the House of Delusion, into that happiness the height of which cannot be scanned by the understanding, and the extent of which cannot be conjured up by the imagination;

To give us, when after deliverance from the horrors of the Doomsday we approach the bliss of Paradise, "that which no eye ever saw, no ear ever heard, and which never occurred to the heart of man"; and

To invest with peace and bless our Prophet Muḥammad, the Chosen one, the best one of all mankind; and his noble descendants and pure companions, who were the keys to guidance, and the lamps lit in darkness.

Now, I have observed that there is a class of men who believe in their superiority to others because of their greater intelligence and insight. They have abandoned all the religious duties Islam imposes on its followers. They laugh at the positive commandments of religion which enjoin the performance of acts of devotion, and the abstinence from forbidden things. They defy the injunctions of the Sacred Law. Not only do they overstep the limits prescribed by it, but they have renounced the Faith altogether, by having indulged in diverse speculations, wherein they followed the example of those people who "turn men aside from the path of God, and seek to render it crooked; and who do not believe in the life to come." The heresy of these people has

its basis only in an uncritical acceptance—like that of the Jews and the Christians—of whatever one hears from others or sees all around. They could not avoid it; for they were born into an un-Islamic atmosphere, and their ancestors had pursued no better ways. In the second place, such heresy results from theoretical inquiries which are the outcome of stumbling—sceptically, misguidedly and stupidly—upon fanciful notions. (A similar case is that of the Disputants who discussed the questions concerning faith and belief raised by the People of wilful Innovations.)

The heretics in our times have heard the awe-inspiring names of people like Socrates, Hippocrates, Plato, Aristotle, etc. They have been deceived by the exaggerations made by the followers of these philosophers—exaggerations to the effect that the ancient masters possessed extraordinary intellectual powers: that the principles they have discovered are unquestionable: that the mathematical, logical, physical and metaphysical sciences developed by them are the most profound: that their excellent intelligence justifies their bold attempts to discover the Hidden Things by deductive methods; and that with all the subtlety of their intelligence and the originality of their accomplishments they repudiated the authority of religious laws: denied the validity of the positive contents of historical religions, and believed that all such things are only sanctimonious lies and trivialities.

When such stuff was dinned into their ears, and struck a responsive chord in their hearts, the heretics in our times thought that it would be an honour to join the company of great thinkers for which the renunciation of their faith would prepare them. Emulation of the example of the learned held out to them the promise of an elevated status far above the general level of common men. They refused to be content with the religion followed by their ancestors. They flattered themselves with the idea that it would do them honour not to accept even truth uncritically. But they had actually begun to accept falsehood uncritically. They failed to see that a change from one kind of intellectual bondage to another is only a self-deception, a stupidity. What position in this world of God can be baser than that of one who thinks that it is honourable to renounce the truth which is accepted on authority, and then relapses into an acceptance of falsehood which is still a matter of blind faith,

unaided by independent inquiry? Such a scandalous attitude is never taken by the unsophisticated masses of men; for they have an instinctive aversion to following the example of misguided genius. Surely, their simplicity is nearer to salvation than sterile genius can be. For total blindness is less dangerous than oblique vision.

When I saw this vein of folly pulsating among these idiots, I decided to write this book in order to refute the ancient philosophers. It will expose the incoherence of their beliefs and the inconsistency of their metaphysical theories. It will bring to light the flimsiest and the obscurest elements of their thought which will provide some amusement for, and serve as a warning to, the intelligent men. (I mean those things which they contributed to beliefs and opinions, and by virtue of which they thought they could be distinguished from the common men.)

Moreover, this book will set forth the doctrines of the ancient philosophers as those doctrines really are. This will serve the purpose of making it clear to the hide-bound atheists of our day that every piece of knowledge, whether ancient or modern, is really a corroboration of the faith in God and in the Last Day. The conflict between faith and knowledge is related only to the details superadded to these two fundamental principles, the two recurring themes in the teachings of all the prophets—i.e., divinely ordained persons the truth of whose mission is evident from the miracles they performed. It was only a few persons having irresponsible views and perverted minds who denied these principles. But in serious discussions no importance can be attached to such persons; and no notice ought to be taken of them. And they must be branded with diabolical perversity and stupid contumacy, so that their example may be a deterrent to people who tend to think that a vainglorious conversion to unoriginal heresy would be an indication of intelligence and good sense. This book is going to demonstrate that the ancient philosophers, whose followers the atheists in our day claim to be, were really untainted with what is imputed to them. They never denied the validity of the religious laws. On the contrary, they did believe in God, and did have faith in His messengers; although in regard to the minor details, they sometimes faltered and went astray, and caused others to go astray, from the even path. We propose

to show how they slipped into error and falsehood. But our examination will not obscure their solid achievements which lie beneath the repulsive facade of their thought. Let God be the sustainer and the helper in the investigations we have undertaken.

Now to begin the book, we proceed to the Prefaces which will presage the general trend of the discussion in this book.

Preface One

Let it be known that it would be tedious to dwell at length upon the differences among the philosophers themselves. For prolixity is their manner, and their disputes are too many, and their opinions are scattered, and their ways are divergent and devious. Therefore, we will confine our attention to the inconsistencies which are found in the theories of the premier philosopher who is called *the* Philosopher, or the First Teacher, for he systematised their sciences, and reformulated them, eliminating all that was redundant in the philosophers' opinions, and retaining only that which was close to the basic principles and tendencies of philosophical thought. This is Aristotle, who refuted all his predecessors—including his own teacher, whom the philosophers call the divine Plato. Having refuted Plato, Aristotle excused himself by saying: "Plato is dear to us. And truth is dear, too. Nay, truth is dearer than Plato."

We have related this story in order to show that in their own view there is nothing fixed and constant in the philosophers' position. They base their judgments on conjecture and speculation, unaided by positive inquiry and unconfirmed by faith. They try to infer the truth of their metaphysical theories from the clarity of the arithmetical and logical sciences. And this method sometimes carries conviction with the weak-minded people. But if their metaphysical theories had been as cogent and definite as their arithmetical knowledge is, they would not have differed among themselves on metaphysical questions as they do not differ on the arithmetical.

As far as the translators of Aristotle's works into Arabic are concerned, our problem is even more difficult. For the translations themselves have been subjected to interpolation

and changes, which have necessitated further commentaries and interpretations. As a result, the translations are as much in dispute among the philosophers as the original works are. However, the most faithful—as Aristotle's translators—and the most original—as his commentators—among the philosophising Muslims are al-Fārābī Abū Naṣr, and Ibn Sīna. Therefore, we will confine our attention to what these two have taken to be the authentic expression of the views of their mis-leaders. For what they discarded and refused to follow must undoubtedly have been utterly useless, and should not call for an elaborate refutation.

Therefore, let it be known that we propose to concentrate on the refutation of philosophical thought as it emerges from the writings of these two persons. For otherwise, the scattered character of the philosophical theories should have to be reflected in a proportionately loose arrangement of our subject-matter.

Preface Two

Let it be known that the difference between the philosophers and others is threefold.

In the first place, the dispute is centred upon a mere word. Take for instance their use of the word 'substance' for God, meaning thereby a being which is not in a subject, or a self-subsisting being which does not need an external cause to continue it in existence.

We do not intend here to undertake the refutation of this terminology. For if the meaning of self-subsistence is agreed upon, the applicability of the word 'substance' in this sense will have to be considered from the etymological point of view. If from that point of view, the application of the word is justified, it will still be debatable whether the Sacred Law approves of its use. For the permission to use words as names (of God) or the injunction against their use is based on what appears from the letter of the Sacred Law. Perhaps you will say: "This word was used by the *Mutakallimūn* in the discussion of the Divine attributes. In the Sacred Law, the Jurists never used it. It is, therefore, improper on your part to confuse the realities of things with matters of habit and custom (of which *Fiqh* treats)." But (this is inadmissible, because) I know that it amounts to a discussion

on whether it is permissible to use a certain name which is truly applicable to the bearer of the name. And hence it is equivalent to a discussion on whether a certain (moral) action is permissible.

In the second place, there are those things in which the philosophers believe, and which do not come into conflict with any religious principle. And, therefore, disagreement with the philosophers with respect to those things is not a necessary condition for the faith in the prophets and the apostles (may God bless them all). An example is their theory that the lunar eclipse occurs when the light of the Moon disappears as a consequence of the interposition of the Earth between the Moon and the Sun. For the Moon derives its light from the Sun, and the Earth is a round body surrounded by Heaven on all the sides. Therefore, when the Moon falls under the shadow of the Earth, the light of the Sun is cut off from it. Another example is their theory that the solar eclipse means the interposition of the body of the Moon between the Sun and the observer, which occurs when the Sun and the Moon are stationed at the intersection of their nodes at the same degree.

We are not interested in refuting such theories either; for the refutation will serve no purpose. He who thinks that it is his religious duty to disbelieve such things is really unjust to religion, and weakens its cause. For these things have been established by astronomical and mathematical evidence which leaves no room for doubt. If you tell a man, who has studied these things—so that he has sifted all the data relating to them, and is, therefore, in a position to forecast when a lunar or a solar eclipse will take place: whether it will be total or partial; and how long it will last —that these things are contrary to religion, your assertion will shake his faith in religion, not in these things. Greater harm is done to religion by an immethodical helper than by an enemy whose actions, however hostile, are yet regular. For, as the proverb goes, a wise enemy is better than an ignorant friend.

If someone says:

The Prophet (may God bless him) has said: "The Sun and the Moon are two signs among the signs of God. Their

eclipse is not caused by the death or the life of a man. When you see an eclipse, you must seek refuge in the contemplation of God and in prayer." How can this tradition be reconciled with what the philosophers say ?

we will answer :

There is nothing in this tradition to contradict the philosophers. It only denies that an eclipse has anything to do with the life or the death of a man. Further, it enjoins prayer at the time of an eclipse. The Sacred Law enjoins prayer at the time of sunrise or sunset or during the day; what is unusual if, with a view to finding greater favour (with God), it also enjoins prayer at the time of an eclipse ?

If it is said :

At the end of the same tradition, the Prophet said: "When God reveals Himself to something, it prostrates itself before Him." Does it not follow from this tradition that an eclipse is an act of prostration caused by Revelation?

we will answer :

This addition is spurious. We must condemn its author as a liar. The Prophet's words are only those which have been reported above. However, if this addition were authentic, would it not be easier to interpret it than to reject the evidence (of astronomical and mathematical sciences) which is conclusive and definite? People have interpreted many a plain text by rational arguments which never attained to such clarity and cogency (as the astronomical and mathematical arguments in this case have done).

The atheists would have the greatest satisfaction if the supporter of religion made a positive assertion that things of this kind are contrary to religion. For then it would be easier for them to refute religion which stood or fell with its opposition to these things. (It is, therefore, necessary for the supporter of religion not to commit himself on these questions,) because the fundamental question at issue between him and the philosophers is only whether the world

is eternal or began in time. If its beginning in time is proved, it is all the same whether it is a round body, or a simple thing, or an octagonal or hexagonal figure; and whether the heavens and all that is below them form—as the philosophers say—thirteen layers, or more, or less. Investigation into these facts is no more relevant to metaphysical inquiries than an investigation into the number of the layers of an onion, or the number of the seeds of a pomegranate, would be. What we are interested in is that the world is the product of God's creative action, whatever the manner of that action may be.

In the third place, there are philosophical theories which come into violent conflict with the fundamental principles of religion, e.g., the religious doctrines of the world's beginning in time: of the attributes of the Creator; and of the resurrection of bodies. All these things have been denied by the philosophers. Therefore, we propose to leave the rest of the sections (enumerated above) aside, in order to concentrate on this one, and on questions allied to it, in our criticism of philosophical theories.

Preface Three

Let it be known that it is our purpose to disillusion those who think too highly of the philosophers, and consider them to be infallible. Since I have undertaken to expose the incoherence and contradiction involved in philosophical thought, I will approach them in order to attack them, not to defend something of mine own. I will refute what they believe, by showing that it is a mixture of diverse elements which come from such schools as the Mu'tazilah, the Karramiyah, the Waqifiyah, etc. My attitude towards these sects themselves is that, while it is not necessary for me to defend any one of them, we are all equally opposed to the philosophers. For we differ among ourselves only in regard to the details; whereas the philosophers attack the very basis of our religion. Let us, therefore, unite against the common enemy; for at a critical juncture, we must forget our private quarrels.

Preface Four

One of the most artful methods employed by the philosophers is that, when in discussion they come up against a difficulty, they say: "The science of metaphysics is extremely subtle. Of all the sciences it is the most difficult even for a sharp intelligence to grasp." Those who follow the philosophers employ a similar trick in order to get rid of their difficulties. When they are unable to explain something in the work of their masters, they still glorify them and say: "Undoubtedly, a solution can be found somewhere in the sciences developed by the ancient masters. Perhaps our failure is the result of our inability to consult Logic and Mathematics on this question."

To these suggestions, we will reply as follows :

As far as Mathematics is concerned, one of its two branches, which is an inquiry into discrete quantity—viz., Arithmetic—has evidently nothing to do with Metaphysics. To say that it is not possible to understand Metaphysics without the help of Arithmetic is nonsense—like saying that Medicine, or Grammar, or Literature cannot be understood without the help of Arithmetic: or that Arithmetic cannot be understood without the help of Medicine.

As regards the other branch of Mathematics—viz., Geometry—which is an inquiry into continuous quantity, all that it tells us is that the heavens and all that is below them down to the Centre, i.e., the Earth, are round in shape. Further, it tells us of the number of the strata of these things: of the planets revolving in the Sphere; and of the quantity of their movements. Now, we can grant them all these things—from conviction, or for the sake of the argument. They need not adduce scientific evidence to prove them. But there is nothing in these facts which proves or disproves metaphysical principles. To say that there is something which does so is like saying: "To know whether this house is the product of a knowing, willing, powerful and living builder, it is necessary to discover whether it has six or eight sides, and what is the number of its beams and bricks." Obviously, such an assertion would be sheer nonsense. It would be like saying: "The temporal character of an

onion cannot be known, unless the number of its layers be discovered"; or, "The temporal character of this pomegranate cannot be known, unless the number of its seeds be discovered." This sort of argument simply does not appeal to an intelligent mind.

As regards their contention that reference to Logic is unavoidable, it is right. But Logic is not their monopoly. Fundamentally, it is the same thing as in the Art of Scholastic Reasoning we call the Book of Theoretical Inquiry. The philosophers have changed its name to Logic to make it look formidable. We often call it the Book of Disputation, or the Data of the Intellects. When a gullible enthusiast hears the word 'Logic,' he thinks that it is a new subject, unknown to the *Mutakallimun* and cultivated by the philosophers alone. In order to remove this misunderstanding, we propose to discuss the Data of the Intellects in a separate work, where we will avoid the phraseology used by the *Mutakallimun* and the Jurists, adopting for the time being the terms used by the Logicians, so that the whole thing might be cast into a different mould, and the methods of the Logicians might be followed in the minutest detail. In that book, we will speak to them in their language—I mean their logical terminology. We will show there that

> neither the conditions for the material validity of Syllogism—laid down by them in the section of Logic devoted to Demonstration—nor those for its formal validity—in the Book of Syllogism—nor the postulates which they have formulated in the Isagoge and Categories, and which form the parts and preliminaries of Logic

are of any help to them in metaphysical sciences. But it is necessary to reserve the discussion of the Data of the Intellects for a separate book. For, although an instrument for the understanding of the purport of this book, it is not indispensable to every reader. Therefore, we are going to postpone it; so that he who does not need it may not be bothered by it here. However, he who fails to understand some of the terms used here will be well advised to begin with mastering the contents of our book called The Standard of Knowledge—viz., the (branch of) knowledge they call Logic.

After the Prefaces, let us give a list of the problems in whose discussion in this book we will expose the contradiction involved in the philosophers' theories.

And these problems are twenty:

(*i*) The refutation of their belief in the eternity of the world.
(*ii*) The refutation of their belief in the everlasting nature of the world.
(*iii*) Their dishonest assertion that God is the Creator of the world, and that the world is His product.
(*iv*) Demonstration of their inability to affirm the Creator.
(*v*) Demonstration of their inability to prove the impossibility of two gods by a rational argument.
(*vi*) Refutation of their denial of the Divine attributes.
(*vii*) Refutation of their theory that the Divine being is not divisible into genus and differentia.
(*viii*) Refutation of their theory that the First (Principle) is a simple unqualified being.
(*ix*) Demonstration of their inability to show that the First (Principle) is not body.
(*x*) The thesis that they are bound to affirm the eternity of the world, and deny the Creator.
(*xi*) Demonstration of their inability to maintain that the First (Principle) knows any one other than Himself.
(*xii*) Demonstration of their inability to maintain that He knows Himself.
(*xiii*) Refutation of their doctrine that the First (Principle) does not know the particulars.
(*xiv*) Refutation of their doctrine that the Heaven is a living being whose movements are voluntary.
(*xv*) Refutation of their theory of the purpose of the Heaven's movement.
(*xvi*) Refutation of their doctrine that the souls of the heavens know all the particulars.
(*xvii*) Refutation of their belief in the impossibility of a departure from the natural course of events.
(*xviii*) Refutation of their theory that the soul of man

is a substance which exists in itself, and which is neither body nor an accident.

(*xix*) Refutation of their belief in the impossibility of the annihilation of the human souls.

(*xx*) Refutation of their denial of the resurrection of bodies, which will be followed by feelings of pleasure and pain produced by physical causes of these feelings in Paradise and Hell.

So these are questions selected from their metaphysical and physical sciences wherein we propose to expose the contradiction involved in their views. As regards Mathematics, there is no point in denying or opposing it; for Mathematics includes Arithmetic and Geometry, and these two sciences are not in dispute here. As regards Logic, it is just an investigation into the instruments of reflection over the intelligibles. And as such, it involves no contradictions which might deserve our consideration. And in the book called The Standard of Knowledge, we are going to introduce as much of this subject as may be helpful towards the understanding of the contents of this book.

PROBLEM I

REFUTATION OF THEIR BELIEF IN THE ETERNITY OF THE WORLD

Details of the theory (of the eternity of the world):

THE philosophers disagree among themselves as to the eternity of the world. But the majority of the philosophers—ancient as well as modern—agree upon its eternity, holding that it always coexisted with God (exalted be He) as His effect which was concurrent with Him in time—concurrent as an effect is with the cause, e.g., light with the Sun—and that God's priority to the world is the priority of the cause to the effect—viz., priority in essence and rank, not in time. Plato is said to have maintained that the world began in time. But some people put different interpretations on his words, for they would not have him believe in the origin of the world. From Galen's book called "What Galen Believed" it appears that towards the end of his life he was inclined to be neutral on this question. He said that he did not know whether the world is eternal or originated. Often he would argue that the nature of the world could not be discovered—not because of any deficiency on his part, but because of the inherent difficulty of the problem which baffles all minds.

But such instances are few and far between. The consensus of opinion among the philosophers is that as a rule it is inconceivable that something which has a beginning in time should proceed from the eternal without there being any intermediary.

Exposition of their arguments:

If I were to relate all the arguments (advanced by the philosophers) and the counter-arguments which have been handed down to us, I should have to devote innumerable pages to the problem. But prolixity is no good. Let us, therefore, omit such of their arguments as tend towards arbitrary and fanciful reasoning; for any observer will find

it easy to deal with them. Our attention should be confined to those (arguments) which really appeal to the mind. It is such arguments which could possibly shake the faith of the maturest thinkers. As regards weaker minds, their faith can be shaken by the flimsiest thing.

Now, such arguments ("as really appeal to the mind") are three.

(1)

In the first argument, they say :

The procession of a temporal (being) from an eternal (being) is absolutely impossible. For, if we suppose the Eternal at a stage when the world had not yet originated from Him, then the reason why it had not originated must have been that there was no determinant for its existence, and that the existence of the world was a possibility only. So, when later the world comes into existence, we must choose one of the two alternatives (to explain it)—namely, either that the determinant has, or that it has not, emerged. If the determinant did not emerge, the world should still remain in the state of bare possibility, in which it was before. But if it has emerged, who is the originator of the determinant itself? And why does it come into being now, and did not do so before? Thus, the question regarding the origin of the determinant stands. In fine, since all the states of the Eternal are alike, either nothing shall originate from Him, or whatever originates shall continue to originate for ever. For it is impossible that the state of leaving off should differ from the state of taking up.

To elucidate the point, it may be said: Why did He not originate the world before its origination? It is not possible to say: "Because of His inability to bring the world into existence"; nor could one say: "Because of the impossibility of the world's coming into being." For this would mean that He changed from inability to power, or that the world changed from impossibility to possibility. And both senses are absurd. Nor can it be said that, before the time of the origination of the world, there was no purpose, and that a purpose emerged later. Nor is it possible to ascribe (the non-origination of the world before it actually

originated) to the lack of means at one stage, and to its existence at another. The nearest thing to imagine is to say that He had not willed the world's existence before. But from this it follows that one must also say: "The world is the result of His having become a willer of its existence—after not having been a willer." So the will should have had a beginning in time. But the origination of the will in the Divine being is impossible; for He is not subject to temporal events. And the origination of the will not-in-His-being cannot make Him a willer.

Even if we give up the inquiry concerning the substratum in which the will originated, does not the difficulty regarding the very act of origination stand? Whence does the will originate? Why does it originate now? Why did it not originate before? Does it now originate from a source other than God? If there can be a temporal existent which has not been brought into existence by anyone, then the world itself should be such an existent, so as to be independent of the Creator. For what is the difference between one temporal existent and another?

So, if the origin of the world is ascribed to God's action, the question remains: Why now, and why not before? Was it due to the absence of means, or power, or purpose, or nature? If so, the transition from this stage to that of existence will revive the difficulty we had to face at the outset. And if it is said to have been due to the absence of will, then one act of will will stand in need of another, and so on *ad infinitum*. From this it is absolutely clear that the procession of the temporal from the eternal is impossible, unless there were a change in the eternal in respect of power, or means, or time, or nature. And it is impossible to suppose a change in the states of the eternal. For as a temporal event, that change would be like any other change (in non-eternal beings). Therefore (in case of the eternal), change of any kind whatsoever is impossible. And now that the world has been proved (always) to have existed, and the impossibility of its beginning in time has been shown, it follows that the world is eternal.

This is their most clever argument. Their discussion of all other metaphysical problems is less substantial than the discussion of this one. For here they have access to a

variety of speculations which would not be available to them in any other problem. This is the reason why we began with this problem, and presented this their strongest argument at the very outset.

The foregoing argument is open to objection on two points.

Firstly, it may be said :

How will you disprove one who says that the world came into being because of the eternal will which demanded its existence at the time at which it actually came into existence, and which demanded the non-existence (of the world) to last as long as it lasted, and (demanded) the existence to begin where it actually began? So, on this view, existence of the world was not an object of the eternal will, before the world actually existed; hence its non-actualisation. And it was an object of the will at the time when it actualised. What can prevent us from believing such a thing, and what is the contradiction involved in it?

If it is said :

The contradiction involved here is self-evident. For that which originates in time is an effect or a product. And just as it is impossible for an originated thing to be uncaused, so it is impossible for the cause to fail to produce its effect when all the conditions and factors requisite for the causal operation are complete and nothing else remains to be awaited. The existence of the effect is necessary, when the cause is operative, and all causal conditions are complete. The postponement of the effect is as impossible as the existence of a temporal but uncaused thing.

Now, before the existence of the world, the Willer existed: the will existed, and the relation of the will to its object existed. The Willer did not have to make a new appearance: nor did the will emerge as a new acquisition, nor did it acquire a new relation to its object. For anything of this kind would amount to change. How, then, did the object of will emerge as something new? And what prevented it from emerging before it actually did? The state of its new-emergence cannot be distinguished from the preceding states in respect of any thing or any factor or any state or any relation whatsoever; for all things remain as they were. If, in spite of all things remaining the same, the object of will is not produced at first, but comes into being later, the whole affair must be exceedingly contradictory. And contradiction of this kind arises not only in case of evident and essential causes and effects, but also in case of those which are conventional and qualified. For instance, if a man pronounces divorce to his wife, and if separation is not the immediate result of the pronouncement, it is inconceivable that it should take effect afterwards. For, in accordance with convention and legal usage, the pronouncement is made the cause of the judgment. Therefore, the postponement of the effect is unintelligible, unless the enforcement of the divorce should be bound up with, say, the coming of the next day, or entering into the house. Only then will the divorce take effect at the time of the coming of the next day, or the entering into the house, and not immediately; for the pronouncement is made a cause of divorce in relation to something which is yet awaited. Since the condition, i.e., the morrow or the entry, is not present at the moment, the effect must be held over until the absent condition should become present. So the effect, i.e., the enforcement of the divorce, will not appear unless a new factor, viz., the morrow or the entry, emerges. But if the man desires—without binding up the effect with the appearance of something which is not present at the moment—to postpone the effect, it would not be an intelligible thing, notwithstanding the fact that he has the right to make the pronouncement, and is at liberty to choose whatever details he likes. Since it is not possible for us to arrange these conventional things as we like, and since our capricious determinations are bound to be unintelligible, it follows that an arbitrary arrangement should be still less intelligible in the sphere of essential, rational and self-evident causation.

Even in the case of morals, the object of our intention is not posterior to the intention, if the intention exists, and there is no hindrance. Therefore, with intention being coupled with power, and with all obstacles having been removed, it is unintelligible that the intended thing should be delayed. Such a thing is conceivable only in the case of inclination; for inclination by itself is not sufficient to

bring about an action. For instance, the mere inclination to write does not produce writing, unless there emerges an intention, i.e., an inner agitation which as a new factor precedes an action.

So if the eternal will is to be likened to our intention, it is inconceivable that its object should be posterior to it. Unless there is a hindrance, there cannot be a gap between the intention and its object. It makes no sense to have an intention to-day that one would stand up to-morrow. One may only have an inclination to do so. But if the eternal will is like our inclination, it shall not by itself be sufficient to bring about the object of inclination. For it is indispensable that something else—viz., the inner agitation that is intention—should emerge to supplement inclination, so that the object of inclination may be produced. But the emergence of such a thing means a change in the Eternal.

And, then, the difficulty remains as it was. Namely, why does this agitation, or intention, or will, or whatever you may like to call it, originate now, and why did it not originate before? Thus, either one must posit a temporal event which is uncaused, or an infinite regress will follow.

The sum and substance of what has been said (by you) is this: That the Cause existed; that all the conditions of its efficiency were complete, so that nothing else remained to be awaited; that, in spite of all this, the origination of the effect was postponed over a length of time, the beginning of which cannot be imagined, and which could not be measured out even by millenia; and that eventually the effect made its appearance all of a sudden, without a new factor coming into operation, or a new condition being realised. And such a thing is intrinsically impossible.

The answer to the foregoing may be stated as follows :

How do you know the impossibility of ascribing the origin of something to an eternal will? Is it the self-evident rational necessity, or theoretical knowledge, which is the ground of your judgment? Or, to use the terms employed by you in Logic, are the two terms in your judgment joined by means of a middle term, or without a middle term? If you claim that they are joined by means of a middle term

—i.e., if your method is deductive—you must state what that term is. But if you claim that this impossibility is known as a self-evident fact, why do not your opponents share this knowledge with you? People who believe in the temporal origin of the world are confined neither to a number nor within a city. And no one would suspect that, out of spite for reason, they believe in something which they know to be untrue. It is, therefore, necessary for you to prove, in accordance with the rules of Logic, that it is impossible to ascribe the origin of the world to the eternal will. All you have said so far only amounts to a suggestion of improbability, and to a comparison of the Divine will to our inclination or will. The comparison is false; for the eternal will *does not* resemble temporal intentions. And the mere suggestion of improbability, unsupported by an argument, is not enough.

If it is said :

We know by rational necessity that, if all the conditions for causal operation are complete, it is inconceivable that the cause should fail to produce the effect. He who admits the possibility of such a thing challenges the necessity of reason.

we will answer :

But, then, what is the difference between you and your opponents who said to you :

> "We regard it as a self-evident truth that it is impossible to say that the one Divine being possesses the knowledge of all the universals—without this knowledge necessitating plurality: without its being additional to His essence; and without its multiplying in proportion to the multiplicity of the known things"?

This position, which has been criticised above, is actually what you believe with respect to Divine knowledge. Now, if it is judged by what applies to us and to our knowledge, it will be found to be utterly impossible. But you say that eternal knowledge cannot be conceived of on the

analogy of temporal knowledge.

The impossibilty involved in the above-mentioned theory was felt by certain people among yourselves. Consequently, they said that He does not know anything but Himself, and that, therefore, knowledge, knower and the known thing are all one—viz., Himself. To this, one might take an objection as follows:

"The impossibility of the union of knowledge, the knower and the known thing is a self-evident truth. It is evidently impossible to suppose a creator who does not know his creature. And if the Eternal (exalted be He far above the words of all perverse thinkers) does not know anything but Himself, He will not know His creature."

But now to recur to the criticism of this question, we will say:

How will you disprove your opponents if they say:

"The eternity of the world is impossible. For it leads to the affirmation of spherical revolutions which are infinite in number, and consist of innumerable units. The fact is that these revolutions can be divided into one-sixth, or one-fourth, or a half. For instance, the sphere of the Sun completes one revolution in one year, while that of Saturn makes one in thirty years. Therefore, the revolutions of Saturn are one-thirtieth of those of the Sun. And the revolutions of Jupiter are one-twelfth of those of the Sun, for Jupiter completes one revolution in twelve years"?

You maintain that, in spite of the fact that the revolutions of Saturn are one-thirtieth of the Sun, they are equally infinite. Nay, you would assert that the revolutions of the Stellar Sphere, each of which takes thirty-six thousand years, are as infinite as the East-West movement of the Sun, which takes only a day and night. If someone says that this is an impossible thing, and that its impossibility is self-evident, how will you silence his criticism?

Even so, one might ask whether the number of these revolutions is odd or even, or both, or neither. If you say that it is both odd and even, or that it is neither odd nor even, it will be an evidently absurd thing. But if you say that it is

even, the addition of one would make the even odd. How could it be that that which is infinite lacked just one? If you say that it is odd, again the addition of one would make the odd even. How could it be that that which is infinite lacked just one which would have made it even? It follows that you are bound to hold that the number is neither odd nor even.

If it is said:

The finite alone is described as odd or even. That which s infinite cannot be so described.

we will answer:

It there is totality which is composed of units, and which —as we saw above—can be divided into one-sixth, one-tenth, etc.; and if still it cannot be described as odd or even, then we must call it a self-evident absurdity, to prove which point we need not advance any rational argument. How will you answer this criticism?

If it is said:

Error lies in your words: "A totality composed of units." As a matter of fact, the revolutions of the sphere are non-existent. Those which took place in the past are gone; while those which will take place in the future are yet to be produced. The word "Totality" points to beings which are present here and now. But in this case no such being is to be found.

we will answer:

A number is bound to be either odd or even. It is impossible that it should fall outside these two categories—regardless of the fact whether the numbered thing is a being which exists, or has perished. For instance, if we suppose a number of horses, we are bound to believe that it is either an odd or an even number. It makes no difference whether we suppose the horses to be existing, or not to be existing. Or, if the horses perished after having existed, this judgment

would not be changed.

Besides, we will say to them: Even according to your own principles, it is not impossible that there should be discrete individual existents, who are infinite in number, and describable each by itself. The souls of men whom death has separated from the body are such beings. And they are beings whose number is not described as odd or even. How will you disprove a man who says that such a thing is a self-evident absurdity? How can you show that this criticism is different from your own rejection, on grounds of rational necessity, of the explanation of the temporal origin of the world by reference to the eternal will? And this opinion about the souls is the one adopted by Ibn Sina; and perhaps it is Aristotle's view, too.

If it is said:

The true opinion about the souls is the one held by Plato. Plato thought that the soul is eternal: that, although one by nature, it gets divided when it is related to bodies; and that, after its separation from bodies, it returns to its original character, and is reunified.

we will answer:

This is even more obnoxious; and there is greater reason why it should be rejected as contrary to rational necessity. Let us say: Is the soul of Zayd identical with that of 'Amr, or other than it? If it is identical, it would be a self-evident absurdity. For each one of the two is conscious of himself, knowing that he is not the same as any other. If the souls were the same, they would be equal in respect of cognitions which are the essential attributes of the souls, and which enter into all the relations of the soul. But if you say that the soul of Zayd is other than that of 'Amr, and that the duality is the result of the division necessitated by the relation of the two souls to bodies, we will say: The division of that which is one, and which possesses no magnitude or quantity, is evidently impossible. How can that which is one become two, nay, a thousand, and then regain its oneness? Such a thing is conceivable in the case of that which has magnitude and quantity. For instance, the water of the ocean is divided into streams and rivers, and then returns to the ocean. But how can that which has no quantity be divided?

The purpose of all this is to show that they cannot render it untenable for their opponents to believe in the origination of the world by the eternal will, unless they claim that such a thing is contrary to rational necessity. But when a similar claim is made by their critics to refute their own beliefs, it will not be possible for them to silence that criticism. And this is, therefore, an inescapable position.

If it is said:

This may be turned against you. For, it might be asked: Did God have the power, before the creation of the world, to create it one year or two years earlier than he did? Since His power is infinite, it appears that He held Himself in patience, and did not create the world. But when at last He created it, are we to call the period of not-creating finite, or infinite? If you say that it was finite, it will follow that the being of the Creater was at first measurable in terms of finitude. But if you say that it was infinite, you will have ignored the fact that this period which contained infinite possibilities did come to an end.

we will answer:

We believe that periods (of time) and time (itself) are created. However, when we deal with their second argument, we will show what is the real answer to this (objection).

If it is said:

How will you disprove one who gives up the argument from rational necessity, and tries to prove (the eternity of the world) from another point of view—namely, that all the moments being equal with respect to the possibility of the relation of the eternal will to them, there cannot be anything to distinguish one particular moment from all those before and after it?

Maybe, it is not impossible for priority or posteriority to have been an object of will. But how about white and

black, or motion and rest? You say that white owes its origin to the eternal will, and that the substratum which actually receives whiteness was equally capable of receiving blackness. Now, why does the eternal will take whiteness, as set over against blackness? What is there to distinguish one of the two contingent things from the other, so that it should be taken by the eternal will?

We know it as a self-evident fact that nothing can be distinguished from its like, unless there be something which gives it a special character. If without such a thing a distinction between two like things were possible, then it would follow that in the case of the world, which was possible of existence as well as of non-existence, the balance could be tilted in favour of existence—notwithstanding the fact that non-existence possessed an equal measure of possibility, and that there was nothing to give existence a special character. If you say that the will (itself) produced the special character, the question will be: Why did it acquire the capacity to produce it? If you say that in the case of an eternal thing the question: Why? cannot be asked, then let the world be such an eternal thing. Do not look for the Creator or the cause of the world; for it is eternal, and in the case of an eternal thing the question: Why? is not to be asked.

If it were possible for the Eternal to acquire a special relation to one of the two contingencies, then it would be absolutely untenable to say that the world, which has a particular shape at present, could possibly have some other shape instead of the present one. For then one might say: "This (shape) has come into being by chance"; even as you might say that the will makes by chance the choice of only one moment of time, or of only one shape. If you say that such a question is irrelevant because it might be asked in the case of anything willed or determined by Him, we will say that it must be faced precisely because it arises in any event, and will necessarily present itself to our opponents, whatever their supposition may be.

we will answer:

The (eternal) will produced the world as it is, wherever it is, and whatever it is like. As regards the will, it is

an attribute of which the function it is to distinguish something from its like. If it had no such function, then power would have had to be regarded as an adequate principle. But since power bears an equal relation to two opposite things, and since it becomes necessary to posit a cause which gives one of these two things a special character, therefore, it must be said that, over and above power, the Eternal has an attribute whose function is to distinguish something from its like. Therefore, if one asks: "Why did the will choose one of two like things?" it will be like asking: "Why does knowledge require the encompassing of the object of knowledge as such?" As the answer to the last question is: "Knowledge is an attribute of which this is the function," so the answer to the first question should be: "Will is an attribute of which the function—rather, nature—is to distinguish something from its like."

If it is said:

It is unintelligible—rather, self-contradictory—to speak of an attribute of which the function is to distinguish something from its like. For by likeness is meant that there is no distinction; and by distinction is meant that there is no likeness. It is not proper to imagine that two black things in two different places are like each other in all respects. For 'This' is in one place, and 'That' is in another place; hence the necessity for the distinction between the two. Nor can two black things in the same place but at different times be absolutely like each other. For 'This' is separated from 'That' in time; how, therefore, can the two be equal in all respects? When we say: "Two black things like each other," we mean that they are alike only in respect of the particular attribute of blackness. We do not mean that they are so in an unqualified sense. For if that were the meaning, and if the identity of time and place had left no dissimilarity, then the two black things would not be intelligible, and their duality would be absolutely irrational.

The question will be settled when it is seen that the word 'will' is derived by analogy from our own will. And our will cannot conceivably distinguish something from its like. If a thirsty man has before him two glasses of water, which are equal in all respects as far as his purpose is

concerned, he cannot take either of the two, unless he thinks that one of the two is prettier, or lighter, or nearer to his right hand (he presumably being a man who habitually uses his right hand), or has some other cause—apparent or invisible—which gives it a special character. For otherwise, the choice of something as distinguished from another exactly like it would in no event be conceivable.

Objection to this from two points of view:

Firstly, is your assertion that such a thing is inconceivable based on self-evident facts, or on theoretical investigations? In fact, it is not possible for you to make either claim. Your comparison of the Divine to human will is as false an analogy as that between the Divine and human knowledge. The Divine knowledge is different from ours in respect of things which we have established. Why, therefore, should it be improbable for a similar difference to exist in the case of will? Your assertion is like one's saying: "A being which is neither outside the world nor inside it: neither connected with it nor disconnected from it is unintelligible; for if such qualities were attributed to us, we would not understand them." To such a person the answer would be: "This is the work of your imagination. Actually, rational proof has compelled the intelligent to assent to that doctrine." How, therefore, will you disprove one who says that rational proof also compels one to affirm an attribute of God (exalted be He) of which the function is to distinguish something from its like? If the word 'will' cannot name this attribute, let us use another name, for names are not at issue at the moment. We had used the word 'will' on the authority of the Sacred Law. Etymologically, however, 'will' signifies something directed towards a purpose. In the case of God, we cannot speak of a purpose. What, however, we are concerned with is the meaning, and not the words.

Besides, we do not admit that even our will cannot conceivably make a distinction between two like things. Let us suppose that there are two equal dates before a man who is fond of them, but who cannot take both of them at once. So he will take only one of them; and this, obviously, will be done—by an attribute of which the function is to dis-

tinguish something from its like! As regards the causes of a special character being possessed by the object of actual choice—viz., the causes mentioned by you, such as prettiness, or nearness, or handiness—we can suppose their absence; and still the possibility of one of the two dates being taken will remain. Here you will have to choose one of the two things:

(*i*) Either you can say that the equal relation of a man's purpose to the two dates is inconceivable. But that is nonsense; for the equality can be supposed.

(*ii*) Or you might say that, the equality having been supposed, the excited man will keep fondly and helplessly gazing on for ever, and will not be able to take either date by mere will or choice which is devoid of purpose. But this is also impossible; and the absurdity of such an assumption is self-evident.

From all this it follows that whoever discusses the nature of volitional action—whether with reference to empirical facts, or on theoretical grounds—will have to affirm an attribute of which the function should be to distinguish something from its like.

In the second place, the objection may be stated as follows:

In your own theories, you have not been able to avoid the assumption of a distinction between two like things. For if the world is produced by a cause which necessitates for it a certain shape as set over against other shapes like it, the question arises: Why was this particular choice made? The rule that a distinction between like things is impossible cannot differ in different cases, e.g., an action, or something which follows by nature or by rational necessity.

If you say:

The entire system of the world could not have been produced in any other way than that in which it has been

produced. If the world were smaller or larger than it is, the system would not be perfect. The same is true of the number of the spheres and the stars. You assert that the Great is opposed to the Small, and the Much to the Little, of whatever they may be predicated. Therefore, in the case of the universal system, largeness and smallness would not be like each other, but different things. It is true that man's powers are too weak to comprehend the wisdom which lies in the quantities and details of the spheres. (In some cases the wisdom can be discerned—e.g., in the case of the declination of the Sphere of the Zodiac Signs from the Equator: or in the case of the Apogee, or in the case of the eccentric sphere.) But, although in most cases the secret of these things cannot be discovered, still their differences are known very well. Therefore, it is not improbable that something should be distinguished from what is opposed to it (as an alternative possibility) because of its relation to the system of things. But the moments of time are, on the contrary, absolutely similar in respect of the relation each bears to possibility and to the system of things. For this reason it is not possible to maintain that, if the creation of the world had been earlier or later by a single instant than it was, the system of things would not take shape. And the similarity of the temporal states is a self-evident truth.

we will answer:

Had we so desired, we could have shown that the temporal states can be treated in the same way as space-filling things. For people have said that He created the world at a time which was the fittest for creation. But we will not confine our attention to this comparison. Let us, therefore, proceed to show that, fundamentally, a distinction between two like things—i.e., two like positions—is acceptable to you. Of these two instances, in each of which absolutely no difference can be supposed to exist between two like things, one is the difference of the direction of spherical movement; and the other is the definite position of the poles in relation to the ecliptic in spherical movement.

As regards the poles, the philosophers give the following

description:

> The heaven is a round body which moves on two poles, which are, as it were, fixed and constant. And the round body of the heaven has similar parts, for it is simple. Particularly so is the highest, i.e., the ninth, sphere which has no stars. And both these (spheres) move on two, i.e., the northern and southern, poles.

Now, let us say, out of what they would call an infinite number of opposite points, any two could conceivably be the poles. Why, therefore, did the two points in north and south happen finally to be chosen as the poles? Why not did the ecliptic pass through some other (two) points, so that as opposite points on the ecliptic they should have been the poles? There may be a wisdom latent in the size or the shape of heaven. But what is it that distinguished the place of the pole from any other place? What caused one particular point, as set over against all other points and parts, to be chosen as the pole? Are not all the points similar; are not all the parts of a round body equal? The philosophers cannot find a way out of this difficulty.

If it is said:

Perhaps the position of the point of the poles is distinct from other points by virtue of a property which is suited to that point's being the point of the pole. This property being permanent, the point of the pole does not depart from its particular place (or space, or position, or whatever name may be supposed to be applicable in this case). In the course of celestial revolutions, all the positions on the sphere, which determine its relation to the Earth and to other spheres, are changed; but the position of the poles is constant. Presumably, therefore, this position was fitter than any other position to remain constant.

we will answer:

This amounts to an explicit admission of a dissimilarity in nature among the parts of the primary round body. If you would have us believe that all the parts of heaven

are not similar, you will contradict your own principles. For one of the arguments, by which you tried to prove that the heaven must of necessity be round in shape, was this:

> The nature of heaven is simple; for heaven is not heterogeneous, but homogeneous. And the simplest shape is the round shape. For four-sided, or six-sided, etc., figures require angularity and the difference (of parts), which requirements cannot be met, unless something should be added to simple nature.

Now, even at the expense of consistency, this position does not render our objection invalid. For the question concerning the 'property' remains unanswered. Were other parts also capable of receiving this property, or were they not? If you say Yes, the next question will be: Why does this property belong in particular to only a few of many similar things? But if they say: "This property can reside only in *this* position; other parts of the sphere are incapable of receiving it," we will say: All the parts of the sphere are, *qua* body which receives forms, evidently similar. This property cannot be claimed by *this* position, merely because of the latter's being body or heaven. For that character is shared in common by all the parts of heaven. So there can be only two explanations: Either it was for some arbitrary reason that a special character was conferred upon *this* position, or there had come into operation an attribute whose function was to distinguish something from its like. If neither of these two hypotheses is adopted, then, just as they cling to the theory that all the moments are equally capable of receiving the occurrence of the world, so will their opponents cling to the contention that all the parts of heaven are equally capable of receiving the character which renders fixity, rather than changeableness, the fittest thing. And again, the philosophers will not be able to find a way out of this difficulty.

The second point on which the philosophers' criticism of the distinction between like things involves a contradiction:

Why is it that, in spite of the similarity of directions, the movements of the spheres—in some cases, from East to West;

in others, vice versa—are specifically determined? Obviously, the similarity of directions is like the similarity of movements. There cannot be any difference between the two instances.

If it is said:

If the universe revolved in only one direction, it could not have varied spatial relations, nor would there be the configurations of the stars which result from their three-fold or six-fold relations, or from their conjunction. So the universe would have one and the same (spatial) relation, and there would be no variety. In point of fact, however, these configurations of the stars are the principle of events in the world.

we will answer:

We do not object to the difference in the directions of movements. What we say is this: The highest sphere moves from East to West; and the one below it, vice versa. Now, whatever is the result of the roles of the two spheres might be obtained even if the roles were reversed—i.e., if the highest sphere moved from West to East, and the one below it in the opposite manner. So the roles would still remain dissimilar. The movements of the spheres having been recognised to be rotatory and opposed to each other, the directions of these movements must be equal. Why, therefore, was one direction distinguished from another like it?

If it is said:

The two directions are opposed to each other as contraries. How can they be equal?

we will answer:

This is like one's saying: "Priority and posteriority of the existence of the world are also opposed to each other as contraries. How can it be claimed that they are similar?" But the philosophers assert that the similarity of the moments of time is known by reference to the possibility of

existence, and by reference to any purpose which might conceivably be served by existence. If the philosophers' claim of difference in spite of this similarity is a warranted claim, their opponents' claim of a difference in the case of temporal states and stages will be equally warranted.

The Second Objection to the Original Argument:

It may be said: You reject as impossible the procession of a temporal from an eternal being. But you will have to admit its possibility. For there are temporal phenomena in the world. And some other phenomena are the causes of those phenomena. Now, it is impossible that one set of temporal phenomena should be caused by another, and that the series should go on *ad infinitum*. No intelligent person can believe such a thing. If it had been possible, you would not have considered it obligatory on your part to introduce the Creator (into your theories), or affirm the Necessary Being in Whom all the possible things have their Ground.

So, if there is a limit at which the series of temporal phenomena stops, let this limit be called the Eternal.

And this proves how the possibility of the procession of a temporal from an eternal being can be deduced from their fundamental principles.

If it is said:

We do not say that the procession of *a* temporal being, whatever it is, from an eternal being is inadmissible. What we call inadmissible is the procession of the first temporal being from the Eternal. For the moment of the appearance (of the first temporal being) cannot be distinguished from preceding moments by virtue of a greater aptitude for existence, which might have been demonstrated through such a thing as the presence of (suitable) circumstances, or the acquisition of an instrument or some other condition, or the development of a certain nature or a purpose, or some other cause of this kind. If the temporal being which proceeds from the Eternal is not the first one, then its procession would be admissible—inasmuch as it had been rendered possible by the appearance of a new factor, e.g., the (newly acquired) capacity of the receptive substratum, or the presence of the suitable time and circumstances, or some other thing of this kind.

we will answer :

That raises a question concerning the acquisition of the capacity, or the presence of the time, or whatever may be supposed to have emerged as new in this case. So either the series will go on to infinity, or it will stop at an eternal being from which the first temporal being should have originated.

If it is said :

Matters, which receive forms, accidents and qualities, are not temporal at all. And the temporal qualities are the movement of the spheres—i.e., rotatory motion—and the relative attributes of that movement which emerge in course of time. (Such attributes are the three-fold, six-fold, four-fold, etc., relations of some parts of the sphere or the stars to each other or to the Earth—e.g., the consequences of sunrise, or daylight, or the decline of a star from the highest point of elevation, or its distance from the Earth—because of its being at the Apogee—or its nearness to the Earth—because of its being at the Perigee—or its tending away from some regions—because of its being in north or south.) So, evidently, these relations inevitably belong to rotatory motion; for it is that motion itself which necessitates them.

And the temporal things in what is surrounded by the concave of the sphere of the Moon—i.e., the Elements and their affections, such as generation and corruption, or mingling and parting, or transformation from one quality to another—they are all traceable one to another in a manner which it would take one too long to describe. Ultimately, however, their primary causes are to be found in the rotatory celestial motion, and in the relations of the stars to each other or to the Earth.

The outcome of all this is that the perpetual and everlasting rotatory motion is the source of all the temporal events. And this rotatory motion of the heaven is derived by the heaven from the souls of heavens. For these souls are

living things which play the same part as our souls do in relation to our bodies. And they are eternal. It, therefore, follows that rotatory motion, which is caused by the souls of heavens, must be eternal as well. The states of the souls being similar—because of their eternity—the states of the movements caused by them are also similar—i.e , these movements are everlasting.

For these reasons it is inconceivable that a temporal being should proceed from an eternal being, unless it were through the intermediacy of the everlasting rotatory motion. This motion resembles the Eternal in one respect—namely, that it is perpetual and everlasting. But it resembles a temporal being in another respect—namely, that every conceivable part of it comes into being after not having been. So, *qua* temporal by virtue of its parts and relations, it is the principle of all temporal phenomena. But, *qua* everlasting and having similar states, it is something which proceeds from the eternal soul(s) (of heavens). This shows that, if there are temporal events in the world, they must of necessity be connected with rotatory motion. And, since actually there *are* temporal events, the everlasting rotatory motion is thereby proved.

we will say :

These lengthy details will not avail you. For the question remains: Is this rotatory motion, which is the source of temporal events, temporal or eternal? If eternal, how did it become the principle of the first temporal being? If temporal, it should stand in need of another temporal being, and therefore an infinite regress should follow. You say that it resembles the Eternal in one respect, and the temporal in another. That is to say, it is something permanent which, nevertheless, emerges and re-emerges in course of time. In other words, it is permanently renewable, or renewably permanent. Now, let us ask: Is it the principle of temporal phenomena by virtue of its being permanent, or by virtue of its being renewable? If by virtue of its being permanent, how was it that something proceeded from a permanent being, whose states were similar, at a particular moment, as set over against all other moments? But if (it is the principle of temporal phenomena) by virtue of its

being renewable, then what is the cause of the renewable character itself? And whatever that cause may be, it will need another cause, and thereby an infinite regress will follow.

This concludes our objections, which have by this time been placed on a secure basis. The philosophers employ many a clever device in order to get rid of these objections. But we propose to postpone the consideration of these devices to some other problems, lest the discussion of this one should lengthen out, and our attention should be diverted from the main question to its side-issues. Later on, we propose to show that rotatory motion is not fit to be the principle of temporal events, and that, in fact, all the temporal events have been contrived by God. In that context, we will also refute the philosophers' theory that the heaven is a living thing which moves by choice, and whose movement is psychic like our movements.

(2)

In their second argument on this question, the philosophers assert :

He who believes that the world is posterior to God, or that God is prior to the world, is bound to adopt one of two explanations : (a) He may mean by it that God is prior in essence, not in time, as one is prior to two. For one is prior to two by nature, although it is possible that both should co-exist in time. Or, God's priority will, on this view, be like the priority of the cause to the effect—e.g., the priority of the movement of a person to the movement of the shadow which follows him, or the priority of the movement of a hand to the movement of the ring on it, or the priority of the movement of a hand in water to the movement of the water. Both the movements in each one of these instances are simultaneous; and yet one is the cause, while the other is the effect. For it is said that the shadow moves because of the movement of the person; and water, because of the movement of the hand in water. And, in spite of the fact that the two movements are simultaneous, no one says that the person moves because of the movement of the shadow; or the hand, because of the

movement of the water. If this is what God's priority to the world means, it will be necessary that both should be either eternal or temporal. It will be impossible for one to be eternal, while the other is temporal.

But, if God's priority means (b) that He is prior to the world and time in time, not in essence, then it follows that, before the existence of the world and time, there was a time when the world did not exist. For in that (pre-existing) time, the world must have been non-existent, as its non-existence preceded its existence. And, therefore, God must have preceded the world during a period which came to an end, but which had never begun. On this view, accordingly, there must be an infinite time before time. But that is self-contradictory. And for this reason it is impossible to believe in the origination of time. Finally, the eternity of time—i.e., the measure of motion—being necessary, it follows that the eternity of motion is also necessary. And hence the eternity of that which is in motion, and the perpetuity of whose motion makes time itself perpetual.

Objection may be taken to the foregoing by saying:

Time did have a beginning; and it was created. And before time, there was no time whatsoever. When we say: "God is prior to the world and time," we mean that He was and the world was not; and that, afterwards, He was and the world was together with Him. And the meaning of our words: " . . . He was, and the world was not . . . ," is limited to the presence of the Creator's being and the absence of the world's being. Similarly, the meaning of our words: " . . . He was, and the world was together with Him," is limited to the presence of two beings. By His priority we mean that His being was the only being (before the existence of the world). The world may be compared to a man. Thus, for instance, if we say: "God was and Jesus was not; and, afterwards, God was and Jesus was together with Him," the statement will signify, first, the presence of one being and the absence of another; and, in the second stage, (it will signify) the presence of two beings. In order to understand this statement, it will not be necessary to suppose any third thing. If the Imagination does not refrain from supposing any third thing, let no heed be paid to the blunders of the

imagination(s).

If it is said:

If we say that God was and the world was not, there will be a third thing implied in the statement, besides the presence of the Divine being and the absence of that of the world. This can be proved as follows: If we suppose the future non-existence of the world, the presence of one being and the absence of another will be established. But in that case it will not be correct to say: "God was, and the world was not." On the contrary, the correct thing to say will be: "God will be, and the world will not be." For "God was, and the world was not" can be said only when it refers to the past. There is a difference between "Was" and "Will be"; and the two words are not interchangeable. So let us see what this difference amounts to. Undoubtedly, the two words do not differ in respect of the presence of the Divine being, and the absence of that of the world. But there is a third sense in respect of which they do differ. For since 'Was' belongs to the past, if we say: "God was, and the world was not" of the future, then it will be pointed out that our words are inaccurate, for 'Was' is said only of the past. This shows that there is a third thing which is expressed by the word 'Was'—namely, the past. And, viewed in itself, the past is time; while, by reference to other things, it is motion, which passes with the passage of time. Therefore, it is evident that before the existence of the world there was time, which passed and finally expired when the existence of the world began.

we will answer:

The original sense of the two words 'Was' and 'Will be' in this case includes only the existence of one being and the non-existence of another. The third thing in respect of which they differ is only a relation, which is, however, necessary from our point of view. This can be proved as follows: If we suppose the future non-existence of the world, and then suppose our own existence as subsequent to it, then we will be able to say: "God was, and the world was not." And it will be right to say so, regardless of the fact whether

we mean thereby the first non-existence (which preceded the existence of the world), or the second one *after* it.

So the relative character of the past and the future is demonstrated by the fact that the future may itself become the past, and may, consequently, be spoken of in terms of the past tense. And all this results from the inability of the Imagination to apprehend the commencement of a being without supposing something before it. This 'before,' which occurs to the Imagination so inevitably, is assumed to be a veritable existent—viz., time. And the inability of the Imagination in this case is like its inability to suppose a finite body, say, at the upper level, without something above its surface. Hence its assumption that beyond the world there is space—i.e., either a plenum or a void. When, therefore, it is said that there is nothing above the surface of the world or beyond its extent, the Imagination cannot accept such a thing—just as it is unable to accept the idea that there is nothing in the nature of a verifiable being before the existence of the world.

Now, it is possible to deny the truth of the Imagination's supposition of (a) void space or (b) infinite extension above the world, by saying that (a) void space is not in itself meaningful, and (b) that extension follows the body whose sides are extended. If the body is finite, extension which follows it must also be finite. And this shows that occupied or empty space (which is not related to bodies) can have no meaning. So it is proved that, notwithstanding the Imagination's inability to accept such an idea, there *is* neither a plenum nor a void beyond the world.

Similarly, it may be said that just as extension in space follows body, so does extension in time follow motion. For *this* is the going-on of motion, just as *that* is the spreading-out of the sides of body. Just as the demonstration of the finitude of the sides of body prevents one from affirming spatial extension beyond it, so should the demonstration of the finitude of motion in either direction prevent one from supposing temporal extension beyond it. And one should be prevented from making this supposition, although the Imagination clings to this fantastic supposition, and is unwilling to give it up.

There is no distinction between temporal extension—which is described, in terms of its relations, as 'before' and

'after'—and spatial extension—which is described, in terms of its relations, as 'above' and 'below.' If it is possible to have an 'above'-less 'above,' it should also be possible to have a 'before'-less 'before.' (No doubt, the pre-existing 'before' may be, as the 'above' unrelated to body is, an imaginary and unreal thing.) This comparison is inevitable, and it should be considered carefully; for the philosophers are all agreed that beyond the world there is neither occupied nor empty space.

If it is said:

This is a devious comparison. For the world has no 'above' or 'below.' It is a round body, and a round body has no 'above' and 'below.' Even so, if you call one direction—e.g., the one corresponding to your head—'above,' and another—e.g., the one corresponding to your foot—'below,' then these will be names applicable to it insofar as it is related to you. The direction which is 'below' in relation to you is 'above' in relation to some other person, whom you might suppose to be standing on the other side of the Globe, so that the sole of his foot is opposite the sole of your foot. The parts of heaven suppposed to be above you in daytime are those very parts which are below the Earth in night. For that which is below the Earth comes above it in the course of spherical revolutions. But the beginning of the world's existence cannot conceivably become its end. Suppose there is a piece of wood one of whose ends is thick, while the other is thin. Let us agree to call the direction of thinness, as far as it may go, the 'above,' and call the other the 'below.' Now, this will not bring about an essential difference among the parts of the world. For the names we have applied will differ in consequence of the difference of the position of that stick. If, for instance, the stick is turned upside down, the names will have to be interchanged—and this will not mean that there has been a change in the world. For 'above' and 'below' are purely relations to you, whereby the parts and planes of the world do not become different.

But the non-existence which preceded the existence of the world, and the original limit of the existence of the world must be essential entities; and it is inconceivable

that one of them should change so as to become the other. Nor can the non-existence supposed to follow the annihilation of the world become the one which preceded the existence of the world. The two limits of the existence of the world—one of them being the First, and the other the Last—are essential and immutable limits. Unlike 'above' and 'below,' these limits cannot be rendered interchangeable by changing relations. Therefore, it is possible for us to say that the world has no 'above' and 'below.' But it is not possible for you to say that the existence of the world has no 'before' and 'after.' And now that 'before' and 'after' have been proved, time has no other meaning than that it is what 'before' and 'after' signify.

we will say:

There is no difference between 'before' and 'after' on the one hand, and 'above' and 'below' on the other. But, since it will serve no purpose to stick to the words 'above' and 'below,' let us use such words as 'beyond' or 'outside' instead. Thus, we will say: The world does have an inside and an outside. Now, is there any occupied or empty space outside the world? Their answer will be: "There is neither an occupied nor an empty space beyond the world. If you mean by the 'outside' (of the world) the uppermost surface of the world itself, the world has an 'outside.' But if you mean anything else, the world has no 'outside.'" Similarly, when we are asked whether the world has a 'before,' we may answer: If that means whether the existence of the world has a beginning—i.e., one of its own limits at which it began—it has a 'before.' And this is analogous to the theory that the world has an 'outside,' if the 'outside' is interpreted to mean an uncovered limit or the boundary of surface. But if you mean by the 'before' something else, then the world has no 'before'—just as it is said not to have an 'outside,' if that means something over and above its own surface. If you say: "The commencement of an existence, which had no 'before', is unintelligible," the rejoinder will be: The existence of a finite body, which has no 'outside,' is unintelligible. If you say: "Its 'outside' is its own surface whereby it is bounded off. It has nothing external to it which could be

called its 'outside,'" we will say: In like manner, its 'before' is the beginning of its existence whereby it is limited (in that direction). It has nothing external to it which could be called its 'before.'

It remains for us to say that God had an existence, while the world was not with Him. This much does not necessitate the affirmation of anything else. What proves that such an affirmation would be an act of the Imagination is that it is related to space and time in particular. (Although our opponent believes in the eternity of body, yet his Imagination is sometimes agreeable to the supposition of its temporal origin. And although we believe in the temporal origin of body, yet our Imagination is sometimes agreeable to the supposition of its eternity. But this is so only in the case of body.) When we resume the discussion of time, the opponent is unable to suppose the beginning of time which had no 'before.' The contrary of what is believed can be posited in the Imagination, as a hypothesis or a supposition; but this, like space, is something which cannot be posited (even) in the Imagination. Both he who does and he who does not believe in the finitude of body are unable to suppose a body beyond which there is neither a plenum nor a void. Indeed, the Imagination cannot accept such an idea. But it is said: "The clear evidence of reason does not disallow demonstratively the existence of finite body. Let no heed be paid to the Imagination." Similarly, therefore, (it may be said that) the clear evidence of reason does not disallow an existence which opened up, and yet had nothing before it. If the Imagination is unable to suppose such an existence, let no heed be paid to the Imagination. For, in the case of space, the Imagination—having found no finite body which did not have by its side some other body or air (which was imagined to be void space)—assumed that the same thing would be true of non-empirical reality. Similarly, in the case of time, when it found that every event followed another event, it refused to accept an Event which had no 'before'—viz., an existing thing which might have run its course before that Event.

This, then, is the cause of error. And the comparison we have drawn here has enabled us to refute the philosophers.

The philosophers restate their argument for the necessity of time's eternity in another form. They say:

There is no doubt that, from your point of view, God had the power to create the world in a year, or a hundred years, or a thousand years before He did. Now, these hypothetical measures differ in quantity. Therefore, it is necessary for you to affirm something—before the existence of the world—which had a quantitative or measurable nature, and some parts of which would be greater in quantity or size than others.

If you say that the word 'years' could be applied only when the sphere and its revolutions had come into being, then we will give up the word, and restate the argument in a different form. Thus, we will say: Supposing that since the beginning of the world till now its sphere has made one thousand revolutions, did God have the power to create before this world another world which would have made eleven hundred revolutions by this time? If you say No, then it would mean a change of the Eternal from inability to power, or a change of the world from impossibility to possibility. But if you say Yes (which is an unavoidable answer in this case), the next question will be: Did He have the power to create a third world which would have made twelve hundred revolutions by this time? Again, the answer must be Yes. Now, let us ask: Could what we call the third world (we call it so because that is its position in our hypothesis, although it is the earliest one) be created together with what we call the second world? And would it still be possible for the two worlds to have made twelve hundred and eleven hundred revolutions respectively (they are supposed to have started at the same time, and to have moved at an equal speed)? If the answer is Yes, it will be an absurdity; for it is impossible for two movements, which have an equal speed and terminate at the same time, to differ in number. But if you say:

> "The third world, which has made twelve hundred revolutions, could not have been created together with the second one which has made eleven hundred revolutions. Nay, it is necessary that the creation of the former should precede that of the latter by just as much as the creation of the latter itself will precede that of the first world. (The first world is called so, because it is the nearest to our imagination, as in our supposition we ascend from our own time upwards),"

then the quantity of one possibility will be double that of another. And there must be yet another possibility which is double the whole. And this quantitatively determined or measurable possibility, some parts of which are longer than others to an ascertainable extent, can in reality be nothing other than time. For these hypothetical quantities cannot form an attribute of the Divine essence, which stands above all quantitative determinations. Nor can they be an attribute of the non-existence of the world. For non-existence is Nothing; hence the possibility of any quantitative determination of it. But quantity *is* an attribute, which presupposes something of which it is the quantity. This 'something' is motion. And the 'quantity' is time, which is the measure of motion. Therefore, on your view, there must have been before the existence of the world something whose quantities should vary—that is, there must have been time. So you must believe that there was time before the existence of the world.

The Objection:

All this is the work of the Imagination. The aptest way of counteracting it is to compare time and space. So, we will say: Did God have the power to create the highest sphere as larger by a cubit than the size He has actually created? If they say No, that will show God's inability. But if they say Yes, then two cubits will be equally admissible, then three, and an infinite regress will follow. And in this, we will say, there is the affirmation of extension beyond the world which has a quantity, and which can be measured. For that which is occupied by the larger-by-two-cubits is not the same thing as that which is occupied by the larger-by-one. Accordingly, there must be Quantity beyond the world. And quantity presupposes something of which it is the quantity—viz., body or empty space. Therefore, there must be occupied or empty space

beyond the world. What is the answer to this?

Similarly, did God have the power to create the round body of the world as smaller by a cubit, or two, than the size He has created? Would there not be a difference between the two suppositions (of size)—a difference caused by the elimination of plenitude or place-occupation? For the occupied space which disappears through the loss of two cubits is greater than that which disappears through the loss of only one. Therefore, void space will have to be regarded as something measurable. But void space is Nothing; how can it be measured?

So our answer to the fantastic supposition by the Imagination of temporal possibilities before the existence of the world is the same as your answer to its fantastic supposition of spatial possibilities beyond the world. There is no difference.

If it is said:

We do not believe that anyone has the power to do that which is impossible. The world's being smaller or larger than it is is impossible. Therefore, it is beyond anyone's power.

This plea will be invalid for three reasons:

Firstly, it is repugnant to reason. For reason shows that the supposition of the world's being larger or smaller by a cubit than it is is not like the supposition of black and white, or existence and non-existence, coming together. It is only the affirmation and denial of the same thing at the same time which is impossible, and to which all impossible things can be reduced. The assertion of the impossibility of a larger or smaller size is an arbitrary, unconvincing and false assertion.

Secondly, if the world could not have been smaller or larger than it is, then its present size should be called a necessary, rather than possible, thing. And a possible thing needs no cause. Therefore, you must say what the Materialists say—viz., rejecting the idea of the Creator, or the Cause of causes; although, actually that is not your belief.

Thirdly, this false assertion cannot even prevent your

opponents from confronting it with something similar to it. For instance, we can say: Before the world came into being, its existence was not possible. On the contrary, existence is commensurate with possibility: being neither more, nor less, than it. If you say: "This means that the Eternal has changed from inability to power," we will say: No, since existence was not possible, it was beyond power. The impossibility of realising what is not possible does not show inability. If yau say: "How is it that the existence of the world, which was impossible, became possible?" we will answer: Why should it be impossible that something impossible in one state be possible in another? If you say: "The states are similar," we will answer: Similarly, the quantities are equal. Why, then, should one quantity be possible, and another smaller or larger than it by as much as a nail impossible? If *that* is not impossible, *this* cannot be impossible either. So this is the way to meet their arguments.

Our answers have brought out the truth that the possibilities supposed by the philosophers are meaningless. What must be taken for granted is that God is eternal and omnipotent, and that if He wills, no action is impossible for Him. And this much does not necessitate the affirmation of an extended time—unless the Imagination in its artful way should add something (to the meaning of 'action').

(3)

Their third argument for the eternity of the world

Seizing (upon the word 'possibility'), they say: The existence of the world must have been possible, before the world had come into being. For it is impossible that, having been impossible, it should have become possible. And this possibility had no beginning—that is, it never lacked being. And the existence of the world never ceased to be possible; for there was no state when it could be described as impossible. Since the possibility never ceased to be, therefore, commensurately with it, that which is possible never ceased to be. For the meaning of our words: "Its existence is possible," is that its existence is not impossible. If existence was always possible, it must always have

been not-impossible. If it had always been impossible, it would be false for us to say that it was always possible. And if it were false to say that it was always possible, it would be false to say that the possibility never ceased to be. And if it were false to say that the possibility never ceased to be, it would be true to say that the possibility had a beginning. And if it were true to say that it had a beginning, it must have been impossible before that (beginning). And this would lead to the affirmation of a state when the world was not possible, and God had no power over it.

The Objection:

The origination of the world never ceased to be possible. Undoubtedly, its origination could conceivably take place at any moment of time. If it is supposed to have existed for ever, it will not be an originated thing. Accordingly, the actuality will not be commensurate with the possibility, but incongruent with it.

And this is like their saying (in the case of space):

> "The supposition of the world as larger than it is, or the supposition of the creation of Body above the world (and the creation of a second body above the first one, and so on *ad infinitum*) is possible; for the possibility of making additions is unlimited. In spite of this, however, an absolute and infinite void space is impossible."

Similarly, an existence whose limits are not determined is impossible. Nay, as it is said:

> "Body with finite surface is possible. But its quantities—i.e., the possibilities with respect to bigness or smallness—cannot be specified,"

similarly, therefore, the origination of the world is possible. But the possibilities of the commencement of its existence being early or late cannot be specified. It is only its being an originated thing which is specified; and only that specific character is, therefore, called a possible thing.

(4)

Their fourth argument:

In this argument, they say: Every originated thing is preceded by the Matter in which it is. No originated thing is independent of Matter; and Matter itself is not originated. It is only the Forms, Accidents and Qualities passing over Matter which are originated. This can be explained as follows:

Before its origination, every originated thing must have been either possible, or impossible, or necessary. Now, it is impossible that it should have been impossible; for that which is impossible in itself is never brought into being. Again, it is impossible for it to have been necessary in itself: for that which is necessary in itself is never deprived of existence. It follows that it must have been possible in itself. Therefore, the possibility of its existence was there before it existed. But the possibility of existence is a relative attribute which cannot exist in itself. There must be a substratum to which it could be related. But there is nothing but Matter to serve as a substratum. So it was related to Matter. This is like the relation we mean when we say that Matter receives heat and coldness, or blackness and whiteness, or motion and rest—that is, it is possible *for Matter* that these qualities should originate (in it), or that such changes should occur (to it). Similarly, therefore, possibility will be an attribute of Matter. And for Matter itself there is no (other) Matter. Hence the fact that it is not originated. If it had been originated, the possibility of its existence would have preceded its existence. And in that case, possibility would exist in itself, unrelated to any (substratum). But possibility being a relative attribute, its existing in itself is unintelligible.

It is not possible to say that possibility means the possible thing's being feasible, and the Eternal's having power over it. For we know that something is feasible only when it is possible. We say that someone has power over it, because it is possible; or that no one has power over it, because it is not possible. If by calling something possible we were to refer to its feasibility, then it would amount to saying: "Someone has power over it, because he has power

over it," or: "It is beyond power, because it is beyond power." And that would be the definition of a thing by referring to that very thing. It is now clear that the judgment about the possibility of something is a distinct intellectual judgment, whereby is known another judgment —viz., the one about its being an object of power.

Again, it is impossible to explain possibility in terms of the Eternal's knowledge of the nature of the possible thing. For knowledge requires the known thing. Therefore, knowledge of possibility and possibility itself which is the object of this knowledge must be different things. Moreover, even when identified with knowledge, possibility will remain a relative attribute which *must* be related to an essence. But there is nothing but Matter which could serve as such an essence; for Matter precedes every originated thing, and primary Matter itself is unoriginated.

To this, objection may be taken as follows:

The possibility they have mentioned *is* derived from an intellectual judgment. True, when the Intellect can suppose the existence of something—the supposition not being inadmissible to reason—we call that thing possible. Or, if the supposition is inadmissible, we call the thing impossible. Or, if the Intellect cannot suppose the non-existence of something, we call that thing necessary. But these intellectual judgments do not need an existent to which to be related as attributes. There are three reasons for this contention.

Firstly, if possibility required an existing thing to which it might be related, and whose possibility it might be said to be, then impossibility would likewise require an existing thing whose impossibility it might be said to be. But, as a matter of fact, the impossible in itself does not exist. Nor is there any Matter to which impossibility occurs and to which it is related as an attribute.

Secondly, in the case of blackness and whiteness, the intellectual judgment of possibility is made before their existence. If this possibility were to be related to a body to which they occur (so that one might say: What the possibility of blackness or whiteness means is that it is possible *for this body* to become white or black), then

neither white nor black would in itself be possible, and the predicate of possibility would not be applicable to either of the two, for the possible thing would be the body to which blackness or whiteness was to be related. Now, we must ask: What about blackness or whiteness in itself? Is it possible, or necessary, or impossible? The only answer to this question is that it is possible. From this it follows that an intellectual judgment of possibility does not require the assumption of an existing essence to which possibility should be related.

Thirdly, they think that the souls of men are self-subsisting substances which are not body, or Matter, or impressed upon Matter. And, according to Ibn Sīna and some other great thinkers, these souls are originated, and are possible before they have been originated. But before the existence of these souls, there is no essence or Matter. And yet their possibility is a relative attribute. Now, if this attribute cannot be explained in terms of the power of a powerful being or agent, how then can it be explained at all? So this difficulty will arise from their own theories.

If it is said:

It is not possible to reduce possibility to an intellectual judgment. For intellectual judgment means nothing (in this case) but the knowledge of possibility. Now, possibility, *qua* an object of knowledge, cannot be identical with knowledge. For knowledge only encompasses its object, follows it, and is related to it—whatever the object may be. When the non-existence of knowledge is supposed, the object of knowledge does not disappear; but with the annihilation of the object of knowledge, knowledge will be annihilated. For knowledge and its object are *two* things; one of which is the follower, and the other is that which is followed. So, even if we suppose that all intelligent men have failed to suppose the possibility, or that they are unaware of it, still we will say that the possibility—nay, even the possible things themselves – will remain undisturbed. The intellects may be unaware of the possible things. But, obviously, the possible things remain, regardless of the fact whether any intellect is aware or unaware of them. Nay, they will remain, even if all the intellects and all the intellectual

persons pass away.

As regards the three points you have made, they are not cogent. For:

(Firstly,) impossibility *is* a relative attribute which does not require an existent to which it could be related. By the impossible is meant the combination of two contraries. If a place is white, it will be impossible for it to be black and white together. So even in this case, there must be a designated subject. To this subject an attribute is attributed; and as long as the connection lasts, it is said that the contrary (of *this* attribute) is impossible *for* the subject. In this way, impossibility becomes a relative attribute existing in, and related to, a subject. As regards necessity, it is no hidden fact that it is related to the necessary being.

The second point—namely, that blackness in itself is possible—is wrong. For if blackness is taken in abstraction of the substratum in which it resides, then it will be impossible, not possible. It becomes possible only when it is supposed to be a quality *in* a body. A body is prepared for the successive occurrence of qualities; and successive occurrence of qualities is possible to bodies alone. Otherwise, blackness has no individual self to which possibility could be attributed.

Now to take the third point—i.e., the soul. There is a class of philosophers who believe that the soul is eternal, and that the connection between the soul and bodies is possible *for* the soul. To this class, your objection does not apply.

As regards those who believe in the temporal origin of the soul, some of them believe that the soul is impressed upon Matter, and follows (this) composition. (This seems to have been Galen's view in some of his works.) Therefore, on this view, the soul will be *in* Matter, and possibility of each soul will be related to its Matter.

As regards those philosophers who believe in the temporal origin of the soul, and who do not consider it to have been impressed upon Matter, the possibility of the soul would mean to them that it is possible *for* Matter that the rational soul should direct it. Thus the possibility of the soul, which preceded its origination, will be related to Matter. For, although the soul is not impressed upon

Matter, yet there is a connection between the two—viz., a connection arising from the fact that the soul is the director or the employer of Matter. In this way, therefore, possibility will ultimately be related to Matter.

The Answer:

It is right to reduce possibility, impossibility and necessity to intellectual judgments. As regards the contention that intellectual judgment means knowledge which requires a known thing, we will say: The intellectual judgment of possibility has a known thing—in the sense in which colouredness or animality or any other universal judgment is, according to the philosophers themselves, an established fact for reason. No one can say that known things do not correspond to these kinds of knowledge. But such 'things' do not exist among real objects. This is why the philosophers themselves have explicitly stated that the universals exist in minds, not in real objects. It is only the objective particulars which exist in the real things. These particulars are the data of the senses, not of the Intellect; but they are the cause of the Intellect's drawing from them a rational judgment by making abstraction of Matter. Hence colouredness is a distinct intellectual judgment independent of the judgments of blackness and whiteness. In Being, a colour which is neither black nor white, etc., is inconceivable. But the unqualified Form of Colouredness is an established fact for reason. So it is said that this Form is a Form which exists in minds, not in real objects. If this is not an untenable position, the position we have taken cannot be untenable either.

In reply to their assertion that the supposition of the non-existence or unawareness of intellectual persons will not annihilate possibility, we will say: Will such a supposition annihilate the universal judgments, viz., the Genera and Species? If they say Yes (which is the only answer; for indeed the Genera and Species mean intellectual judgments only), the same will be our answer with respect to possibility. There is no difference between the two kinds of judgment. If they claim that the Genera and Species will continue to exist in the Divine knowledge, again the same thing will be true of possibility. Thus our objection comes to

tell. And it was our purpose to expose the incoherence of their thought.

As regards their plea that impossibility is related to Matter—to which something has been attributed, and for which the contrary of that thing is, therefore, impossible—it must be pointed out that all impossible things are not of this kind. For instance, the existence of a partner of God is impossible. But in this case there is no Matter to which the impossibility could be related. If they assert that the meaning of the impossibility of a partner of God is that God's singular being or His unity is necessary, and that singularity is related to Him, we will say: No, the world exists with Him; His being is, therefore, not singular. If they assert that His singularity—insofar as it precludes a rival—is necessary, and that, impossibility being the term contradictory to necessity, impossibility is related to Him, we will say: We mean that God's singularity—insofar as it precludes a rival—is not a singularity which precludes the co-existence of the contingent creatures with Him. For in the former sense, His singularity is necessary; in the latter, it is not. Now, we will make use of this distinction to concoct a relation between Him and the possibility (which the philosophers would have us relate to a substratum), even as they have concocted a relation between Him and impossibility—by shifting the discussion from impossibility to necessity, and then relating singularity to Him through (His) attribute of necessity.

As regards the plea that blackness or whiteness has no self or individual essence, it is true if it means that this is so in Being. But it is not true if it means that this is so for the Intellect as well. For the Intellect does apprehend universal blackness, judging that it is possible in itself.

Finally, the plea concerning the originated souls is invalid. For they have individual essences as well as a possibility which precedes their origination. And there is nothing to which this possibility can be related. The philosophers' statement that it is possible for Matter that the soul should direct it gives only a remote relation. If such a thing can satisfy you, then it would not be improbable if one said: The meaning of the possibility of the existence of an originated thing is that it was possible for a powerful agent to originate it. In this way, possibility will be related to an

agent, although it is not impressed upon him—even as you related it to a passive body upon which it had not been impressed. To relate it to an agent is not different from relating it to a patient: for in neither case does 'impression' take place.

If it is said:

In all your objections you have tried to meet difficulties by raising other difficulties. You have not tried to solve the difficulties which had been raised by the philosophers.

we will answer:

After all, this method has exposed the invalidity of the philosophers' theories. Nor do the causes of the difficulties remain unravelled during the process of questioning (their principles) and reducing (them) to absurdity. However, in this book we have undertaken only an attack on their doctrines, and a refutation of their arguments. It is not our business to support a particular point of view. That is why we would not go beyond the purpose of this book. Nor would we try to find out arguments which might prove the temporal origin of the world; for the only thing we intended to do was to refute the philosophers' claim that its eternity is definitely known.

But, in order to affirm the true doctrine, we will—if Divine help enables us to do so—write a separate book, after having concluded this one. We will call that book "The Principles of Beliefs," and will be concerned therein with Affirmation, as in the present one we are concerned with Destruction. And God knows the best.

PROBLEM II

REFUTATION OF THEIR BELIEF IN THE EVERLASTING NATURE OF THE WORLD, TIME AND MOTION

LET it be known that this problem is a corollary of the preceding one. For as the philosophers consider the world to be eternal—i.e., without a beginning in time—so do they consider it to be everlasting—i.e., never coming to an end. (They say that) its corruption or annihilation is impossible; and that it always was, and ever will be, as it is.

The four arguments they advanced to prove the eternity of the world apply to its everlasing nature as well. And the same objections will be taken to them as have been taken before.

They say that the world, as an effect whose Cause is eternal and everlasting, must be together with the Cause; and that since the Cause is unchangeable, the effect cannot change either. This is the basis for their denial of a beginning (of the world); and this very argument is applicable to the end (of the world). This is the first line of thought they take in this problem.

In the second place, they say that if the world passes away, its non-being will be *after* its being. Thus it will have an 'after'; wherein lies the affirmation of time.

In the third place, they say that the possibility of existence never ceases. Therefore, it is proper that the possible being should be (unceasing) in agreement with the possibility. [But this argument is not cogent. For we consider the eternity of the world to be impossible; but not its everlasting nature—if God (exalted be He) grants it an everlasing existence. It is not necessary for something which has a beginning in time to have an end; while it is necessary for an action to be originated and have a beginning in time. No one, except Abu Hudhayl al-'Allāf, has laid it down as a necessary condition that the world should come to an end. Said he: As an infinite number of spherical revolutions in the past is impossible, so is it in future. But this is wrong; for the whole of the future does not enter

into existence, either concurrently or successively; while the past has entered into existence successively, although not by concurrence. Since now it is clear that we do not find from the rational point of view any impossibility in the supposition of the everlasting existence of the world, and that, on the contrary, we consider its perpetuation as possible as its annihilation, the knowledge as to which one of the two possibilities will actually happen is to be derived from the Sacred Law, for it has nothing to do with theoretical investigation.]

Their fourth argument is allied to the third one which we considered above. For they say: When the world passes away, the possibility of the existence must still remain, for that which is possible can never become impossible. But possibility is a relative attribute. And (they claim) everything which is in time needs a preceding Matter; hence everything which passes away must also need a Matter out of which to pass away. This shows that the Matters and the Roots do not perish; it is only the Forms and the Accidents subsisting in them which perish.

The reply to all this has been stated earlier. However, we put this problem in a separate place, because they have two new arguments.

(1)

The first argument is the one adopted by Galen. Said he: If the Sun were liable to annihilation, signs of decay in it would be visible in course of time. But the astronomical observation of its size has for thousands of years revealed the same quantity. If, therefore, it has not decayed through these long ages, it follows that it is incorruptible.

Objection to this argument from several points:

The syllogistic form of this argument would be:

(i) If the Sun were corruptible, decay should befall it.
(ii) But the consequent is impossible.
(iii) Therefore, the antecedent is impossible.

This is what they call a hypothetical conjunctive syllogism.

Here the conclusion does not follow; for the antecedent is not true—unless a new condition were added to it, viz., the assertion that if the Sun were corruptible, decay would be inevitable. So this consequent does not follow from this antecedent, without the addition of a condition, such as the assertion that if the Sun were liable to corruption-bv-decay, then decay would be inevitable, or it must be shown that decay is the only way in which corruption takes place. For only then would the consequent necessarily follow from the antecedent. And we do not admit that decay is the only way in which things are corrupted. On the other hand, decay is one of the ways in which corruption takes place. And it is not improbable that even in the state of perfection something should be overtaken by corruption all of a sudden.

Secondly, even if it is granted that there is no corruption without decay, how did Galen know that decay has not befallen the Sun? His reference to astronomical observation is absurd. For quantities discovered by astronomical observation are only approximate. If the Sun, which is said to be one hundred and seventy times as big as the Earth, or any other thing of the same size as the Sun loses as much as a range of hills, the loss cannot be apparent to the senses. So it may be assumed that the Sun is in decay, and that so far it has lost as much as a range of hills, or a little more; and that the human senses cannot perceive this loss, for in sciences which depend on observation quantities are known only approximately. This may be illustrated. The philosophers tell us that gold and sapphire are composed of elements and are, therefore, liable to corruption. But if a sapphire is kept for a hundred years, the senses will not be able to perceive the diminution it has suffered. Therefore, the loss suffered by the Sun during the entire history of as. onomical observation may be compared to that suffered by a sapphire in a century. In neither case is the loss or decay apparent to the senses. Hence the utter unsoundness of Galen's argument.

We have ignored many other arguments of this kind; for intelligent people laugh at such things. This one was mentioned here only to serve as an example of what we have passed over. And this is the reason why we proposed to confine our attention to the four arguments which, as already has been seen, require some ingenuity in order that we may

solve the doubts raised by them.

(2)

In their second argument for the impossibility of the annihilation of the world, the philosophers say:

The substances in the world are imperishable. For no cause of their annihilation will be intelligible. If that which has not been non-existent becomes so there must be a cause of this change. Such a cause

will either be the will of the Eternal. But this is impossible. For if not having been the Willer of the non-existence of the world, He becomes one, He undergoes a change. Or it will lead to the conclusion that the Eternal and His will continue uniform in all states, but the object of the will nevertheless changes—first from non-existence to existence, and then from existence to non-existence.

Thus, the argument we had advanced to prove the impossibility of the origination of something in time because of the eternal will also proves the impossibility of its passing into non-existence.

Besides, there is another difficulty which is even more formidable. Namely, the object of the will is obviously the action of the willer. Now, even if he who was not an agent, but became one later, does not change in himself, yet it is necessary that his action should become an existent after not having been one. For if the agent remains as he was at the time when he had not effected an action—viz., even if at present he has no action—then he will have done nothing. And non-existence is Nothing. How, then, can it be an action? Suppose He annihilates the world, whereby an action which had not been done before emerges. What can this action be? Is it the existence of the world? Impossible, for existence has come to an end. Is it the non-existence of the world? No, for non-existence is Nothing; hence it cannot be an action. To be an existent is the least degree of an action. But the non-existence of the world is no existent; hence it cannot be said to be effected by an agent, or produced by a producer.

This difficulty (claim the philosophers) has divided the *Mutakallimun* into four groups, each attempting the impossible by trying to solve it:

(a) The Mu'tazilah say: The action which proceeds from Him *is* an existent—viz., Annihilation, which is created by Him not in a substratum. So the whole world will perish all of a sudden. And the created Annihilation itself will perish, so that there will be no need for another Annihilation, which would start an infinite regress.

But this is false for several reasons. Firstly, Annihilation is no intelligible existent whose creation could be supposed. Secondly, if it were an existent, it would not perish by itself, without any cause of annihilation. Thirdly, even on this assumption the world does not perish. For if Annihilation is supposed to be created within the world itself, the whole supposition will be absurd. For the substratum and that which subsists in it come into contact. and, therefore, coexist—though only for an instant. If, therefore, the world and Annihilation could be supposed to coexist, they would not be mutually exclusive: and then the world would not be annihilated. But if Annihilation is created neither within the world nor in any other substratum, how then can the existence of the one exclude that of the other?

Further, this view is obnoxious for another reason. It implies that God has not the power to annihilate *some* of the substances of the world, and allow others to survive. Nay, it is implied here that He has not the power to do any thing, except to create Annihilation which is to annihilate the whole world at once—for not being in a particular substratum, it is brought to bear upon the whole simultaneously and indiscriminately.

(b) The Karrāmīyah say: Destruction is an action of God, which (action) signifies an existent originated within the Divine essence (may He be exalted above what is said of Him). Thus, the world becomes non-existent through this action. Similarly, existence is the result of an act of production which occurs in His assence, and because of which the existent becomes an existent.

This is also false. In the first place, it makes the Eternal subject to temporal phenomena. Further, it goes outside the scope of intelligible reality, for by production is understood a being which can be ascribed to will and

power. To affirm any thing else besides will, power and the being to which power extends—viz., the world—is unintelligible. The same is true of destruction.

(c) The Ash'arīyah say: The Accidents perish by themselves, and their immortality is inconceivable. For if it were conceivable, their annihilation would be inconceivable in that sense. As regards the Substances, they are not immortal in themselves, but because of an immortality which is additional to their being. So when God does not create immortality for them, the Substances will perish because of the absence of that which would make them immortal.

This is also false: because it comes into conflict with the sensible facts, inasmuch as it implies that blackness or whiteness does not survive and continue, but has its being renewed ever and anon. The Intellect rejects this assertion, as it would reject the assertion that body has its being renewed ever and anon. For the Intellect, which judges that the hair on the head of a man today is the same hair as, and not merely similar to, the hair which was there yesterday, makes the same judgment in regard to the blackness of the hair.

There is yet another difficulty in this theory. For if that which survives does so because of a (derived) immortality, it follows that the Divine attributes should likewise continue because of a (derived) immortality: that this immortality should need another immortality to immortalise it, and that, therefore, an infinite regress should follow.

(d) Another section of the Ash'arīyah say: The Accidents perish themselves: but the Substances perish when God would not create in them motion or rest, etc. When it has nothing of the sort, it perishes.

It appears that both the groups among the Ash'arīyah incline towards the view that destruction is not an action, but a refraining from action: for they do not find it intelligible to regard non-existence as an action.

Since all these methods of explaining the destruction of the world have been found to be invalid, there is no ground left for anyone to believe in the possibility of the destruction of the world.

This criticism applies when the world is admitted to have originated in time. For, although they admit the temporal

origin of the human souls, still they assert the impossibility of their destruction, basing the argument on the same principles as we have related above. In short, the position taken by them is: The annihilation of anything—whether eternal or originated in time—which exists in itself, not in a substratum, is impossible. If one says to them: "When fire burns under water, water is destroyed," they will answer: It is not destroyed. It only changes into steam. Later on, steam will change into water once again. Matter, i.e., the *Hayuli*, persists in Air. It is the same Matter as was there beneath the Form of water. Now the *Hayuli* has put on the Form of Air, having divested itself of the Form of water. When the air is cooled, it will condense, and water will reappear. Matter does not emerge anew (during these changes). On the contrary, the Matters are common to all the Elements. It is only the Forms passing over them in succession which change.

The answer:

We might possibly defend all the classes of the *Mutakallimun* mentioned by you, and demonstrate that inasmuch as your fundamental postulates include much like what is to be found there, it is unjust on your part to criticise them. But we prefer brevity, and will confine our attention to only one of these classes. Thus, we will say: How can you disprove one who says that production and destruction are the effects of the will of the Omnipotent? So when God wills, He produces: and when He wills, He destroys. And this is what His being the Omnipotent *par excellence* means. And in the course of all these activities He Himself never changes: it is only the action which changes. As regards your objection: "It is necessary that an action should proceed from an agent. What proceeds from God?" we will reply that that which proceeds from Him is what has newly emerged, viz., non-existence. For there was no non-existence before the action. Since it newly emerges, it is that which proceeds from Him.

If you say:

Non-existence is nothing. How can it proceed ?

we will answer:

Being nothing, how did it happen at all? Its proceeding from God only means that that which happens is to be related to His power. If its happening is intelligible, why should its relation to power not be intelligible? And what is the difference between them and one who absolutely denies the occurrence of non-existence to Accidents and Forms, saying that since non-existence is nothing, it cannot occur, and occurrence and emergence cannot be predicated of it? For our part, we never doubt that the occurrence of non-existence to Accidents is conceivable. Therefore, that of which the occurrence can be predicated can also intelligibly happen, regardless of whether it is called a thing, or not. And, finally, the relation of this intelligible occurrent to the power of the Omnipotent is also intelligible.

If it is said:

This objection may be taken to the position of a man who thinks that the non-existence of a thing *after* its existence is possible. Such an one might be called upon to explain what it is that occurs. But in our view it is impossible that any existent should cease to exist. To us, the non-existence of Accidents means the occurrence of their contraries, which are themselves existents. It does not mean the occurrence of abstract non-existence which is Nothing. How can occurrence be predicated of that which is nothing? If the hair whitens, it is whiteness which occurs. And that is all. And whiteness is an existent. We would not say that that which has occurred is the non-existence of blackness.

This is false for two reasons:

Firstly, does the occurrence of whiteness include the non-existence of blackness, or not? If they say No, they will be opposed to intelligible reality. If they say Yes, is that which includes other than that which is included, or identical with it? If they say that it is identical, it will be a self-contradiction: for nothing includes itself. But if they say that it is other, then is this 'other' intelligible,

or not? If they say No, we will answer: How, then, do you know that it is included? The judgment about its being included is an admission of its being intelligible. But if they say Yes, then is this intelligible included one—namely, the non-existence of blackness—eternal, or originated in time? If they call it eternal, it will be absurd. But if they call it originated, how can that of which a temporal origin is affirmed not be intelligible? If they say that it is neither eternal nor originated in time, it will be absurd. For if before the occurrence of whiteness it were to be said that blackness is non-existent, it would be false. If after the occurrence of whiteness it is said to be non-existent, it is true. So, obviously, it has occurred. And this occurrent is intelligible. Therefore, it is reasonable to ascribe it to the power of the Omnipotent.

Secondly, there are some accidents which, even according to them, perish *not*-by-their-contraries. Thus, motion has no contrary. The antithesis between motion and rest is the antithesis between possession, and non-possession, i.e., being and non-being. Rest means the non-existence of motion. So when motion is non-existent, it is not a contrary, viz., rest, which has occurred, but pure non-existence. The same is true of attributes which are to be classed as perfection, e.g., the impression of the image of sensible objects on the vitreous humour of the eye: or the impression of the Form of the intelligibles on the soul. All these represent the commencement of a being, without the disappearance of a contrary. And their becoming non-existent means the loss of a being to which no contrary succeeds. So their disappearance does mean pure non-existence. Hence non-existence comes to occur. And the happening of this occurrent non-existence is intelligible. And that of which the occurrence is in itself intelligible can intelligibly be related to the power of the Omnipotent, even if it were not a 'thing.'

From this it is clear that if the happening of any thing because of the eternal will is conceivable, it makes no difference whether that which happens is existence or non-existence.

PROBLEM III

OF THEIR DISHONESTY IN SAYING THAT GOD IS THE AGENT AND THE MAKER OF THE WORLD WHICH IS HIS ACTION OR PRODUCT: AND THE EXPLANATION OF THE FACT THAT THESE WORDS HAVE ONLY A METAPHORICAL, NOT REAL, SIGNIFICANCE TO THEM

BARRING the Atheists, all the philosophers are agreed that the world has a maker: that God is the Maker or the Agent of the world, and that the world is His action or product. But this is a dishonest distortion of their principles. There are three reasons why, according to their principles, the world's being the action or the product of God is inconceivable. One of these reasons is to be found in the nature of the agent: another in the nature of the action, and the third one in the relationship between the action and the agent.

The reason to be found in the nature of the agent is that it is necessary for an agent to have the will for the action: to have free choice, and to know what he wills. But, according to the philosophers, God has no will. Nay, He has no attribute at all. Whatever proceeds from Him is a necessary consequence.

Secondly, the reason found in the nature of the action is that an action must have a beginning in time. But the philosophers consider the world to be eternal.

Thirdly, the reason found in the relationship between the action and the agent is that, according to them, God is one in all respects, and only one proceeds from one. But the world is composed of different things. How can it proceed from Him?

Let us investigate each one of these three reasons, and see how fallacious their reasoning is, when they endeavour to defend their position.

(1)

We say :

An agent is he from whom an action proceeds because of the will for action: by way of free choice, and alongside of the knowledge of what is willed. But in your view the world bears the same relation to God as an effect to its cause. So it follows from Him by way of necessary causation. And, therefore, it is not conceivable that God should have been able to avoid His action, even as the shadow is unavoidable to a person, or light to the Sun. Now, this has nothing to do with an action. He who says that the lamp 'does' the light, or that a person 'does' the shadow, will be extending the sense of the word beyond its definition. He will be borrowing a word used in a different context, having been too easily contended with the relation between the two things in respect of only one attribute—namely, that an agent is on the whole a cause, and the lamp is the cause of illumination, and the Sun is the cause of light. But the agent is not called the agent merely because of his being a cause, but because he is a cause in a special manner, viz., in the manner of will and free choice. Thus, it is that when one says that the wall is no agent: the stone is no agent: the inorganic Matter is no agent for an action exclusively belongs to an animal, then this statement will not be disputed, and his words will not be untrue. But in their view, the stone does have an action—namely, the inclination, or the gravitation, or the tending towards the Centre—and so does fire have an action—viz., production of heat. And they believe that that which proceeds from God is like all these things. But this is absurd.

If it is said :

We call every existent which is not a necessary being in itself, but owes its existence to another, an agendum: and call its cause the agent. We do not care whether the cause is an agent by nature, or by will—just as you would not care whether an agent is an agent by an instrument, or without an instrument. An action is a genus divisible into those actions which occur with the help of an instrument, and those without the help of an instrument. Similarly, it

is a genus divisible into those actions which occur by nature, and those which occur by free choice. The argument to prove our contention is this: When we say 'action by nature,' the words 'by nature' are not contradictory to, or imcompatible with, the word 'action.' On the contrary, they just describe a species of action: as our words 'action without an instrument' will not be contradictory to, or incompatible with, each other, but will be only a description or a specification. Again, when we say 'action by free choice,' it is not a tautology, as the words 'animal man' would be: on the contrary, it is only the description of a species of action, like the words: 'action by instrument.' If the word 'action' were to include will, and if will were essential to action, *qua* action, then the words 'action by nature' would be contradictory, even as the words 'action' and 'non-action' are.

we will answer :

This terminology is false. It is not proper to call every cause an agent, and every effect an agendum. If it were proper to do so, it would not be right to say that the inorganic Matter has no action, and that an action belongs to an animal alone. But this proposition is one of the most widely accepted and, therefore, true dicta. If sometimes, inorganic Matter is called an agent, it is purely metaphorical. For instance, inorganic Matter is called an aspirant, or willer, e.g., a stone is said to incline, because it desires or seeks the Centre. But will or seeking is something which is inconceivable, if not accompanied by the knowledge of the object willed or sought. And, therefore, it cannot conceivably be applied in case of any thing other than an animal.

Your assertion that action is a general thing which can be divided into actions by nature and actions by will is inadmissible. It is like one's saying that will is a general thing which can be divided into cases in which will is accompanied by the knowledge of the object willed and those in which it is not. That is false, for will must needs include the knowledge of the object willed. Similarly, action must needs include will. As regards your statement that the words 'action by nature' are not contradictory to the first term; i.e., 'action,' this is not so. They *are* contradictory, as far as reality is concerned. But the contradiction does

not strike the understanding : nor is the heart's aversion to it very great, for after all in a metaphorical sense it remains true. This is so, because a cause, whatever its nature may be, is at least metaphorically called an agent, for an agent is also a cause. And the words 'action by free choice' are certainly redundant, like saying: 'He willed, and had the knowledge of what he willed.' But because it is not unusual to speak of an action which is only metaphorical, and another which is real, the mind is not averse to hearing of an 'action by free choice.' What, however, it means is that the action is real, not metaphorical. One might say : 'He spoke with his tongue, and saw with his eye,' for it is permissible to speak of seeing in case of the heart, and of speaking in case of the movements of the head and hand. Thus, metaphorically, it is said : 'He said by his head, i.e., nodded, Yes.' And this is the reason why he who says: 'He spoke with his tongue, and saw with his eyes,' will not be taken to task. And the meaning of this expression will be a denial of the metaphorical import of the words. This is the stumbling block. A warning must be given here, for this is the place where these idiots have fallen into error.

If it is said:

To call an agent an agent is something the knowledge of which can be derived from language. And even if language were not hopeful, it could be made clear by reason that a cause may be either a willing, or an unwilling cause. Our dispute turns on the question whether action is in reality the word for (the result of) the two kinds of causes. Now, the applicability of the word 'action' cannot be denied, since the Arabs say: 'Fire burns' : 'A sword cuts' : 'Ice cools' : 'Scammony loosens the bowels' : 'Bread satisfies hunger' : 'Water quenches thirst,' etc. When we say: 'strikes,' we mean: *'does* strike' : and by: 'burns,' we mean: *'does* burn,' by: 'cuts,' *'does* cut,' etc. If you say that all these actions are metaphorical, you make an arbitrary and groundless assumption.

The answer:

All these actions are metaphorical: for the real action depends on will. Following is an argument to prove this

contention. Suppose an event which, in order to happen, depends on two things—one volitional, and the other non-volitional. Here reason will attribute the action to the volitional factor. And the same position will be taken by language. For he who throws a man into fire, whereupon that man dies, is called the murderer: but fire is not. And this is so completely true that no objection is taken to one who says: 'No one, except this man, is the murderer.' If the word 'agent' could be applied to the willing and the non-willing cause in the same way (not in the sense that the one was originally, while the other was metaphorically, so), then language, convention and reason would not all be at one in attributing the responsibility for the murder to the willing cause—notwithstanding the fact that the fire was the nearer cause of murder, and that the man who threw the victim into the fire did nothing besides putting the victim and fire together. Seeing that the volitional action which consists in putting together the victim and the involuntary influence of fire, is held responsible for the murder, and fire is not called the murderer, except in a metaphorical sense, it follows that the agent is he from whose will an action proceeds. And since, in their view, God has neither will nor free choice of action, they can call Him an agent or a maker only in a metaphorical sense.

If it is said:

What we mean by God's being the Agent is that He is the Cause of the existence of every other being: that He sustains the world: that if He had not been, the existence of the world would have been inconceivable; and that if His non-existence could be supposed, the world should cease to exist, as with the supposition of the non-existence of the Sun, light should cease to exist. So this is what we mean by His being the agent. If the opponent refuses to use the word 'action' in this case, let there be no dispute over words, once the meaning has been made clear.

we will answer:

It is our purpose to show that this meaning cannot be called an action or a product. What an action or a product

means is something which really proceeds from will. You have denied the reality of the meaning of an action, retaining the word itself in order to find favour with the Muslims. But religious obligations cannot be fulfilled merely by applying words which are devoid of meaning. Therefore, do assert that God has no action, thus making it clear that your belief is opposed to that of the Muslims. Do not dishonestly say that God is the maker of the world, and that the world is His Product. For you have not discarded this word, yet you have denied its reality. And the purpose of this problem was to expose this dishonesty.

(2)

The second reason—why on the philosophers' principles, it is self-contradictory to believe that the world is an action of God—is to be found in a condition for an action. Namely, an action must have a beginning in time. But in their view, the world is eternal, not temporal. An action means causing something to come out of non-existence into existence, by giving it a temporal origin. This is inconceivable in the case of an eternal thing. For that which eternally exists cannot be produced by being given a temporal origin. So a temporal origin is an indispensable condition for an action. And they consider the world to be eternal. How, therefore, can it be an action of God?

If it is said:

Temporal existence means being after non-being. Now, let us ask: When the agent caused forth a being in time, was that which proceeded from him—and which, therefore, bore a relation to him—pure existence, or pure non-existence, or both? It is false to say that the preceding non-existence could bear a relation to him. For no agent has influence over non-existence. Also, it is false to say that both could be related to him. For it has been seen that non-existence can never be related to him, and non-existence, *qua* non-existence, does not stand in need of an agent at all. It, therefore, remains to say that that which proceeds from the agent is related to him by virtue of its being an existent: that pure existence proceeds from him: and that nothing

but existence can bear a relation to him. If the existence is supposed to be everlasting, its relation to the agent must also be supposed to be everlasting. And if this relation is everlasting, then—inasmuch as non-existence has never been related to the agent—he to whom the relation is sustained will be all the more efficient, and his influence will be all the more enduring.

It remains to say that that which proceeds from the agent is related to the agent by virtue of its having an origin in time. But its having an origin in time only means that it exists after non-being. But non-being has never borne a relation to the agent. If the precedence of non-being is made an attribute of being, and if it is said that what is related to the agent is a particular existence—viz., an existence preceded by non-existence—not all existence, then the answer would be: Its being preceded by non-existence is not the action of any agent, or the work of any maker. If this existence cannot proceed from the agent, unless it were preceded by non-being, and seeing that the precedence of non-being is not the action of any agent, it follows that the character (of this existence) of being preceded by non-existence is not the action of the agent, and, therefore, bears no relation to him. So if the precedence of non-being is regarded as a condition required to be fulfilled in order for existence to be actualised, then this means the imposition of a condition over which the agent has no influence.

Your statement that the production of an existent is not possible is true, if you mean that no existence which has been preceded by non-existence begins to run its course. But if you mean that in the state of being an existent, it cannot be the object of production, then it must be borne in mind, as has been shown by us, that it *is* produced in the state of being an existent, not in that of being a non-existent. For something is produced, when the agent is able to produce, not in the state of the non-existence of the object of production, but in the state of its existence (because of the agent). Production is coincident with the agent's being able to produce, and the object's being able to be produce. For production is only the relationship between the producer and the object of production. And all this is together with existence, not before it. Thus, it is clear that nothing but

an existent can be the object of production, if production means the relation by which the agent is able to produce, and the object able to be produced. Therefore, (they add) we have judged that the world is an action of God from eternity to eternity, and that there is no state in which He is not the agent of the world; for that which is related to the agent is existence. If this relation is perpetual, the existence will also be perpetual: if the relation is severed, existence will cease. This is not the same thing as you imagine it to be—namely, that the world can remain even when the Creator is supposed not to exist. To you, He is like the builder in relation to the building: the latter remains even when the former has perished. The continuity of the building is not owing to the builder; it is the result of the structural system which holds all the components of the building together. If such a power of cohesion—e.g., that provided by water—is not there, mere action of an agent will not be successful in keeping any edifice intact.

The answer:

The action is related to the agent by virtue of its being a temporal event, not by virtue of the non-existence which preceded it, nor by virtue of its merely being an existent. So it is not related to the agent in what we could call the second state of its existence—i.e., when (even at the time of the action) it was an existent. On the contrary, it is related to the agent in the state of its temporal origination. And it is so related, because it is a temporal phenomenon, a transition from non-existence. If its temporal character is denied, its being an action will be unintelligible, and it will bear no relation to the agent. As regards your statement that its being a temporal event ultimately means its being preceded by non-existence, and that its being preceded by non-existence is no action of an agent: no work of a maker, there is no doubt that this is so. But this being preceded by non-existence (which itself is no action of an agent) is a condition for an action to become an action of an agent. For, existence which is not preceded by non-existence is not fit to be the action of an agent. Not every thing, which is a condition for an action to be what it is, is necessarily owing to the efficiency of an agent. For instance, the essence and the

power and the will and the knowledge of an agent is each a condition for his action to be an action; but none of these things is effected by the agent himself. Even so, an action is intelligible only when it is performed by an existent. Therefore, like his will and power and knowledge, the existence of an agent is also a condition for his efficiency; regardless of whether it is an effect of his efficiency, or not.

If it is said:

If you admit the rule that it is proper for the action to be together with, not posterior to, the agent, then it will follow that the action must be temporal if the agent is temporal, and eternal if the agent is eternal. If you lay down the condition that the action must be posterior to the agent in time, then it will be an impossible condition. If you move your hand inside a basin full of water, the water will move together with, not before or after, the movement of your hand. If the water were to move after the movement of the hand, then the moving hand and the water-at-rest—i.e., before its being stirred—would be together in the same place. If it were to move before the movement of the hand, then the movement of the water would again be separate from that of the hand. But this would be incompatible with the one's being an effect of the other: an action resulting from the other. So if we suppose the hand moving in water to be eternal, the movement of the water will also be perpetual. And, in spite of its perpetuity, the movement of the water will still be an effect. For being an effect is not incompatible with the supposition of perpetuity. This is how the world is related to God.

we will answer:

We do not find it impossible that the action be together with the agent—*after* having originated in time. For instance, the movement of water is a temporal event arising out of non-existence: it can properly be an action, and it is immaterial whether it is posterior to the agent's being, or coexistent with it. But we cannot concede the possibility of an eternal action. For that which has not arisen out of non-existence cannot be called an action—except in a

metaphorical sense, having no basis in reality. As regards the relation between the cause and the effect, it is possible that both should be eternal, or both temporal. For instance, it is said that the eternal knowledge is the cause of the Eternal's being a knower. This is indisputable. But what is to be disputed is that which is called an action. The effect of a cause is not called the action of that cause—except in a metaphorical sense. For it is a condition for an action to have arisen out of non-existence. If someone ventures to call an eternal and everlasting being an action of some other being, he will be using unwarranted metaphorical language. Your assertion that if the movement of a finger together with the movement of water is supposed to be eternal, still the movement of the water will not cease to be an action, is a deliberate attempt at creating confusion. For the finger has no action. Action belongs to him who has the finger. And he is the willing agent. If he is supposed to be eternal, still the movement of the fingers will be his action—inasmuch as each unit in this movement is a temporal event which arises out of non-existence. So in this sense, it will be an action. As regards the movement of water, we would not say that it is the action of the person who moved his hand in water. On the contrary, it is an action of God—whatever may be the description of this relation. And its being an action is determined by its having had a beginning in time—not by the perpetuity of the process of the origination of the units of which it is composed. It is an action only because it begins in time.

If it is said:

If you admit that the relation between the action and the agent, which is based on the former's being an existent, is like the relation between the effect and its cause, then you will have conceded the idea of the perpetuity of causal relation. We do not mean by the world's being an action any thing other than that it is an effect which bears an everlasting relation to its cause, i.e., God (exalted be He). If you do not call such a thing an action, we will not have a dispute over the application of names whose meaning has been made clear.

we will answer:

The only purpose of this problem is to show that you pretend to believe in these names for the sake of the merit acquired by one who believes in them. But you do not think that in reality any thing corresponds to them. To you, God is not an agent in the real sense of the word; nor is the world His action in reality. The use of the word 'action' in your theories is only a piece of metaphorical language, having no basis in reality. So our purpose has been achieved inasmuch as this subterfuge has been exposed.

(3)

In the relationship between the agent and the action is to be found the third reason why on principle the world's being an action of God is impossible in the philosopher's view. They say that only one proceeds from one. But the Principle is one in all respects; while the world is composed of different things. Therefore, according to their fundamental principles, it is inconceivable that the world should be an action of God.

If it is said:

The world as a whole does not proceed from God without intermediaries. What proceeds from Him is one, it is the first creature which is a pure intelligence: a self-subsisting substance which is unextended: knows itself: knows its Principle, and in theological language is called an angel. From it proceeds the second intelligence; from the second, the third: from the third, the fourth: and thus through intermediaries, the beings multiply. Now, the difference and multiplicity in an action may result from:

(i) the difference of efficient faculties. For instance, by the faculty of desire we do something which is different from what we do by the faculty of anger.

(ii) or from the difference of Matters. For instance, the Sun whitens the washed clothes, but blackens the face of a man; and melts some substances, but hardens others.

(iii) or from the difference of instruments. For instance, the same carpenter saws with the saw, hews with the axe, and bores with the awl.

(iv) or the multiplicity in action may result from the multiplicity of intermediaries. Something is done; it gives rise to another; and thus the action multiplies.

All these kinds are inapplicable to the first Principle. As we will see in the arguments for Divine unity, there is neither difference, nor duality, nor multiplicity in His being. Nor is there any difference of Matters in the first Principle; we have yet to discuss the origin of the first effect—i.e., let us say, Prime Matter. Nor is there any difference of instruments; for there is no being together with God and in the same position as He has: and we are yet to discuss the origin of the first instrument. The only thing which remains is, therefore, that multiplicity in the world proceeds from God through intermediation, as we have shown earlier.

we will answer:

From this it would follow that there is in the world not a single thing which is composed of individuals, but that all the beings are units, each of which is an effect of some other unit above it, as it is the cause of some other unit below it, and so on, till the series comes to an end with an effectless effect at the bottom, and a causeless cause at the top. But in fact this is not so. For the philosophers say that body is composed of Form and Matter, both of which combine to make one thing. Similarly, man is composed of body and soul, neither of which owes its existence to the other, for both depend for their existence on some other cause. The same is true of the spheres. For they too are composed of body and soul; and the soul has not originated from the body, nor the body from the soul, but both have emanated from external causes. How, then, do all these composite things come into existence? Does each one have only one cause? If the answer is in the affirmative, it will refute their assertion that only one proceeds from one. Or, does a composite thing have a composite cause? In that case, the inquiry will be directed to the composite character of the cause, until the point is reached where the composite neces-

sarily meets the simple. The Principle is simple; whereas the effects are characterised by composition. And this is inconceivable, unless the simple and the composite were to meet. And whenever such meeting occurs, their assertion that from one only one proceeds will be refuted.

If it is said:

The difficulty will be removed when our theory is understood. All beings can be divided into: (a) those which are in substrata—e.g., Accidents and Forms—and (b) those which are not in substrata. These latter can be divided into: (c) those which are substrata for others—e.g., bodies—and (d) those which are not. To (d) belong such beings as are self-subsisting substances. These substances can be divided into: (e) those which influence bodies—let us call such substances 'souls'—and (f) those which influence souls, not bodies—let us call such substances 'pure intelligences.' The beings which subsist in substrata—e.g., Accidents—have a temporal origin, and their causes are also temporal. The series of their causes and the causes of the causes comes to an end with a principle which is temporal in one respect, and everlasting in another. This principle is rotatory motion; and it is an indisputable principle. It is, however, the self-subsisting Roots with which we are here concerned. They are three:

(a) Bodies, which occupy the lowest rank.

(b) Pure intelligences, which are not connected with bodies at all—neither by the relation of efficient causality, nor by being impressed upon bodies. Hence theirs is the highest rank.

(c) Souls, which stand midway between the two extremes. They are related to bodies, inasmuch as they influence and activate them. Standing midway in the order of worth, they receive influences from the intelligences, and impart influences to bodies.

Bodies are ten in number: the nine heavens, and Matter which is the stuff filling the concave of the sphere of the Moon. The nine heavens are living beings, composed of bodies and souls. Let us now describe the order of existence among them.

From the being of the first Principle emanated the first intelligence. It is a being existing in itself, neither body nor impressed upon bodies. It knows itself as well as its Principle. We have called it the first intelligence: but it makes no difference whether it is called an angel, or an intelligence, or whatever one likes. From the being of this intelligence three things followed: another intelligence, the soul of the highest sphere which is the ninth heaven, and the body of that sphere. From the second intelligence followed the third intelligence, the soul of the stellar sphere, and the body of that sphere. From the third intelligence followed the fourth intelligence, the soul of the sphere of Saturn, and the body of that sphere. From the fourth intelligence followed the fifth intelligence, the soul of the sphere of Jupiter, and the body of that sphere. And so on, till there was an intelligence from which followed the last intelligence, the soul of the sphere of the Moon, and the body of that sphere. This last intelligence is called the Agent Intellect. From it followed the stuff of the sphere of the Moon—viz., the Matter which receives generation and corruption—and the constitutions of the spheres. The Matters combine, because of the movement of stars, into different combinations which produce minerals, vegetables, and animals. It is not necessary that from each intelligence follows another intelligence, and that the series thus become infinite. For the intelligences have specific differences: what is true of one does not necessarily hold of others.

It must have been seen that, apart from the first Principle, the intelligences are ten in number. And the spheres are nine. The total of these noble principles, apart from the first Principle, comes to nineteen. Also, it must be clear that each intelligence has under it three things: an intelligence, the soul of a sphere, and the body of that sphere. Obviously, there must be ground for threefoldness in its principle. Now, plurality in the first effect is inconceivable. But there is an exception to the rule. The first effect knows its principle, knows itself, and is possible in itself—inasmuch as it derives the necessity of its existence from someone other than itself. These are three different meanings. It is proper that the noblest meaning should belong to the noblest of all the three aspects of the first effect. Thus, an intelligence proceeds from it, because it knows its principle: the soul of a sphere

proceeds from it, because it knows itself; and the body of a sphere proceeds from it, because it is possible in itself. We must now ask: What is the source of threefoldness in the first effect whose Principle is one? The anwer is: From the first Principle only one proceeds—i.e., the essence of the first intelligence by which it knows itself. Now, its knowledge of its principle is, evidently, necessary, although the necessity is not derived from the Principle. Again, being possible in itself, the first intelligence owes its possible character to itself, not to the first Principle. To us, it is not improbable that, while only one should proceed from one, the first effect may still acquire—not from the first Principle—some evidently necessary things, which express some relation, or no relation, and which give rise to plurality. This will make it the principle of plurality. And in this way will it be possible for the simple to meet the composite. There is no escape from such a conjunction: and only in this way can it take place. Hence the necessity to adopt this view. (This much is necessary in order to expound their theory.)

we shall answer:

All you have said here is arbitrary reasoning. To be more exact, it is darkness piled upon darkness. If someone says that he saw things of this kind in a dream, it will be inferred that he was suffering from some disease. Or if such things are introduced in the discussion of the problems of *Fiqh*—the only place where conjecture is the ultimate end—it will be said that these things are wild guess-work which does not raise even a presumption as to its validity.

The points from which objection can be taken to these things are innumerable. Let us, however, be content with only a few of the reasons for which we find this theory to be unsatisfactory.

A. *We will say:* You have asserted that one of the meanings of plurality in the first effect is that it is possible. Now, let us ask: Is its being possible identical with its being, or other than it? If it is identical, no plurality will arise from it. If it is other than its being, then why do you not say that there is plurality in the first Principle? For He is a being, and at the same time He is necessary.

The necessity of being is other than being itself. Therefore, this plurality in the first Principle can make it possible for different things to proceed from Him. If it is said that necessity of being does not mean any thing other than being itself, it will be said that the possibility of being in like manner does not mean any thing other than being itself. If you say that we can know its possible character, and that this shows that possibility is other than being, then the same holds of the Necessary. For in His case, too, it is possible to know of existence, while the necessity of existence is not known (unless a different argument should be used); and, therefore, His being necessary is other than His existence itself. In fine, being is a general thing which can be divided into necessary and possible being. If the differentia of one of the two divisions is additional to the generic character, so will the differentia of the other be. The two cases cannot differ.

If it is said :

The possibility of being springs from the nature of the possible: whereas it owes its existence to someone other than itself How, then, can the two things—one of which is natural, while the other is external—be the same?

we will answer :

But, then, how can the necessity of being be identical with existence either? It is possible to deny the necessity of being, affirming existence at the same time. The absolutely true one does not admit of the affirmation and the denial of the same thing at the same time. It is not possible to say that it is being and non-being: or that it is necessary and not-necessary. But one might say that it is a being, and that it is not necessary—just as one could say that something is a being, and that it is not possible. This is how oneness is determined. And the supposition of such a thing in the case of the first Principle is invalid, if, as they have maintained, it is true that the possibility of existence is not identical with the existence of the possible.

B. *The second objection : we will say :* Is the first

effect's knowledge of its Principle identical with its existence and with its knowledge of itself, or other than the two? If it is identical, then there will be no plurality in its nature, except insofar as its nature itself is to be interpreted in terms of plurality. But if it is other than the two, then such a plurality also exists in the first Principle, for He too knows Himself as well as what is other than Himself.

If they assert :

His self-knowledge is identical with His essence. He cannot know Himself, unless He knew that He is the Principle of other beings. His knowledge being coincident with the object of knowledge, the whole thing is resolved into His being.

we will anwer :

Similarly, the first effect's self-knowledge is identical with its essence. For by its substance, it is an intelligence; hence its self-knowledge. And in its case, too, the knower, the knowledge and the object of knowledge form a unity. Its self-knowledge being identical with its essence, it knows itself as the effect of its cause. Therefore, knowledge being coincident with the object of knowledge, the whole thing can be resolved into its being. It follows that either there can be no plurality at all; or if it is there, it will exist in the first principle as well. And from Him, therefore, the beings characterised by diversity and plurality will directly proceed. Let us give up the doctrine of His unity-in-all-respects, if unity is adversely affected by this kind of plurality.

If it is said :

The first Principle does not know anything other than Himself. His self-knowledge is the same thing as His essence. So the knowledge, the knower and the object of knowledge are all one. And He does not know anyone other than himself.

The answer from two points :

Firstly, this tenet is so obnoxious that Ibn Sīna and all other great thinkers of later times have actually repudiated

it. They say :

> The first Principle does know Himself as the Principle of the emanation of all that emanates from Him. He knows all the beings—in all their species—by a knowledge which is not particular, but universal.

They were led to this position, for they had recoiled in horror from the theory that:

> From the first Principle only an intelligence proceeds. He does not know what proceeds from Him. From His effect, which is the first intelligence, proceed another intelligence, the soul of a sphere, and the body of that sphere. The effect knows itself, its three effects, and its cause or principle. So the effect is nobler than the Cause—inasmuch as from the Cause only one proceeds, while from the effect three things proceed: and the Cause does not know anything other than Himself, while the effect knows itself, its cause, and its three effects.

He, who is content with making his conception of God imply only this much of glory, actually makes Him lower than any other being which knows itself as well as what is other than itself. For that which knows Him as well as itself will be nobler than He is with only self-knowledge to His credit.

The final result of all their investigations into Divine Glory is that they have destroyed all that Glory signifies. They have made His condition comparable to that of a dead man who has no awareness of what goes on in the world—the only difference between Him and a dead man being that He knows Himself. This is how God confounds those :

> who diverge from His path:
> who try to subvert the ways of right guidance :
> who call into question the truth of His words: "I did not call them to witness the creation of Heavens and the Earth, or their own creation":
> who entertain ignoble thoughts about God :
> who fancy that man has the power to grasp Divine things:
> who have a misguided faith in their intellects; and

> who claim that in matters of intellectual inquiry they are under no obligation to follow the prophets.

It is but natural that they have found themselves constrained to admit—as the sum and substance of their intellectual investigations—something which would surprise one who came to hear of it even in a dream.

The second objection :

He who would say that the first Principle does not know any thing except Himself does thereby succeed in avoiding plurality. (For, if he were to believe in His knowledge of other beings, it would follow that self-knowledge is not identical with the knowledge of other beings—in the case of the first Principle, as in that of the first effect.) But then the first effect must not be considered to have knowledge of any thing other than itself; for if it were to have the knowledge of the first Principle or of *any* thing other than itself, such knowledge would not be identical with itself, and therefore would need a cause other than the cause of its own being. Since there is no cause other than the cause of its being—viz., the first Principle—it follows that the first effect cannot know any thing other than itself. And thus the plurality made possible from this point of view stands rebutted.

If it is said:

Once the first effect comes into being, and comes to know itself, it necessarily follows that it should know its Principle.

we will answer :

Is it by a cause, or without one, that such a thing necessarily follows? If it needs a cause, there is no cause other than the first Principle—who is one. It is inconceivable that from the One more than one thing should proceed. Since the being of the first effect is the one thing which has already proceeded, how can any other do so? If, however, no cause is needed for the knowledge of the Principle to be a

concomitant of the first effect's being and self-knowledge, then we are inevitably led to the conclusion that a plurality of uncaused beings somehow follows from the being of the first Principle, and that, therefore, a multiplicity of beings—as set over against the One Being—is the cause of the plurality in the world. If such an explanation of plurality be rejected—on the ground that the necessary being is one, and that an addition to one is a contingency, which needs a cause—then the same thing will be applicable to the first effect. For if the knowledge possessed by the first effect is necessary *per se*, that will refute their dictum that the necessary being is only one. If, however, it is possible, it must have a cause. Since no cause of it can be discovered, it must have a cause. Evidently, such knowledge is not a necessity of the possible nature of the first effect. Possibility of existence is a self-evident element of the nature of any effect. But its being cognisant of its cause is not a self-evident element of its nature, even as the knowledge by a cause of its effect is no self-evident element of the nature of a cause. Nay, the necessity of the knowledge possessed by a cause of its effect is more clear than the necessity of the knowledge by an effect of its cause. So it has now been shown that the plurality derived from the knowledge by the first effect of its Principle is impossible, because there is no principle to explain it, nor is it a necessity of the nature of the effect. And this is an inescapable conclusion.

The third objection :

Is the self-knowledge possessed by the first effect identical with its essence, or other than it ? It is impossible to say that it is identical, for knowledge cannot be the same thing as that which is known. But if it is other than the essence, the same difference should obtain in case of the first Principle. From Him, therefore, will plurality follow.

Moreover, there is not only a threefold but a fourfold character (by reference to which the procession of many things from the first effect can be explained). Thus, (i) it has being: (ii) knows itself: (iii) knows its Principle, and (iv) is possible in itself. Nay, to these four aspects yet another can be added—namely, that it is a necessary being whose necessity is derived from an external source.

That will give us a fivefold character as the principle of the explanation of plurality. And from this it should be clear how idle the speculations of these philosophers are.

The fourth objection :

The threefold character of the first effect is not enough for the explanation of plurality. Take for example the body of the first heaven. They would ascribe its procession to one aspect of the essence of its Principle. But there is a threefold composition in it—namely :

Firstly, it is composed of Form and Matter—as, according to them, all bodies are. Now, Form and Matter must have different principles, because they are so dissimilar to each other. And the philosophers deny that either Form or Matter can be a permanent cause of the other in such a way that no additional cause transcending them would be needed.

Secondly, the body of the uppermost sphere has a definite size. The adoption of this definite size, as distinguished from all other sizes and quantities, is additional to its own being; for its being larger or smaller than the actual size was possible. It is, therefore, necessary that there must have been a cause of the adoption of *this* particular size, and that the cause must be additional to the simple thing which necessitated the existence of the body of the first heaven. The existence of the body of the first heaven cannot be like the existence of its Principle, which is an intelligence pure and simple. An intelligence does not adopt a particular quantity as set over against all other quantities. Hence it is properly said that an intelligence depends on only a simple cause.

If it is said :

The cause of the adoption of a particular size is that if the body of the first heaven were larger, it would exceed the requirements of the universal system : and if it were smaller, it would not be fit for the desired system.

we will answer :

Is the definite character of the system sufficient reason

for the existence of that which constitutes the system, or does it need a cause to produce it? If you think that it is sufficient, you will have dispensed with all causal explanations. And then you must say that the system immanent in universal being demanded, by itself and independently of any additional cause, the existence of universal being. But if you say that the definite character of the system is not a sufficient reason for the existence of that which constitutes the system, then you must also admit that it will be equally insufficient for the adoption of one of many similar quantities, and that we will need, not only a cause of the adoption of one of the quantities, but also a cause of the composition of Form and Matter in the body of the first heaven.

Thirdly, the highest sphere has two points which are the two Poles. These Poles are fixed, and never depart from their positions. But other parts of the Zone have different positions. Now, only one of the two hypotheses can be adopted. In the first place, it may be said that all the parts of the highest sphere are similar. But then how was it that only two points were chosen, in preference to all others, to be the Poles? Or, alternatively, it may be said that the parts of the sphere are different. This means that some of these parts have properties which are not possessed by others. Now, what is the principle of these differences, if the first sphere has proceeded from one simple thing? The simple can only give rise to a simple and homogeneous shape, i.e., a circle. And such a shape is bound to be free from varied properties. This is, therefore, a dilemma which cannot be resolved.

If it is said:

Perhaps the first effect, as the principle of other effects, has within itself a certain kind of plurality which, however, does not come to it from the first Principle. We have been able to know only three or four kinds of plurality, any others still being hidden from us. But our failure to know them does not shake our belief that there must be plurality within the principle itself, for out of the One the many do not come.

we will answer:

If you admit this, do say that all the beings in all their

multiplicity—which run in thousands – directly proceed from the first effect. You need not confine the procession from the first effect to the body and the soul of the first sphere. It must be considered possible that there should emanate from it all the heavenly and the human souls as well as all the terrestrial and celestial bodies. And the multiplicity of all these souls and bodies should be of such a kind as has not been discovered with the first effect.

And thence it will follow as a necessary consequence that the first Cause can also be dispensed with. For if you admit the appearance of plurality—which is said to follow without a cause, and yet is not a self-evident element of the nature of the first effect—you can also admit that such plurality can exist together with the first Cause, its own existence being uncaused. And it will be said that it necessarily follows, and that its number cannot be known. If it is possible to imagine the uncaused existence of such plurality in case of one, it will be equally possible to imagine it in case of the other. Nay, even the words 'one' and the 'other' have no meaning; for they are not separated in time or space. So, that which does not cause the first cause and first effect to be separated in space or time, and which can possibly exist without a cause, does not belong to either of the two in particular.

If it is said:

The plurality of things exceeds thousands. But it is improbable that plurality in the first effect should go to that extent. Therefore, we have increased the number of the intermediaries.

we will answer:

To say that it is improbable is only guess-work, which cannot form the basis of an intellectual judgment. You should have said that it is impossible. But then we would ask: Why is it impossible? When unity has been exceeded, and we have come to believe that two or three things may possibly be the inseparable accidents of the first effect—not resulting from the first Cause– then how can we retreat, and what will be our criterion? What is there to prevent us

from extending the number to four, or five, or even to a thousand? He who has exceeded the unity, and yet posits one particular number as the limit, must bear in mind that the retreat has been cut off. And this is a fatal objection.

Moreover, we will say, this explanation breaks down in the case of the second effect. For it is the stellar sphere which is said to proceed from this effect. And that sphere has about twelve hundred stars which are different in respect of size, shape, position, colour, influence, and good or evil fortune. Some of them have the form of a ram, or a bull or a lion, while others have the form of a man. Even in the same place in the terrestrial world, the influence of these stars differs—in respect of heat or cold, or good or evil fortune. And their quantities are fundamentally different from each other. So it is not possible to say that all these stars form a single species, in spite of the differences among them. If such a thing were possible, it would be in like manner possible to say that all the bodies in the world form a single species characterised by corporeality and adequately governed by one cause. But in fact it is clear that the difference of attributes, of substances, and of constitutions among the bodies proves that the bodies are different from each other. Similarly, the stars are different from each other. And each one of them needs a separate cause—for its Form: its Matter: its definite and distinct adaptation to a hot or cold nature, or an auspicious or inauspicious nature: its definite position; and its definite adaptation to the figures of different animals. If such a plurality can conceivably have its origin in the second effect, it can also do so in the first effect. And thus the hypothetical value of either of these two disappears.

The fifth objection:

We will say: Even if we allow these idle postulates and arbitrary assumptions, why are you not ashamed of saying that the possible nature of the first effect demanded the procession from it of the body of the highest sphere: that its self knowledge demanded the procession from it of the soul of that sphere, and that its knowledge of the first Principle demanded the procession of an intelligence? What is the difference between this and one's saying that, since

he knew that any non-existent man could possibly exist, and have self-knowledge and the knowledge of his Creator, therefore it might be inferred that from his being possible would follow the existence of the body of a sphere, and from his self-knowledge and the knowledge of the Creator would follow the two other things? To such an assumption the answer would be: What is the connection between being possible and body of a sphere? If such a thing will be laughed at when spoken of a man, it must be laughed at when it is spoken of any other being. For the possibility of existence is a judgment which does not differ, whether the possible being is a man or an angel or a sphere. I wish I could see how even an insane person could rest satisfied with such postulates, let alone these intellectual thinkers who take pride in their hair-splitting theorising.

If one were to say:

Now that you have refuted the theories of the philosophers, what do you yourself say? Do you assert that from the absolutely One two different things may proceed? If so, you will be opposed to the intelligible reality. Or do you say that there is plurality in the first Principle? That will be a renunciation of the doctrine of Divine unity. Or do you say that there is no plurality in the world? That will be a denial of sensible fact. Or do you say that plurality follows from the first Principle through intermediaries? That will perforce bring you round to the position the philosophers had taken.

we would answer:

Ours was not the point of view of a system-builder. On the contrary, we only intended to throw their theories into confusion. And that purpose has been achieved. Nevertheless, we would say: He who thinks that a belief in the procession of two from one is opposition to the intelligible reality, or that the supposition of some eternal and everlasting attributes of the first Principle is repugnant to the Divine unity, must bear in mind that both these assertions are groundless. The philosophers have not been able to prove these propositions. The impossibility of the procession of two from one is not as evident a fact as is the impossibility of the

presence of one person in two places at the same time. In general, it is known neither as a self-evident truth, nor as a matter of inferential knowledge. So what is there to prevent one from believing that the first Principle is an omnipotent and a willing agent: that He does what He wills, and ordains as He likes, and that He creates the similar and dissimilar things alike, whenever and in whatever manner He wills? The impossibility of such a belief is neither a self-evident truth, nor a matter of inferential knowledge. On the contrary, the prophets, whose strength lay in their miracles, have lent their authority to it. Hence it is obligatory on us to believe them. As regards the inquiry into the manner in which the world proceeded from God's will, it is an idle and aimless venture. Those who sought to discover the connection between that which proceeds and its principle have only been able to sum up their investigations by saying that from the possible nature of the first effect proceeds the body of a sphere, and from its self-knowledge proceeds the soul of that sphere. But that is a stupid thing, not the explanation of a connection.

Therefore, let us accept the authority of the prophets in regard to the fundamentals of these things. Let us submit to that authority; for reason has not been able to contradict it. Let us give up the inquiry concerning the 'Why?' and and 'How much?' and 'What?'. For these are things beyond the power of man. This is the reason why the Law-giver said: "Think over the product of God's creative activity: do not think over His essence."

PROBLEM IV

TO SHOW THEIR INABILITY TO PROVE THE EXISTENCE OF THE CREATOR OF THE WORLD

WE SAY:

All men can be divided into two classes:

(i) the class of the people of the truth. They hold that the world began in time; and they know by rational necessity that nothing which originates in time originates by itself, and that, therefore, it needs a creator. Therefore, their belief in the Creator is understandable.

(ii) the Materialists. They believe that the world, as it is, has always been. Therefore, they do not ascribe it to a creator. Their belief, too, is intelligible—although rational arguments may be advanced to refute it.

But the philosophers believe that the world is eternal. And still they would ascribe it to a creator. This theory is, therefore, even in its original formulation, self-contradictory. There is no need for a refutation of it.

If it is said:

When we say that the world has a creator, we do not mean thereby an agent who acts voluntarily, after not having acted, as we observe to be the case with so many kinds of agents, e.g., a tailor, or a weaver, or a builder. On the contrary, we mean thereby the cause of the world, whom we call the First Principle, in the sense that His own being is uncaused, while He is the cause of all other beings. So it is only in this sense that we call the First Principle the Creator. As regards the fact of the uncaused being of such an existent, it can presently be proved by a conclusive argument. The world, we will say, and all the beings therein are either uncaused, or have a cause. If they have a cause, this cause itself will either have a cause, or will be uncaused. And the same will be true of the cause of the

cause. Therefore, (a) either the series will go on *ad infinitum* (which is impossible): or (b) it will come to an end at length. So the ultimate term will be the first cause, whose own being will be uncaused. Let us call this cause the First Principle.

If, however, the world itself is supposed to be uncaused, we already will have found the First Principle. For we do not mean by such Principle any thing other than an uncaused being. And on our hypothesis, such a being will be a necessarily recognisable fact.

Undoubtedly, it is not possible to consider the heavens as the First Principle. For they form a numerous group. And the proof of Divine unity prevents number from being attributed to the First Principle. So the falsehood of the view that the heavens may be the First Principle will be seen from an inquiry into the qualities of the First Principle.

Nor is it possible to say that any one heaven, or any one body, or the Sun, or some other thing of the kind is the First Principle. For all these things are bodies; and a body is composed of Form and Matter. It is not possible that the First Principle should be so composed. And this is known through another inquiry (besides the one into the qualities of the First Principle).

Thus, what we wanted to show was that the existence of an uncaused being is an established fact—established by rational necessity and by general acceptance. It is only with respect to the attributes of such a being that opinions vary.

So this is what we mean by the First Principle.

The answer from two points:

Firstly, it follows as a necessary consequence from the general drift of your thought that the bodies in the world are eternal and uncaused. Your statement that this consequence can be avoided through a 'second inquiry' will be refuted, when we come to the problems of Divine unity and the Divine attributes.

Secondly,—more especially to this problem—it may be said: According to the hypothesis under consideration, it has been established that all the beings in the world have a cause. Now, let the cause itself have a cause, and the cause of the cause have yet another cause, and so on *ad*

infinitum. It does not behove you to say that an infinite regress of causes is impossible. For, we will say, do you know it as a matter of immediate inference necessitated by reason, or through some deductive argument? Now, an argument from rational necessity is not available in this case. And methods of theoretical inquiry were betrayed by you when you admitted the possibility of temporal phenomena which had no beginning. If it is possible that something infinite should come into existence, why should it not be equally possible for it to have some of its parts working as the causes of others, so that on the lower side the series terminates into an effectless effect, without, however, terminating on the upper side into an uncaused cause? This will be like the Past, which reaches its term in the fleeting 'Now,' but had no beginning. If you assert that the past events are existing neither at present nor in any other state, and that the non-existent cannot be described as limited or unlimited, then you will have to take a similar view of the human souls which have departed from bodies. For, according to you, they do not perish. And the number of the souls existing after their separation from the body is infinite. A sperm is continually generated from a man, and a man from a sperm, and so on indefinitely. Then, the soul of every man who is dead has survived. And this soul is by number different from the soul of those who died before, or after, or together with, this man. If all the souls were by species one, then, according to you, there would exist at any time an unlimited number of souls.

If it is said:

Among the souls, there is no connection of one part to another. Nor do they have an order—by nature, or by position. We believe in the impossibility of an unlimited number of beings which have an order, either by position—e.g., bodies, some of which are arranged above others—or by nature—e.g., causes and effects. But this is not so in the case of the souls.

we will answer:

This judgment about (the order by) position cannot

be elaborated with any greater validity than its contrary would have been. Why do you believe in the impossibility of one kind of beings infinite in number, and not in that of the other? What is the argument to prove this distinction? And how will you disprove one who says:

"These souls which are infinite in number do still have an order. For the existence of some of them is before that of others. For the number of the past days and nights is infinite. And if we suppose the existence of a soul in each day and night in the past, the total by this time would exceed all limits, and would still be arranged in order of existence—i.e., one soul having existed after another."?

As regards the cause, all that can be said is that it is before the effect by nature, as it is said to be above the effect by essence, not in space. If this is not impossible in the case of the real temporal 'before,' it should not be any more impossible in the case of the essential natural 'before.' What has happened to these philosophers who deny, on the one hand, the possibility of bodies arranged above one another in space *ad infinitum*: but admit, on the other hand, the possibility of beings existing before one another in time *ad infinitum*! Is not this an arbitrary, groundless and unconvincing position?

If it is said:

The conclusive demonstration of the impossibility of an infinite regress of causes is this: Each one of individual causes is either possible in itself, or necessary. If necessary, it will not need a cause. If possible, the Whole (of which it is a part) must be describable in terms of possibility. Now, all that is possible depends on a cause additional to itself. Therefore, the Whole must depend on a cause external to itself (and that is impossible).

we will answer:

The words 'possible' and 'necessary' are vague terms—unless 'necessary' is used for an uncaused being, and 'possible' for one which has a cause. If this is the meaning, we will

come back to the point, and say that each individual cause is possible in the sense that it has another cause which is additional to itself, and that the Whole is not possible—i.e., it has no cause additional or external to itself. If the word 'possible' means any thing other than the sense we have given to it, that meaning cannot be recognised.

If it is said:

This leads to the conclusion that a necessary being can be made of possible things. But the conclusion is absurd.

we will answer:

If by 'possible' and 'necessary' you mean what we have suggested, then this conclusion is exactly what we seek. And we do not admit that it is absurd. To call it absurd is like one's saying that something eternal made up of temporal events is impossible. To the philosophers, Time *is* eternal; whereas individual spherical revolutions are temporal. And each individual revolution has a beginning; whereas the aggregate of those revolutions has no beginning. Therefore, that which has no beginning *is* made of those which have. And the predicate of having a beginning in time is truly applicable to individual revolutions, but not to their aggregate. Similarly, therefore, (in the case of the causes and their aggregate) it will be said that each cause has a cause, but the aggregate of these causes has no cause. For all that can be truly said of the individuals cannot similarly be said of their aggregate. For instance, of each individual it can be said that it is one (of many), or that it is a fraction, or a part (of a whole). But no such thing can be said of the aggregate. Any spot we can specify on the Earth is brightened by the Sun in daytime, and becomes dark by night. And every temporal event originates after not having been—i.e., it has a beginning in time. But the philosophers would not admit that the aggregate of temporal events can have a beginning.

From this it will be seen that if one admits the possibility of originated things—viz., the forms of the four elements and the changeable things—which have no beginning, then it does not behove one to say that an infinite series of causes is impossible. And this further shows that because

of this difficulty the philosophers cannot find their way to affirming the First Principle ; and that, therefore, their conception of Him is bound to be an arbitrary notion.

If it is said :

The revolutions of the sphere do not (all) exist at present. Nor do the forms of the elements so exist. What actually exists is only one form. And that which has no existence cannot be called finite or infinite—unless its existence should be supposed in the Imagination. That which is supposed in the Imagination is not impossible, even though some of the supposed things are causes of others. For man often supposes these things in his imagination. But here it is the thing existing in reality, not in mind, which we are discussing.

What remains now of the difficulty we had to face is the souls of the dead. Some philosophers have held that, before their connection with the bodies, all the souls are one from eternity, and that, after their separation from the bodies, their unity is restored. So there is no number : let alone the possibility of calling them finite or infinite. Some other philosophers believed that the soul follows the constitution of the body : that death means the non-existence of the soul ; and that by its substance the soul has no character. Therefore, on this view, existence is not attributed to the souls, unless they are the souls of living persons. And the living persons are the actual beings whose number is limited, and to whom finitude is not inapplicable. Those who are non-existent cannot be described at all in terms of finitude or its contrary—except in the Imagination, if they are supposed to exist (there).

The answer :

We present this difficulty to Ibn Sīna and Fārābī and other thinkers who postulate that the soul is a substance which exists in itself. That is also the position adopted by Aristotle and some other authorities in the ancient world. However, to him who would not adhere to this position, we will say : Is it conceivable that something which is imperishable should have come into being ? If they say No, it will

be an absurd answer ; but if they say Yes, we will say : If we suppose that every day such an imperishable thing came into existence to last for ever, obviously, by this time, there should have accumulated an infinite number of such beings. For even if a circular movement were transitory, still the appearance in it of an everlasting being should not be impossible. So by this supposition the difficulty is re-enforced. It is irrelevant here whether this everlasting thing is the soul of a man, or a jin, or a devil, or an angel, or any other being you may suppose. For the difficulty will arise, whatever point of view they may have taken. And it will arise because they have posited spherical revolutions which are infinite in number.

PROBLEM V

OF THEIR INABILITY TO PROBE BY RATIONAL ARGUMENTS THAT GOD IS ONE, AND THAT IT IS NOT POSSIBLE TO SUPPOSE TWO NECESSARY BEINGS EACH OF WHICH IS UNCAUSED

THEY argue this point in two ways :

(1)

In the first place, they say :

If there were two gods, each would be called necessary. Now, a being is called necessary in one of the following senses:

Either the necessity of its existence is essential to it. But such necessity cannot belong to anyone else.

Or there may be a cause for the necessity of its existence. So the essence of the necessary being will be the effect of a cause, which demanded the necessity of its existence. But by the necessary being we do not mean any thing whose existence is connected with a cause in any manner.

(And they further assert) :

The species 'man' is predicated of Zaid and 'Amr. Zaid is not a man *per se*. For if he were, 'Amr could not be a man. On the contrary, Zaid is a man through a cause which made him, as well as 'Amr, a man. Thus humanity multiplies with the multiplication of the Matter bearing it. And its relation to that Matter is the effect of a cause: for this relation is not essential to humanity.

The same is true of the necessity of existence which belongs to a necessary being. For if it is essential to a necessary being, no one else can have it. But if it were the effect of a cause, the necessary being would itself be a caused thing, and would therefore cease to be necessary. From this it is clear that the necessary being must be one.

We will say :

Your statement, that the species 'necessity of existence' is either essential or derived from a cause, is a fundamentally wrong division. We have shown that the word 'necessity' is ambiguous, unless it be used to show the absence of a cause. Using it in that sense, we will say : Why is it impossible that there should be two beings which are uncaused and do not cause each other? Your statement that that which is uncaused is uncaused *per se* or *per causam* is a wrong division. One does not seek a cause of the absence of or of the freedom of a being from a cause. What meaning can be conveyed by the words that the uncaused thing is uncaused *per se* or *per causam*? When we say that something has no cause, the meaning is a pure negation; and pure negation itself has no cause, and one cannot ask whether it is *per se* or *per causam.*

If, however, you mean by the necessity of existence an ascertainable and positive attribute of the necessary being—over and above the uncaused existence of that existent—then that meaning will not be intelligible in itself. The meaning which emerges from the denial of the cause of being, and which is a pure negation, cannot itself be called caused or uncaused. And, therefore, no purpose can be served by the division of necessary beings on this ground. Indeed, the conclusion at which we have arrived is that such a division is a foolish and groundless way of arguing.

What we mean by a necessary being is that there is no cause of its existence, and of its uncaused character. Its being uncaused is not the effect of any cause whatsoever. One can only say that its existence is uncaused, and so is its uncausedness uncaused. The division of attributes into those which are derived from some causes, and those which are essential cannot be applied to positive attributes, let alone those which are negative. One cannot say :

Is blackness a colour *per se*, or *per causam*? If *per se*, then redness cannot properly be called a colour. For this species, i.e., colouredness, should exclusively belong to the essence of blackness. But if blackness is a colour through a cause which makes it a colour, then it will follow that it

is reasonable to have a blackness which is not a colour—i.e., the cause of colouredness has not made it a colour. For if that which exists together with the essence has been added to the essence by an external cause, it is possible in the Imagination to suppose the non-existence of such an additional thing, even though the supposed non-existence may not be observed in experience.

The answer to this would be: This division is fundamentally wrong. When it is said that blackness is a colour *per se*, the statement does not imply that nothing else can possess this attribute. Similarly, when it is said that a certain being is necessary, i.e., uncaused, in itself, the statement will not imply that nothing else can possibly possess the attribute of necessity.

(2)

In the second place, they say:

If we suppose two necessary beings, they can be either alike in all respects, or different from each other. If they are alike in all respects, then numerical dissimilarity or duality will not be intelligible. For two black things are two, only when they are in two different places, or in the same place but at different times. Or blackness and motion in the same place and at the same time are two things—because of their different natures. But if the nature does not differ—e.g., in the case of two black things—and if time and place are the same, numerical dissimilarity is not intelligible. If it were possible to speak of *two* black things in the same place and at the same time, it would be possible to say that each person is two persons, and that the distinction between the two is generally overlooked for it is not very striking.

Now, similarity (of two necessary beings) in all respects being impossible, it follows that some difference must be taken for granted. This difference cannot be that of time or place. What, therefore, remains is the difference of nature.

Again, if the two necessary beings differ in something, the difference can take one of two forms: Either the two will have nothing common to them: or they will have. It is impossible that there should be nothing which is common to

them. For in that case, neither existence, nor the necessity of existence, nor each one's being a self-subsisting entity independent of a subject, will be common to them.

But if something is common to them, while they differ in respect of something else, then that which is common to them will not be identical with that which distinguishes them. This means that there will be composition in the necessary beings, and that their definitory formula will be analysable into several parts. But there can be no composition in the necessary being. Neither is it divisible in quantity, nor can its definitory formula consist of divisible parts. The essence of the necessary being is not composed of those things whose multiplicity is indicated by the (divisibility of the parts of the) definitory formula. For instance, 'animal' and 'rational' express what constitutes the quiddity of man. For man is an animal, and he is also rational. What *in* a man corresponds to the word 'animal' is different from what (*in* him) corresponds to the word 'rational.' Therefore, man is composed of parts which are joined together in the definition of man by the words meaning those parts. And the name 'man' is applied to the Whole (of those parts). But this is inconceivable in the case of the necessary being. And without this duality is inconceivable.

The answer:

Granted that duality is inconceivable, unless there be distinction between two things in respect of something; and that there is no distinction between two things which are alike in all respects. But your assertion that this kind of composition is impossible in the case of the First Principle is an arbitrary assumption. What is the argument to prove it?

(Let us consider this question in detail. For it is the philosophers' well-known position that the First Principle cannot be analysed through the definitory formula, even as quantitative division is inapplicable to Him. And it is on this assertion that they base their own doctrine of Divine unity.)

Even so, they assert:

The belief in Divine unity is imperfect, unless it is

affirmed that the Divine being is one in all respects. And oneness in all respects is affirmed by denying plurality in all respects. And plurality is introduced into the essence of things in five ways:

Firstly, by division in fact, or in the Imagination. It is for this reason that a body is not absolutely one. A body is one in virtue of its continuity which exists in the body, and which is liable to decrease. Therefore, a body can be divided in the Imagination with respect to its quantity. And such division is impossible in the case of the First Principle.

Secondly, by a non-quantitative division of something in the Intellect into two different concepts—e.g., the division of body into Form and Matter. For, although neither Form nor Matter can conceivably exist without the other, still they are two different things, by definition and in reality. This, too, ought to be denied in the case of God. For it is not proper that the Creator should be either a Form in a body, or Matter in a body, or the combination of the two. There are two reasons why He cannot be a combination of Form and Matter. In the first place, such a combination is divisible—actually or in the Imagination—as it is analysed into different parts. Secondly, this combination is also divisible conceptually into Form and Matter. Next, God cannot be Matter: for Matter depends on Form. And the necessary being is independent in all respects, and it is not possible to connect its existence with any cause beyond itself. Finally, God cannot be Form; for Form depends on Matter.

Thirdly, plurality comes in by way of attributes: e.g., when knowledge, power and will are supposed to be the attributes of God. If these attributes are supposed to be necessary, necessity of existence would be common to them and to the (Divine) essence. In this way, plurality would arise in the Necessary Being, and unity would consequently disappear.

Fourthly, there is plurality which results from the composition of genus and species. For instance, a black thing is 'black' and 'colour.' And to the Intellect, blackness is not identical with colouredness. On the contrary, colouredness is a genus, and blackness a difference. Therefore, a black thing is composed of a genus and a difference. Similarly, animality is not identical with humanity—from the Intellect's point of view. So man is an animal and a rational being: and 'animal' being the genus and 'rational' the difference,

man is composed of a genus and a difference; and this is plurality of another kind. And this, too, (they assert) ought to be denied of the First Principle.

Fifthly, plurality follows from the supposition of a quiddity and, then, the supposition of the existence of that quiddity. For instance, man has a quiddity prior to his existence. And his existence is related to, and explained in terms of, his quiddity. Similarly, a triangle has a quiddity—viz., that it is a figure enclosed by three sides. And the existence of a triangle is no part of the essence of its quiddity; nor does existence constitute the quiddity. For this reason, it is possible for a man to know the quiddity of a man or a triangle, without knowing whether it does or does not exist in reality. If existence were to constitute the quiddity of a triangle, the existence of the quiddity in the Intellect, before its actualisation, would be inconceivable.

So existence is related to the quiddity, regardless of the fact whether the quiddity is always in existence—e.g., in the case of the Heaven—or comes into existence after not having been—e.g., the quiddity, i.e., humanity, in Zaid and ʿAmr, or the quiddity of accidents and temporal forms. (And they assert:) This kind of plurality is again to be denied of the First Principle. It must be said that in His case there is no quiddity to which existence should be related: for His necessary existence is to Him what quiddity is to any other being. So His necessary existence is a quiddity: a universal reality, or a real nature, just as manness, or tree-ness, or heaven-ness is a quiddity. If we were to affirm His quiddity as separate from His existence, then necessary existence would have to be regarded as a consequence, not as a constitutive principle, of that quiddity. And a consequence is a subordinate, or an effect. Therefore, necessary existence would in that case be an effect; and that would be contradictory to necessity.

[In spite of this explanation, the philosophers say that the Creator is (a) principle: (the) First: (a) being: (a) substance: (the) One: (the) Eternal: (the) Everlasting: (a) knower; (an) intelligence: (an) intelligent: (an) intelligible: (an) agent: (a) creator: (a) willer: powerful: living: (a) lover: (a) beloved (one): pleasant: pleased: generous, and pure Good. And they assert that all these words mean one and the same thing wherein there is no plurality. This is a strange

notion. Before we take objection to it, let us elucidate this doctrine further, so that it may be understood. For before complete understanding is gained, an objection to a doctrine is like an arrow shot in the dark.]

The best way to understand their doctrine is to consider the explanation, wherein *they say* :

The essence of the First Principle is one. But a plurality of names for this one essence arises either from the relation of things to it, or from its own relation to things, or from the negation of things as its predicates. The negation of something as a predicate does not necessitate plurality in the subject. Nor does a relation indicate any plurality. (So they do not deny the plurality of negations and relations; but the contribution to this problem they would make consists in the attempt to explain all the attributes in terms of negation and relation.)

They say :

To call Him the First is to show His relation to all the beings *after* Him.

To call Him a principle is to point out that all other beings derive from Him, and that He is the cause of their existence. So this is a relation to His effects.

To call Him a being has a meaning which is obvious.

To call Him a substance means an existence of which the subsistence in a subject is denied. So this is a negation.

To call Him the Eternal means the negation of a preceding non-existence in His case.

To call Him the Everlasting denies a non-existence which in the case of other beings would follow existence at last. 'The Eternal' and 'the Everlasting,' taken together, mean an existence which is neither preceded by non-existence, nor will be followed by it.

To call Him the Necessary Being means that His existence is uncaused, and is the cause of the existence of all other beings. Here we have a combination of negation and relation; the former being represented by uncausedness, and the latter by the character of being the cause of others.

To call Him an intelligence means that He is a non-material being. Every such being is an intelligence, i.e., it has self-knowledge and self-consciousness, and knows what is

other than itself. So this, i.e., being free from Matter, is an attribute of the Divine being. Therefore, He is an intelligence. And being an intelligence and being free from Matter both mean the same thing.

To call Him an intelligent means that He, being an intelligence, has an object of intelligence, or an intelligible, which is His own essence. For He is conscious of Himself, and knows Himself. So His essence is the Intelligible, the Intelligent, and the Intelligence. And all these three are really one; for :

He is also called the Intelligible—inasmuch as His quiddity, which is divested of Matter, is not obscure to, or hidden from, His essence which is intelligence in the sense that it is a non-material quiddity from which nothing is hidden, and to which nothing is obscure. Himself being known to Himself, He is the Intelligible. And His self-knowledge not being additional to His essence, He is the Intelligence. And it is not impossible that an intelligent and his intelligence and the intelligible should be one. For when an intelligent person knows himself as an intelligent person, he does so because of his being an intelligent person. And thus the intelligent and the intelligible become one—whatever the manner of that union may be. Undeniably, this union will be different in the case of God. For the object of Divine intelligence is perpetually actual: whereas ours is sometimes potential, sometimes actual.

To call Him a maker, or an agent, or a creator, or any other thing which possesses the attribute of action means that His existence is the noble existence from which universal being proceeds—in the manner of inevitable procession; and that the existence of all other beings is derived from, and subordinate to, His existence—like the relation of light to the Sun, or that of heat to fire. But the only comparison between the relation of the world to Him and the relation of light to the Sun is with respect to the fact that the world as well as light is an effect. Apart from this fact, there is no comparison. For the Sun is not conscious of the emanation of light from itself; nor is fire conscious of the emanation of the heat. For the emanation in either case is pure nature. But, on the contrary, God knows Himself; and knows that His being is the Principle of the existence of all other beings. Thus, the emanation of that

which emanates from Him is known to Him; and He is not unaware of what proceeds from Him. Further, He is not like any one of us, who stands between a sick man and the Sun, thus causing the heat of the Sun to be cut off from the sick man—against his choice and liking. On the contrary, God knows His effects, and does not dislike them. In the case of the man who casts the shadow, the agent of the shadow is his body; while it must be his soul, not his body, which knows the falling of the shadow, and likes it. This cannot be so in the case of God. For the doer in Him is also the knower and the liker—i.e., the not-disliker. He knows that His perfection consists in that other beings should emanate from Him. Even if it were possible to suppose that the body which casts the shadow is itself the knower of the falling shadow and the liker of it, still there would be no parallel between this case and the Divine action. For God is not only the knower and the doer, but His knowledge is the principle of His action. For His self-knowledge, i.e., the knowledge that He is the Principle of the Universe, is the cause of the emanation of the Universe. Thus, the existing System follows the intelligible system, in the sense that it occurs because of the latter. So God's being the Agent is not additional to His being the Knower of the Universe. His knowledge of the Universe is the cause of the emanation of the Universe from Him. And His being the knower of the Universe is not additional to His self-knowledge. For He does not know Himself without knowing that He is the Principle of the Universe. By His first intention, His own essence is the object of His knowledge. By His second intention, the Universe is known to Him. And this is what His being an agent means.

To call Him the Omnipotent means His being an agent —in the manner we have determined. That is, His is the being from which emanate all those things to which Omnipotence extends, and by whose emanation the order of the Universe is shaped forth in such a way that the possibilities of perfection and beauty are realised in the highest degree.

To call Him a willer means nothing but that He is not unaware of, or displeased with, whatever proceeds from Him. He knows that His perfection consists in the emanation of the Universe from Him. In this sense, therefore, it is permissible to say that He likes what emanates from Him.

And He who likes his effects can also be called the willing one. Thus, the Divine will is identical with Omnipotence. And Omnipotence is identical with Divine knowledge. And the Divine knowledge is the Divine essence. Therefore, all the Divine attributes are ultimately to be identified with the Divine essence. And this is so, because of His knowledge of things is not derived from things. For if it had been, God would have had to be regarded as the recipient of a benefit, or an attribute, or some perfection, from other beings. And that is impossible in the case of the Necessary Being.

Even our knowledge is of two kinds. In the first place, there is the knowledge of a thing which (knowledge) is derived from the form of that thing—e.g., our knowledge of the form of the Heaven or the Earth. In the second place, there is a knowledge which we spontaneously acquire—e.g., the knowledge of a thing whose form we have never observed, but to which we gave a form in our souls, so that it was originated by us. In this case, the existence of the form is derived from knowledge, not knowledge from the existence of the form. And the Divine knowledge is of this kind. For the ideal representation of the System in His essence is the cause of the emanation of the System from His essence.

Undoubtedly, if the mere appearance of the form of a line or a letter in our soul were sufficient for the production of that form, our knowledge too would be identical with power, and, therefore, with will. But because of our imperfection, our giving a form to something in our soul is not sufficient for the production of the form of that thing. Accordingly, together with knowledge, we need an act of will which appears as a new factor. This originates from the faculty of desire. As a result of it, there comes into operation the faculty which causes the movement of the muscles and the tendons in the outer limbs. So with the movement of the muscles and the tendons, the hand or some other limb begins to move. With the movement of the hand arises the movement of a pen, or whatever external instrument there may be. With the movement of the pen arises the movement of Matter—e.g., the ink in this case, or some other thing. And then comes into being the form of the thing to which we had given a form in our souls. And this is the reason why the mere existence of a form in our souls is neither power nor will. On the contrary, our power is with the principle

which moves the muscles. So the form moves another mover—i.e., the principle of our power. And this cannot be true of the Necessary Being; for He is not composed of bodies within whose limits powers are diffused. His power and will and knowledge are one and the same as His essence.

To call Him a living being means that He is a knower in such a way that from His knowledge emanates the being which is called His action. A living being is an agent and a knower in the highest degree. Therefore, what is meant by calling Him a living being is His essence—in relation to His actions (the relation to be explained in the manner we have stated). His life is not like ours which needs for its completion the two different powers which are manifested through our knowledge and actions. On the contrary, His life, too, is identical with His essence.

To call Him generous means that the Universe emanates from Him—not because of a purpose He might have in view. Generosity includes two things. Firstly it is necessary that he who receives a gift should be able to profit by it. To give something to one who does not need it cannot be called generosity. Secondly, the generous person should not have an ulterior need to be fulfilled by his generosity. He should perform an act of generosity, as if it were the fulfilment of its own need. He who is generous in order to be praised and extolled, or in order to avoid blame, is a bargainer, not a generous person. And God's generosity is the true generosity; for He does not seek through it to avoid blame, or to gain the perfection which is the result of praise. Thus the word 'generous' is an expression for His being—in relation to the action, i.e., generosity, and in privation of a purpose. Hence it does not mean any plurality in His essence.

To call Him the pure Good may mean that His being is free from imperfection and the possibility of non-existence. Evil, which has no being, means either (a) the non-existence of a substance, or (b) the non-existence of the fitness of the condition of a substance. Existence, *qua* existence, is good. Therefore, when the word 'good' is used, it means the privation of the possibility of imperfection and evil.

Alternatively, good may be used as the name of something which is the cause of the system of things. The First Principle is the Principle of the system of every thing. Therefore, He is good; and the name signifies the Divine being as

bearing this particular relation.

To call Him the Necessary Being means the Divine being —denying a cause of it, and affirming the impossibility of non-existence before or after it.

To call Him a lover and a beloved one: and pleasant and pleased means that all beauty and grandeur and perfection is dear and lovely to the Perfect (and Beautiful and Grand) One. And pleasure means nothing but an agreeable consciousness of perfection. He who is aware of his perfection—perfection which flows from his comprehension of all knowable things (suppose that he does comprehend them): from the beauty of his form: from the greatness of his power: from the strength of his physique; in short from his consciousness of being the possessor of every possible cause of greatness (suppose that all these things could conceivably belong to *one* man)—will certainly love his perfection, and derive pleasure from it. But the pleasure of man is imperfect, because the non-existence or the loss of his perfection is an inevitable fact; and the causes of pleasure or delight do not include those things which are liable to decrease, and whose loss can always be foreseen. But the First Principle has perfect grandeur and the completest beauty; for every perfection which is possible for Him is actually present. And His consciousness of this perfection is safe from the possibility of decrease and loss. And the perfection which He always actually enjoys is superior to any other perfection. It follows that His love for, and interest in, this perfection are superior to all other cases wherein love is felt for, or interest is taken in, perfection. And the pleasure He derives from it is greater than the pleasure anyone else may derive from perfection. Nay, there is no comparison between our pleasures and His. Words like 'delight,' 'joy' and 'bliss' are too coarse to describe His pleasures. But there being no adequate words we might use for the Divine meanings, it becomes inevitable to use even the remotest metaphor—as we metaphorically use words like 'a willer' or 'a free agent' for Him, thus unwarrantably cutting short the distance between His will and power and knowledge and ours. It is, therefore, likely that the word 'pleasure' should not be approved of. In that case, some other word might be used instead of it. However, what is intended here is to show that His state is nobler—and, therefore, much more enjoyable—than that of

the angels. And the state of the angels is nobler than ours. If the satisfaction of physical and sexual appetite were the only cause of pleasure, the condition of an ass or a pig could be nobler than that of the angels. For the angels—i.e. the Principles or the beings divested of Matter—have no other pleasure than that of a joyful consciousness of the perfection and beauty which specially belongs to them, and which is not liable to decrease.

That which belongs to the First Principle is superior to that which belongs to the angels. For the existence of the angels, who are pure intelligences, is possible in itself, and necessary by virtue of something other than itself. And possibility of non-existence is a kind of evil or imperfection. No one except the First Principle being absolutely free from all evil, He alone is the pure Good, and His alone is the perfect beauty and grandeur. Further, He is a beloved one, regardless of whether anyone loves Him, or not—as He is the Intelligent and the Intelligible, regardless of whether any other intellect knows Him, or not. And all these meanings are resolved into His essence, and into His self-consciousness and self-knowledge. For His self-knowledge is identical with His essence. He being a pure intelligence, all the names (we have given to Him) mean one and the same thing.

[So this is the way to expound their doctrine. Now these things can be divided into:

(a) those which may be believed. With respect to such things, we will show that they are not compatible with the philosophers' fundamental principles.

(b) those which cannot be believed. With respect to such things, we will criticise the philosophers.

And we will recur to the five categories of plurality. Criticising the philosophers' rejection of each category (as applied to God), we will show how they fail to adduce rational arguments to prove their contention. Let us, therefore, consider each category in detail.]

PROBLEM VI

(REFUTATION OF THEIR DENIAL OF THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES)

LIKE the Mu'tazilah, the philosophers agree in rejecting as impossible the affirmation of knowledge, power and will of the First Principle. *They assert:*

These names have been used by the Sacred Law, and their application is etymologically defensible. Nevertheless, they all mean—as has been shown above—the same thing, viz., the one essence. It is not right to affirm attributes which are additional to the Divine essence, as our knowledge or power is an attribute additional to our essence. For (they assert) such a thing necessitates plurality.

If our attributes had occurred to us, we should have known that they are additional to our essence—insofar as they had subsequently emerged. Therefore, even if they are supposed to be coextensive with, and not posterior to, our being, still their coexistence will not change their character of being additional to the essence. For of any two things, if one occurs to the other, and if it is known that *This* is not *That*: nor can *That* be *This*, then—notwithstanding their coexistence—their being two different things will remain an intelligible fact. So the Divine attributes, even if coexistent with the Divine essence, will not cease to be additional to the essence. And this will necessitate plurality in the Necessary Being. But that plurality is impossible. Hence the (unanimous) denial (by the philosophers) of the Attributes.

It should be said to them:

How do you know that plurality of this kind is impossible? You are opposed to all the Muslims, except the Mu'tazilah. What is the argument to prove that this opposition is justified? If one says that the essence (which would bear the attributes) being one, plurality in the Necessary Being is impossible, then all he means is that plurality of attributes is impossible. And that is the point at issue. For such impossibility is not known by rational

necessity. An argument must be produced to prove it.

And they argue the point in two ways.

(1)

Firstly, they say :

Following is an argument to prove our point: Of the two things—viz., an attribute and its subject—*This* is not *That*, and *That* is not *This*. Now, (a) either the existence of each of the two will be independent of the other ; or (b) each will need the other; or (c) one will be independent, while the other is not. If each is supposed to be independent, both will be necessary. That amounts to absolute Duality, which is impossible. But if each of the two needs the other, neither will be a necessary being. For a necessary being means one which subsists by itself, as independent of other beings. So that which needs another being has its cause in that being ; for if the latter were to disappear, its own existence would be impossible. That is, its existence is not derived from itself, but from another being. Finally, if only one of the two depends on the other, then that which depends will be a caused being, and the other a necessary being. As a caused being, the dependent one will have an external cause. And this will lead to the conclusion that a dependent being comes to be connected with a necessary being by an external cause.

Objection to this may be taken as follows :

Of these three alternatives, the last one must be chosen. But even in regard to the first one—viz., Duality—we have shown (in the preceding problem) that your rejection of it is not supported by an argument. For the rejection of duality can only be based on a denial of plurality—i.e., the subject of this problem, and the following one. So, that which is a corollary of this problem cannot be the basis of this problem. However, the alternative to be chosen here is that in its constitution the essence does not depend on the attributes, while the Divine attributes—as well as ours—depend on their subject.

It remains for them to say :

That which depends on someone else cannot be a necessary being.

To this, the answer should be :

Why do you say so, if by the necessary being you mean a being which has no efficient cause? Why should it be impossible to say that, just as the essence of the Necessary Being is eternal and independent of an efficient cause, so are His attributes eternal and independent of an efficient cause? If by the necessary being you mean a being without a receptive cause, then the attributes are not necessary in that sense. Nonetheless, they are eternal and have no efficient cause. What is the contradiction involved in this view ?

If it is said :

An absolutely necessary being has neither an efficient nor a receptive cause. If you admit that the attributes have a receptive cause, you admit that they are caused things.

we will answer :

To call the essence which receives the attributes a receptive cause is your terminology. Rational arguments do not prove the existence of a necessary being to which these terms of yours could be applied. What they prove is only that there must be a limit at which the series of causes and effects comes to an end. Nothing beyond this can be proved. And the series of causes and effects can be brought to an end by the One who has eternal attributes, and whose attributes and essence are both independent of an efficient cause. Although eternal, His attributes reside in His essence. Let the word 'necessary being' be discarded, for it is likely to create confusion. Rational arguments only prove that a series must stop. Nothing beyond this can be proved. Therefore, the claim of any thing beyond this is an arbitrary claim.

If it is said:

Just as the series of efficient causes must stop somewhere, so must the series of receptive causes stop. For if every being needs a substratum in which to exist, and if the substratum itself were to need another substratum, an infinite regress would follow—as would be the case if every being needed an efficient cause, and the cause itself needed another.

we will say:

This is true. But we did bring the series to an end by saying that the Divine attributes are in the Divine essence, and that the Divine essence does not depend on any thing else. And this is like the position of our own attributes. For instance, the substratum of our knowledge is our essence, but our essence itself is not in another substratum. So in the Divine essence the series of the efficient causes of the attributes reaches its end; for neither the essence nor the attributes have an efficient cause. And the uncaused essence as well as its uncaused attributes never ceased to exist. As regards the series of receptive causes, it does reach its end in the essence. Whence does it follow that, in order to deny a cause, a substratum should be denied? Rational arguments do not compel one to believe any thing but that a series must stop. Every method through which a series can be cut short is faithful to the judgment on which the rational demonstration of a necessary being is based. If, however, by the rational being you mean something other than a being which is independent of an efficient cause, and in which the series of efficient causes reaches its end, we will not concede that such a being is necessary at all. Finally, if reason admits the idea of an eternal being which is uncaused, it will also admit the idea of an eternal possessor of attributes whose attributes and essence are both uncaused.

(2)

Secondly, they say:

Our knowledge or power does not enter into the quiddity of our essence; for it is only an accident. Therefore, if

such attributes were affirmed of the First Principle, they would not enter into the quiddity of His essence either, but remain mere accidents related to His essence—maybe, for ever. Many an accident is inseparable—i.e., it belongs to the quiddity inevitably. But that does not make it a constituent of the essence. Being an accident, it is always subordinate to the essence, which is, therefore, a cause of it. This makes an accident a caused thing. How, then, can you call an accident—i.e., an attribute—a necessary being?

(This is the same thing as the first argument changed in words.)

We will answer:

If by its being subordinate to the essence, and by the latter's being a cause of it you mean that the essence is an efficient cause of it, and that it is an effect of the essence, then this sense is not true. And such a thing is not necessary even in the case of our knowledge, as related to our essence For our essence is not an efficient cause of our knowledge. But if you mean that the essence is a substratum, and that the attributes cannot exist in themselves (if they do not exist in this substratum), then that sense has already been granted, and there is no reason why it should be called impossible. Whether the attribute is called a subordinate, or an accident, or an effect, or whatever one likes to call it, the meaning cannot be changed. For these words will not mean anything, if they do not mean that the Divine attributes exist in the Divine essence—in the manner in which all attributes exist in their subjects. And there is no reason why it should be regarded as impossible that the attributes exist in the essence, and still be eternal and independent of an efficient cause.

All the arguments advanced by the philosophers aim at scaring us by using (for the Divine attributes) such words as 'possible,' 'contingent,' 'subordinate,' 'inseparable accidents,' 'effects,' etc., and by suggesting that these words are undesirable. It must be said to them: If the meaning is that the attributes have an efficient cause, then that meaning is unacceptable. But if the meaning is that the attributes have, not an efficient cause, but a substratum in which they exist, then—whatever words one may choose to express this mean-

ing—there is no impossibility involved in it.

Sometimes, the philosophers try to scare us by using repulsive words of another kind. Thus, *they say* :

This leads to the conclusion that the First Principle needs the attributes. Consequently, He will not be the absolutely Unneedy. For the absolutely Unneedy does not need any thing which is external to Himself.

This is the most unconvincing literal-mindedness. The attributes of perfection cannot be separated from the essence of the perfect one, so as to occasion one's saying that the perfect one needs something which is external to him. If God has never ceased to be, nor will ever cease to be, perfect by virtue of His knowledge, power and life, how can it be said that He has a need for them? How can one read a need into the perfection which is an inseparable accompaniment? The philosophers' assertion is like one's saying:

> The perfect one is he who needs perfection. And he who needs —even the attribute of perfection—is essentially imperfect.

To this the answer would be: What is meant by one's being perfect is nothing but the actual existence of perfection in relation to his essence. Similarly, therefore, what God's being unneedy means is the actual existence of those attributes which preclude all wants and needs in relation to His essence. How, therefore, can you deny—through such verbal niceties—those attributes of perfection whereby the Divine realises itself?

If it is said:

If you affirm (a) an essence; (b) an attribute, and (c) the subsistence of the attribute in the essence, then you introduce composition. And wherever there is composition, there must be one who produces composition. This was the reason why we did not find it permissible to call the First Principle a body, which is subject to composition.

we will answer:

To say that all composition needs one who produces composition is like saying that every being needs one who

causes being. To that assertion the rejoinder will be: The First Principle is a being which is eternal, uncaused and independent of 'one who causes being.' Similarly, therefore, it should be said: The First Principle is a possessor of attributes who is eternal and uncaused, and whose (a) essence; (b) attributes, and (c) the subsistence of the attributes in the essence are all uncaused, each existing from eternity to eternity.

As far as body is concerned, it cannot be the First Principle, for it has a temporal character. And it has a temporal character, for it is never free from changes. But he who does not believe in the temporal character of body is bound—as we will show later—to admit the possibility that the First Cause should be body.

It must be clear now that all the methods of demonstration adopted by the philosophers are fantastic.

Moreover, they have failed to show how all the positive statements they make about God can be reduced to His essence. For instance, they affirm that He is a knower. But they must admit that being a knower is additional to existence. One should ask them: Do you admit that the First Principle knows any thing but Himself? To this, they make different answers. Some admit this; whereas others say that He knows Himself only.

The position that God knows what is other than Himself was adopted by Ibn Sīna. He said that God knows all the things in a universal manner which does not fall under Time. He argued that the particulars are not known to God, for the knowledge of particulars necessitates change in the essence of the knower.

Taking objection to this theory, we will say:

Is God's knowledge of all the Species and Gonera, whose number is unlimited, identical with His self-knowledge, or not? If you say that it is not identical, you will break the rule by affirming plurality. But if you say that it is identical, why should you not have yourself classed with one who claims that man's knowledge of what is other than himself is identioal with his self-knowledge and with his essence? And he who makes this statement must be a fool.

To him it will be said: The definition of 'one' thing is that it is impossible—even in the Imagination—to suppose the combination of Affirmation and Denial in it. The knowledge of 'one' thing being one, it is impossible to imagine it to exist and not to exist at the same time. Since it is not impossible to suppose—in the Imagination—a man's self-knowledge, without supposing his knowledge of things other than himself, it is said that his self-knowledge is not identical with his knowledge of things other than himself. If the two cognitions were identical, the denial of one would deny the other, and the affirmation of one would affirm the other. It is impossible that Zaid should be and not be at the same time. But such a thing is not true of the two cognitions—viz., self-knowledge and the knowledge of the other. Similarly, God's self-knowledge and the knowledge of the Other cannot be identical. For it is possible to imagine the existence of one of them, without imagining the existence of the other. They are two different things. It is not possible to imagine the existence of His essence, without imagining the existence of His essence. If the self-sameness of His essence were like the alleged identity of the two cognitions, this imagining would be impossible. Therefore, any philosopher, who claims that God knows any thing other than Himself, thereby affirms plurality.

If it is said:

He does not know the Other by primary intention. But He knows Himself as the Principle of the Universe. From this knowledge follows—by second intention—the knowledge of the Universe. It is impossible that He should know Himself, without knowing that He is the Principle of the Universe. For being the Principle of the Universe is the reality of His essence. And it is not possible that He should know Himself as the Principle of that which is other than Himself, without the Other entering into His knowledge—by way of implication or necessary consequence. There is no reason why His essence should not have necessary consequences. Nor does the having of necessary consequences necessitate plurality in the quiddity of essence. What is impossible is only that there should be plurality in the essence itself.

The answer from several points:

Firstly, your statement that He knows Himself as the Principle of the Universe is an arbitrary assumption. It would be proper that He knew just the existence of His essence. The knowledge of His being the Principle is additional to the knowledge of existence. For being a principle is a relation of the essence. It is possible for one to know his essence, without knowing its relations. If the state of being a principle were not a relation, the essence would be multiple—i.e., there would be existence *and* the state of being a principle. For existence and the state of being a principle are two different things. As it is possible for a man to know himself, without knowing that he is an effect (for that knowledge depends on *his* knowledge that being an effect is a relation *he* bears to his cause), so God's being the Cause is a relation *He* bears to *His* effects. Even if the effects are left aside, the objection to their statement, that He knows Himself as *a* principle, stands. For the statement means the knowledge of essence *and* the knowledge of being a principle. Being a principle is a relation of the essence. A relation of the essence is not identical with the essence. Therefore, the knowledge of the relation cannot be identical with the knowledge of the essence. Our argument for this conclusion has already been given—namely, that, on the one hand, it is possible to imagine the knowledge of essence, without imagining the knowledge of its being a principle; and that, on the other hand, it is not possible to imagine the knowledge of essence, without imagining the knowledge of essence (for essence is one).

Secondly, their statement that the Universe is known to Him by a second intention is rational. For if His knowledge encompasses the Other, as it encompasses His own essence, then there will be two distinct objects of His knowledge. And the number and distinction of known things will necessitate the numerical increase of knowledge. Since it is possible in the Imagination to keep the objects of knowledge apart from each other, the knowledge of one cannot be identical with the knowledge of another. If it were not, it would not be possible to suppose the the existence of one without the other. If all the cognitions were one, there would be no 'other': and variation in phraseology—by using the words

'a second intention'—would not create any difference.

I wish I could understand how one who says:

> 'Nothing—not even as much as a particle of dust, in the heavens or on the earth—is hidden from His knowledge.' But He knows things in a universal manner. The universals which can be known are infinite in number. But in spite of the multiplicity of, and the differences among, the objects of knowledge, His knowledge of these objects is one in all respects.

dares to deny plurality. And Ibn Sīna is opposed on this point to other philosophers, who, in order to avoid plurality, adopted the view that God does not know any thing other than Himself. How can Ibn Sīna agree with these philosophers in denying plurality, and disagree with them in affirming God's knowledge of the Other. He would be ashamed of saying:

> God does not know any thing in this world, or in the Hereafter. He knows Himself only. But every other being knows (a) God; (b) itself, and (c) what is other than itself. So all other beings are nobler than God, so far as knowledge is concerned.

So he rejected this doctrine, for he was disgusted with it. But then, he was not ashamed of insisting on the denial of plurality in all respects. He asserted that God's self-knowledge and His knowledge of any—rather, every—thing other than Himself are precisely the same as His essence. This is the contradiction—detectable at the first sight—of which all other philosophers would be ashamed. And thus we arrive at the conclusion that both Ibn Sīna and those with whom he disagreed end by saying things which are disgraceful. And this is how God confounds those who go astray from His path, thinking that their reason or imagination can help them to grapple with the Divine things.

If it is said:

If it is established that He knows Himself as a principle

by way of relation, the knowledge of the thing to which a relation is borne must be one. For he who knows 'son' knows him by 'one' knowledge which is also—by implication—the knowledge of 'father,' 'fatherhood' and 'sonship.' Thus, in spite of the multiplicity of the objects of knowledge, knowledge remains one. Similarly, God knows Himself as the Principle of the Other; and, in spite of the multiplicity of the objects of knowledge, knowledge remains one. And since such a thing is intelligible in the case of one effect *and* its relation to God, and seeing that it does not necessitate plurality, it follows that increase in the number of that which is not generically a cause of plurality will not necessitate plurality either.

The same thing happens when one who knows a thing also knows the knowledge of that thing. He knows his knowledge of the thing by knowing the thing; for every knowledge is the knowledge of itself, as of its object. Therefore, the objects of knowledge multiply; but knowledge remains one.

Another proof of our thesis is the fact that you believe that, although the objects of God's knowledge are infinite in number, yet His knowledge is one. You do not say that He has a correspondingly unlimited number of cognitions. If the multiplicity of the objects of knowledge necessitated numerical increase in knowledge itself, there would be an unlimited number of cognitions in the Divine essence—which is impossible.

we will answer:

Whenever knowledge is one in all respects, its relation to two objects is inconceivable. The relation of knowledge to more than one object demands plurality, if the postulates laid down by the philosophers in their theory of plurality are to be followed. For they have exaggerated (the sense of plurality) by saying that, if God had a quiddity as the possessor of the attribute of existence, plurality would arise. They have claimed that 'one' thing which has a reality, and to which existence is *then* attributed, is unintelligible. They have asserted that, if existence is related to a reality, the two would be different things, whence plurality will arise. So on *this* ground, it is impossible to suppose the relation of one knowledge to many objects—without thence arising a kind

of plurality which is more clear and distinct than the plurality following from the supposition of an existence related to quiddity.

As regards the knowledge of 'son,' or any other relative term, there *is* plurality in it. For the knowledge of 'son' and the knowledge of 'father' are two different cognitions. And there is a third knowledge, viz., that of the relation between the two. This third knowledge is implied in the first two cognitions; for they are its conditions, and provide its necessity. Without knowing the things which are related, you cannot know the relation. So all these cognitions are numerically distinct; and some of them are conditioned by others.

Therefore, if God knows Himself as related to the Genera and Species by virtue of His being their Principle, this knowledge will require that He should know (a) Himself; (b) the Genera and Species, one by one, and (c) His relation to the Genera and Species—by virtue of His being the Principle of the Genera and Species. Otherwise, it would be unintelligible to say that the relation is an object of His knowledge.

As regards their statement that he who knows something knows his knowledge by this very knowledge (which shows how, in spite of the multiplicity of the objects of knowledge, knowledge remains one), it is not true. One who knows his knowledge of something, knows it by another knowledge (and knows the second knowledge by a third knowledge), and so on, till the series comes to an end at a knowledge to which he is inattentive, and which is, therefore, not known to him. So he is (ultimately) inattentive to knowledge, but not to the object of knowledge. For instance, when one knows a black thing, his soul is at the time of knowing absorbed into this object; and, therefore, he is inattentive to, or unaware of, his knowledge of this object. For if he were to be aware of his knowledge, it would require another knowledge-- whereby his awareness would cease.

As regards their statement that our objection may turn against us in the case of the objects of Divine knowledge (which we consider to be infinite in number, although Divine knowledge is one), we will say: In this book, ours is not the point of view of (system-) builders, but only that of those who destroy things, or criticise them. For this reason, we have called the book *The Destruction Of The Philosophers*, not "*An Introduction To Truth.*" Therefore, we are not bound

to reply to your objection.

If it is said:

We do not mean that you must adopt a definite point of view—e.g., the position of a particular Sect. But a difficulty which presents itself to all mankind, and which is equally baffling to all, should not be dismissed by you. The difficulty we have raised is such a difficulty. Therefore, neither you, nor any other Sect, can ignore it.

we will say:

No, our purpose is only to show your inability to justify your claim to the knowledge of the realities of things by conclusive arguments. We wanted to shake your faith in your own claims. Now that your inability has been shown, let it be borne in mind that there are some people who believe that the realities of the Divine things cannot be discovered through intellectual investigations, and that, on the contrary, it is beyond man's power to discover them. For this reason, the Law-giver has said: "Think over the product of God's creative activity; do not think over His essence." How will you disprove the people

who believe in the truth of the Apostles, regarding the miracles performed by them as their arguments:

who refrain from expressing an intellectual judgment concerning Him who sent the Apostles:

who refrain from attempting intellectual investigations into the Divine attributes:

who assent to whatever the Law-giver has told them with respect to God's attributes:

who follow the Law-giver's example in using words like 'the knowing One': 'the willing One': 'the Omnipotent,' etc., about God:

who refuse to apply to Him words which have not been recommended to them; and

who confess that they are unable to understand these things with the help of reason?

You disagree with these people, because you think that

they are ignorant of the methods of rational demonstration, and cannot arrange their premises in the form of syllogisms. And you claim to have discovered the realities of the Divine things by your rational methods. But your helplessness has been shown; the incoherence of your methods has been exposed; and your claim to definite knowledge has been reduced to absurdity. And this is what we aimed at in this discussion. Where is he who claimed that metaphysical arguments are as conclusive as mathematical arguments?

If it is said :

This difficulty should be presented to Ibn Sīna who asserted that God knows what is other than Himself. The 'masters' among the philosophers agree that He does not know any thing but Himself. So the difficulty raised by you is removed.

we will answer :

Beware this infamous doctrine! If it were not extremely obnoxious, the latter philosophers would not refuse to support it. Let us explain what makes it so disgraceful. It implies that the effects of God are worthier than God. For an angel, or a man, or any intelligent being, knows (a) itself; (b) its principle; and (c) other beings. If God does not know any thing other than Himself, He must be imperfect—in comparison with man (not to speak of the angels), or even the beasts (who, in addition to self-consciousness, know many other things). Obviously, knowledge is a cause of worth, and its absence is an imperfection. Where is now the philosophers' assertion that He is a lover and a beloved one, for perfect grandeur and the completest beauty belongs to Him? What beauty can belong to a simple being which has no quiddity or reality, and which does not know what goes on in the world, or what necessarily follows or proceeds from it? What imperfection in the world of God can be more imperfect than this? All intelligent people must be surprised to see that the philosophers, who claim a profound knowledge of the intelligibles, end by saying that the Supreme Deity, the Cause of all causes has no knowledge of what goes on in the world. What, apart from His

self-knowledge, can be the difference between Him and a dead person? What is the point in calling His self-knowledge a perfection, if He is ignorant of what is other than Himself? This doctrine is so evidently disgraceful that no detailed description is required to prove the fact. Finally, it must be said to the philosophers: In spite of steeping yourselves into these disgraceful things, you have not been able to get rid of plurality. We must ask you: Is His self-knowledge identical with, or other than, Himself? If you say that it is other than Himself, plurality comes in. But if you say that it is identical, what will be the difference between you and him who says that man's self-knowledge is identical with himself? To such a statement, *our* answer will be: This is nonsense. The existence of the essence of a man is intelligible—even at a time when he is inattentive to himself. When his inattention ceases, he awakens to himself. This again shows that his self-consciousness is other than himself.

If you say :

Man is sometimes devoid of self-knowledge, which, however, occurs to him afterwards. It follows that self-knowledge is other than himself.

we will answer :

Otherness is not determined by occurrence or coexistence. The identity of a thing does not occur to it. And that which is other than something does not become that thing—i.e., it does not cease to be other than that thing—because of coexistence with it. Therefore, if God has never ceased to be a knower of Himself, it does not follow that His self-knowledge is His essence. The Imagination admits the supposition of an essence, and *then* the occurrence of consciousness. If consciousness were identical with the essence, this imagining would not be possible.

If it is said :

His essence is intelligence and knowledge. There is no such thing as: "Essence: *then* knowledge existing in essence."

we will say :

This is evidently stupid. Knowledge is an attribute or an accident which requires a subject. To say that in Himself, He is intelligence or knowledge is like saying that He is power or will. The latter statement will amount to saying that power or will exists in itself. And if it is seriously maintained, it will be like saying that blackness, or whiteness, or Quantity, or threefoldness, or fourfoldness, or any other accident exists in itself. The argument which proves the impossibility of attributes existing, not in bodies (which are other than the attributes), but in themselves, is also the argument to prove that the attributes of living beings—e.g., knowledge, life, power, will, etc.—exist, not in themselves, but in an essence. For instance, life exists in an essence, whose life it is. And the same holds of all other attributes.

The philosophers are not content with denying all the attributes of God, nor with denying His reality and quiddity; they go further to deny His self-subsistence—by reducing Him to the nature of accidents and qualities which cannot exist in themselves. But we intend to show (in some other problems in this book) that they are unable to prove (by rational arguments) that He even knows—Himself, or that which is other than He.

PROBLEM VII

REFUTATION OF THEIR THESIS THAT IT IS IMPOSSIBLE THAT SOMETHING SHOULD SHARE A GENUS WITH GOD, BEING SEPARATED FROM HIM BY DIFFERENTIA; AND THAT THE INTELLECTUAL DIVISION INTO GENUS AND DIFFERENTIA IS IN APPLICABLE TO HIM

THEY have agreed on this point, and based on it the contention that, since nothing shares with Him a generic factor, nothing can be different from Him by virtue of a differential one. Hence He cannot be defined. For definition consists of genus and differentia; and that wherein there is no composition cannot be defined, as this is a kind of composition.

And they assert :

One's saying: "He is comparable to the first effect in respect of His being an existent; a substance, and a cause of others; whereas, obviously, He is distinguished from the first effect in respect of something else" does not show a cosharing in genus, but only in a common inseparable accident. As Logic shows, the difference between a genus and an inseparable accident has a basis in reality, even though the two may not differ in regard to inseparableness. For the essential genus is that common property which is given in answer to the question: What is it? It enters into the quiddity of the defined thing, and is a constituent of its being. For instance, man's being a living being enters into man's quiddity—i.e., animality: hence it is the genus. On the other hand, his being a born or a created thing is an inseparable relation which never leaves him, but which does not enter into his quiddity—even though it is an inseparable accident common to all men. The way in which these things are known in Logic is indisputable.

Further, they assert:

Existence never enters into the quiddity of things, but is related to quiddity—either as an inseparable accident which never leaves the thing (e.g., the existence of heaven), or as something which happens after it had not been (e.g., the existence of things which have a beginning in time). Therefore, cosharing in existence is not cosharing in genus.

As regards His sharing with other causes in the character of being the cause of other things, it is again the cosharing of a relation which, however inseparable, does not enter into quiddity. Neither principleness, nor existence, constitutes His being; but each is inseparably related to it after the constitution of being by the parts of quiddity. If either is coshared, it will be but the cosharing of an inseparable accident whose inseparableness is subordinate to being. It will not be the cosharing of genus. This is the reason why things can be defined only by reference to their constituents. If they are defined by reference to their inseparable accidents, it is only a description in order to mark something off, not to depict its reality. For instance, in the definition of a triangle it is not said that all its angles are equal to two right angles, although it is an accident inseparably related to every triangle. On the contrary, it is said that a triangle is a figure enclosed by three sides.

The same holds of the cosharing of the state of being a substance. What being a substance means is that something is an existent not-in-subject. An existent is not a genus. Nor by the relation of something negative—i.e., not-in-subject—does it become a constituting genus. Nay, even if the positive aspect is related to it—i.e., when it is called an existent in a subject—it will not become a genus *per accidens*. This is so, because he who knows substance through its definition (viz., that it is an existent not in subject), which serves the purpose of a description of it, does not know anything about its being, except that it may, or may not, be in a subject. When in order to describe substance we say that it is an existent not-in-subject, the meaning is that it is a reality which, when found, is found not-in-subject. We do not mean that actually it is an existent at the time of definition It follows that cosharing of it is not cosharing of genus. Only the cosharing of the constituents of quiddity is

the cosharing of genus, which consequently requires distinction by virtue of differentia. And God has not quiddity other than necessary existence. Hence necessary existence is the real nature, the quiddity-in-itself which belongs to Him, and to no one else. And because necessity of existence belongs to Him alone and to no one else, no one can be cosharer with Him. Therefore, no one can be differentiated from Him by a specific difference. Therefore, He is indefinable.

(This much was necessary by way of the exposition of their doctrine. Now, we proceed to criticise it from two points of view: first that of a questioner, and the second that of one who refutes.)

In the questioning, it may be said:

This, then, is the summary of the doctrine. Now, how do you know the impossibility of this, in regard to God—so as to base upon it the denial of duality (cf. your position that the second necessary being must coshare with Him something, being differentiated in respect of another; and that he who has one thing to be shared and another not to be shared is composite, whereas the composite—as an attribute of God—is impossible)?

Let us say:

Whence comes to you the knowledge that this kind of composition is impossible? There is no proof of it, except what you were reported to say in denial of the attributes—namely, that the composition of genus and differentia produces an aggregate of parts: that if the existence of a part or the whole is valid independently of the other, then it will be necessary of existence, as set over against the other; and that if the existence of the parts is not valid independently of the aggregate, nor that of the aggregate independently of the parts, then each will be an effect or a dependent.

We have considered this argument in connection with the attributes, and have shown—in connection with the question of the termination of the series of causes—that this is not impossible. What can be rationally proved is only the termination of regress. As regards those grand things which have been invented by them so as to form inseparable

attributes of the necessary being, there is no argument for them. If necessary being means what they explain it to be—namely, that there is no composition in it, and that, therefore, it does not depend on anyone other than itself for its constitution—then there is no argument to prove necessary being. What there is an argument for is only the termination of regress. With this (argument) we have already dealt in connection with the attributes.

Our contention is all the more valid in this section. For to divide something into genus and differentia is not like dividing a bearer of attributes into essence and attribute. An attribute is other than the essence, and the essence is other than the attribute. But the species is not other than the genus in all respects. When we speak of the species, we only mean the genus *plus* an additional factor. Thus, when we speak of Man, we mean Animal *plus* the additional factor of rationality. To ask whether man-ness can be independent of animality is like asking whether man-ness can be independent of itself, when something else is added to it. It is, therefore, further removed from plurality than an attribute and its bearer can be.

Why should it be impossible for the series of causes and effects to stop at two causes—one being the cause of the heavens, and the other that of the elements: or one the cause of the heavens, and the other that of all bodies? Why should it be impossible for the two causes conceptually to be separate and distinct—as, for instance, between redness and heat even in the same place there is conceptual distinction without our supposing any genus-differentia composition in redness so as to make it analysable? Nay, if there is plurality in it, this sort of plurality will not be repugnant to the unity of essence. So what is the reason why this should be impossible in the case of causes? And this shows how they fail to defend their denial of the possibility of two gods or creators.

If it is said:

This is impossible, because that wherein the two beings differ must be present in each necessary being—if it is condition for the necessity of existence. But then there will be no difference between the two. On the contrary, if it is

not a condition, then, insofar as necessary existence can do without all that is no condition for the necessity of existence, necessity of existence will be completed without it.

we will answer:

This is the same as what you had to say in connection with the attributes. We have already dealt with it. In all this the source of confusion is the term 'necessary being.' This term should, therefore, be discarded. We do not concede that rational arguments prove the necessary being—if the term does not mean an eternal existent who has no efficient cause. But if this meaning is adopted, then the term 'necessary being' should be dismissed, and you must prove that in an existent which has no cause or agent, number or composition is impossible. But that just cannot be proved.

There remains their question whether the necessary being's uncausedness is conditioned by that which is supposed to be common to the two necessary beings. This is silly, for we have shown that something which is uncaused is not caused to be so, wherefore its condition should be sought out. It is like one's asking whether blackness is a condition for colour's being colour: and, if it were, why should redness be colour. To this question, the answer will be: As regards its reality—viz., the reality of colouredness as realised in the Intellect—neither blackness nor redness is a condition. But as far as its existence is concerned, each one may be a condition, although not the only one. That is, no genus can possibly exist without some difference. Similarly, therefore, he who affirms two causes, thereby putting an end to the causal series, might say: They are distinguishable from each other by differences one of which is of necessity a condition for existence—not in an exhaustive way.

If it is said:

This is possible in the case of colour, for colour has an existence related to quiddity or additional to it. But it is not applicable to the necessary being; for such being has nothing but the necessity of existence. There is no quiddity to which existence could be related. As the differentia of blackness or redness is no condition for colouredness, *qua*

colouredness, but only a condition for the existence of colouredness which is caused, similarly it is proper that the differentia of the necessary being should not be a condition for the necessity of existence. For necessary existence is to the Necessary Being what colouredness is to colour—unlike the existence of a coloured thing which is related to colouredness.

we will say:

This cannot be allowed. The necessary being must have a reality to which existence is attributed. The point will be explained in the next problem. The philosophers' assertion that the necessary being has no quiddity but existence is unintelligible. The upshot of the whole discussion is that they base the denial of quality on that of genus-differentia composition. And this they base on the denial of quiddity as set over against existence. So when we have destroyed the last one, which is the foundation of foundation, the whole structure will collapse. For verily, it is a shaky structure like the spider's web.

The Second Method: Objection:

We say: Even if existence, substantiality, or being a principle is no genus (for none is given in answer to the question: What is it?), still you consider God to be a pure intelligence, as all other intelligences (who are the secondary principles of existence, and whom the philosophers also call Angels—i.e., the effects of the First Cause) are pure intelligences divested of Matter. So this reality will include God and His first effect. For the first effect, too, is simple, having no composition in it, except by way of its inseparable accidents. The two will, therefore, stand on par, inasmuch as each is intelligence divested of Matter. And this is a generic reality, for being pure intelligence is not one of the inseparable accidents of being, but the very quiddity. So this quiddity will be common to God and all the intelligences. Now, if God is not distinguished from the intelligences by something else, you will have conceived a duality without mutual distinction. But if He is distinguishable, then that which causes distinction must be other than that which gives God

and the intelligences their common character of being intelligent. And the cosharing of this character will be the cosharing of the generic reality. For, according to those who believe in God's knowledge of what is other than Himself, God has self-knowledge and the knowledge of the Other—*by virtue of* His being intelligence divested of Matter. And the first effect—viz., the first intelligence, whom God has already caused forth—does share this character with God. The argument for this is that the intelligences, which are the primary effects, are different species sharing the character of being intelligences, but separated from each other by certain differentiae. And God will share with all of them the character of being an intelligence. So here the philosophers have two alternatives: either the rule laid down by them will be broken, or they should revert to the position that being an intelligence does not constitute the essence of God. And for them each alternative is impossible.

PROBLEM VIII

REFUTATION OF THEIR THESIS THAT GOD'S IS SIMPLE BEING—I.E., IT IS PURE BEING, WITHOUT A QUIDDITY OR ESSENCE TO WHICH EXISTENCE WOULD BE RELATED—AND THAT NECESSARY EXISTENCE IS TO HIM WHAT QUIDDITY IS TO ANY OTHER BEING

We will criticise this from two points of view:

Firstly, demand for an argument: let it be said to them:

How do you know this—as a self-evident fact, or by theoretical investigation? It is not a self-evident fact. Therefore, you must set forth the theoretical grounds of it.

If it is said:

If He had a quiddity, His existence would be a relation or a subordinate or an inseparable accident of quiddity. But the subordinate is only an effect. Consequently, necessary existence would be an effect. But that is a contradiction in terms.

we will answer:

By using the words 'necessary being,' you are reverting to the source of confusion. We say that He has an essence or a quiddity: that the essence is an existent—in the sense that it is not a non-entity or a negation—and that existence is related to the essence. If they love to call such existence an inseparable accident or a subordinate, names will not matter very much—if it is recognised that such existence had no agent, but continued from eternity without any efficient cause. If by the words 'subordinate' and 'effect' they understand something which has an efficient cause, these words will be inapplicable to His existence. But

if any other meaning is assigned to them, that meaning will be allowed, and no contradiction will be involved in it. For rational demonstration has not proved anything besides the termination of the series of causes and effects. And it is possible to terminate the series by an existent essence, a well-defined quiddity. The termination does not require that the quiddity be explained away.

If it is said:

From this it follows that the quiddity is the cause of existence, which, being subordinate to quiddity, will be only an effect or an agendum of it.

we will answer:

Even the quiddity of the originated things is not the cause of their being. How can it be the cause of the Eternal being—if cause means an agent? If, however, by cause they mean something else (e.g., something which cannot be dispensed with), then the quiddity may be the cause of existence, without involving any impossibility. What actually involves impossibility is an infinite regress of causes. When this is cut short, the impossibility is obviated. It is not clear why anything else should be impossible. He who claims that impossibility has not been obviated even after the termination of the causal series must give an argument to prove the point. And all the arguments advanced by the philosophers are only arbitrary assumptions based: (a) upon the use of the words 'necessary being' in a sense from which certain consequences are drawn by them, and (b) upon the assumption that rational demonstration has proved the Necessary Being in accordance with their own description of it. But—as shown above—this is not so.

In short, this argument of the philosophers has its basis in their arguments against the attributes and against the genus-differentia division. It is even obscurer and weaker, for the plurality attacked here exists only in words. Actually, the supposition of quiddity which is 'one' existent is intellectually admissible. If they say: "Every quiddity which is an existent has already received plurality, since there is existence in addition to quiddity," they only show their

utmost ignorance. For in any case, the 'one' existent is intelligible, and there is no existent without an essence, but the existence of the essence is not incompatible with oneness.

The Second Method: we will say:

Existence without quiddity or essence is unintelligible. As we do not understand non-existence which is not related to a being whose non-existence it should be, so we cannot understand unqualified existence which is not related to a definite essence. Specially, when existence is particularised into one essence, how can it have that particular oneness which will be the conceptual basis for its distinction from anyone else—unless it had a reality? To deny quiddity is to deny reality. And if the reality of a being is denied, its existence will be unintelligible. What the philosophers say is like saying: 'Existence, but no existent.' And that is a contradiction in terms. To prove the point, if existence without an existent were intelligible, existence without reality could be found among the effects as well. Such existence would be a cosharer with God in the character of having no reality or quiddity; and would be distinguishable from Him in that it had a cause while God had none. Now, why is not such a thing among the effects conceivable? Is there any other reason for its being inconceivable than that in itself it is unintelligible? That which is in itself unintelligible does not become intelligible, if its cause is denied. And that which is intelligible does not cease to be so, if it is supposed to depend on a cause.

By going to this extent, the philosophers show how miserably they grope in the dark. They thought that they had arrived at a pure idea of God; but, in fact, the ultimate result of their investigations is pure negation. The denial of quiddity is the denial of reality. When reality is denied, nothing remains but the word 'existence,' to which no object corresponds, unless it be related to quiddity.

If it is said:

His reality is that He is necessary. So this is the quiddity.

we will answer:

'Necessary' only means the denial of cause. And that is a negation which cannot constitute the reality of a being. Moreover, the denial of the cause of reality is a property of reality. There must be an intelligible essence to which uncausedness might be related. It follows that the non-existence of reality is inconceivable—since necessity has no other sense than that of being uncaused.

Besides, if necessity is additional to existence, plurality comes in. If it is not additional, how can it be the quiddity? Existence is not quiddity. Therefore, that which is not identical with existence cannot be so either.

PROBLEM IX

OF THEIR INABILITY TO PROVE BY RATIONAL ARGUMENTS THAT GOD IS NOT BODY

WE WILL SAY :

One who believes that body is originated in time (for it is never free from changes and all changes need one who originates them in time) can consistently maintain that God is not body. But you accord intellectual assent to the idea of an eternal body which never began, but which, nevertheless, is always subject to changes. Why, therefore, should it be impossible for you to believe that the First Principle is body—e.g., the Sun, or the highest sphere, etc.?

If it is said:

The reason is that body is bound to be composed. It can be divided: (a) quantitatively, into two parts; (b) conceptually, into Form and Matter, and (c) into those qualities which specially belong to a body—so as to distinguish it from other bodies from which, *qua* body, it is, however, not different. But the Necessary Being is one, and indivisible with respect to all these things.

we will answer:

We have refuted this argument of yours, and shown that the only thing you can prove is that, if some parts of an aggregate need others, then the aggregate must be a caused thing. We have considered this point, and shown that, if it is not untenable to suppose a being which is independent of 'one who causes its being,' it will not be any more untenable to suppose: (a) a compound which is independent of 'one who causes its composition'; or (b) many beings which are independent of 'one who causes their being.' You base your denial of number and duality on the denial of composition; and the denial of composition is based on the denial of a quiddity—as set over against existence. We have refuted

your denial of quiddity—which is the ultimate basis of your theory—and shown how arbitrary your assumptions are.

If it is said:

If body is not connected with soul, it will not be an efficient cause. But if it is connected with soul, then soul will be its cause. Therefore, body cannot be the First Cause.

we will answer:

Our soul is not the cause of our body. Nor (according to you) is the soul of the sphere by itself the cause of the body of the sphere. In either case, body is produced by an external cause. And if it can be eternal, it will have no cause at all.

If it is said:

But then how did combination of soul and body happen?

we will answer:

This question is like one's asking: How did the Prime Being happen? To that question, the answer will be: This question is to be asked concerning an originated thing. 'How did it happen?' cannot be asked concerning a being which never ceased to exist. Similarly, therefore, if neither the soul nor the body ever ceased to be, why should it be impossible that body be the Creator?

If it is said:

The reason is that body, *qua* body, cannot create any other being. And the soul which is connected with body acts only through the intermediacy of body. And body cannot be an intermediary for the soul for the purpose of: (a) the creation of other bodies; (b) the production of other souls, and (c) the production of things uncongenial to bodies.

we will answer:

Why is it not possible that, among the souls, there be a

soul which is enabled by a special property possessed by it to be the source for the production of bodies and other things from it? Such an impossibility is not a self-evident fact. Nor can it be proved by theoretical arguments. No doubt, we have not observed such a thing in the case of empirical bodies. But non-observation does not prove impossibility. For instance, the philosophers attribute many things to the Prime Being, which (things) cannot be attributed to a being at all, and have not been observed in the case of any other being. But the fact that they have not been observed in the case of other beings does not prove their impossibility in His case. The same may, therefore, be true of soul and body.

If it is said:

The body of the highest sphere, or the Sun, or whatever other body is supposed, must possess a certain quantity the increase or decrease of which must have been possible. Hence the special choice of a contingent quantity for the body will require a cause of that special choice. And, therefore, the body will not be the First Cause.

we will answer:

How will you disprove one who says:

"It is necessary—because of the universal system—that this body should possess the quantity it does possess. It could not have a bigger or a smaller quantity than the present one. This is like your own explanation. You have said: 'The body of the highest sphere emanated from the first effect. This body possesses a certain quantity. In relation to the first effect, all the quantities are equal. But one of them has been specified—by virtue of its relation to the universal system—to be the quantity of the body of the first sphere. Therefore, the quantity which actually exists is necessary, and any thing different from it is rejected.' So the same explanation may be extended to that which is not an effect."?

Nay, the question is not settled even by their affirmation of a principle of special choice *in* the first effect (which is,

according to them, the cause of the body of the first sphere) —e.g., the affirmation of will. Just as they have put the question to Muslims (who relate all things to the eternal will), so can they be asked: Why did the first effect will *this* quantity, as set over against all others? (In fact, we have turned their objections against them in the discussion of the specific direction of the movement of the Heaven, and in the discussion of the two specific points which are the Poles.)

Since it is now clear that they are bound to admit the possibility of a *caused* distinction of something from another like it, it follows that the admission of a *caused* distinction of this kind is like the admission of an *uncaused* one. For it makes no difference whether the question is about something which has a special quantity—viz., Why does it have it? or about the cause—viz., Why did it give something a special quantity? If the latter question—i.e., the one about the cause—can be answered by saying that *this* quantity is not like any other quantity (for it has a connection with the system which connection other quantities do not have), then the former question—i.e., the one about the thing itself which has a special quantity—can be answered in the same way, without there being any need for an external cause. And this is an inescapable position. For, if a particular quantity, which has actually happened, is like the one which has not happened, then the question will be: How is something distinguished from another like it? (And the question is particularly relevant to their principles, for they reject the will as a cause of distinction). But if a specific quantity, which has happened, is not like the one which has not happened, then the possibility of the non-existent quantity will not be established. And then it will be said to them that, just as they consider the Eternal Cause to have 'happened,' so did the body (which, in order to refute them, we have assumed to be the First Cause) 'happen' eternally.

(In this discussion, he who argues with the philosophers must make use of the objections raised by them to the eternal will, and the counter-objections we raised to their theory of the Pole, and of the direction of spherical movement.)

And this shows that he who does not believe in the temporal origin of bodies cannot prove by rational arguments that the First Principle is absolutely incorporeal.

PROBLEM X

OF THEIR INABILITY TO PROVE BY RATIONAL ARGUMENTS THAT THERE IS A CAUSE OR CREATOR OF THE WORLD

WE WILL *say:*

He who believes that all body is originated (for it is never free from changes) has an intelligible position, if he claims that body requires a cause or a creator. But what prevents the philosophers from saying—as the Materialists say—that:

> "From eternity, the world has been as it is. It has no cause or creator. A cause is required by that which originates in time. No one of the bodies in the world originates in time; nor does it perish. It is only the Forms and Accidents which originate in time. The bodies —i.e., the heavens—are eternal. And the four elements, which are the stuff of the sphere of the Moon, and their bodies and Matter(s) are eternal. On these pass in succession the Forms resulting from combination and transformation. Further, the human soul and the vegetative soul originate in time. And the series of the causes of all those things which originate in time comes to an end at rotatory motion. And rotatory motion is eternal, its source being the eternal soul of the sphere. All this shows that the world has no cause, and that the bodies in the world have no creator. The world is as it has always been. Similarly, the bodies in the world are, and have been, eternally uncaused."?

What do the philosophers mean by saying that the eternal bodies in the world have a cause?

If it is said:

That which is uncaused is a necessary being. In connection with the attributes of a necessary being, we have

stated the reason why body cannot be a necessary being.

we will answer:

And we have exposed the invalidity of what you claim to be the attributes of a necessary being. It has been shown that rational demonstration does not prove anything but the impossibility of an infinite regress. And the Materialist cuts short—at the very outset—an infinite regress by saying that:

> The bodies have no cause. As regards the Forms and Accidents, some of them are causes of others, till at last the series comes to an end at rotatory motion.

And, as the philosophers themselves believe (the Materialist admits that) some of the rotatory movements are causes of others, but that the causal series reaches its end in rotatory motion.

So he who reflects over the points we have mentioned will see the inability of all those who believe in the eternity of bodies to claim that they have a cause. These people are in consistency bound to accept Materialism and Atheism—as some thinkers, who gave clear expression to the presuppositions of the philosophers' theory—have actually done.

If it is said:

Our argument is this: If these bodies are supposed to be necessary, it will be absurd. If they are supposed to be possible, all that is possible needs a cause.

we will answer:

The words 'necessary' and 'possible' are meaningless. All the confusion created by the philosophers has its source in these two words. We prefer substituting for them their sense—i.e., the denial of a cause, and its affirmation respectively. This would result in the philosophers' saying that these bodies may, or may not, have a cause. The Materialist will say that they do not have a cause. Why should the philosophers find fault with him? And possibility meaning what it does, we will say that body is necessary, not possible.

If they say that it is not possible for body to be necessary, they make a groundless and arbitrary assumption.

If it is said:

No one can deny that body has parts: that parts constitute the whole; and that essentially they take precedence over the whole.

we will answer:

Let it be so. Let the whole subsist by the parts and their combination. Let, however, the parts as well as their combination be uncaused, eternal and independent of an efficient cause. The philosophers cannot prove the impossibility of these assumptions, unless they use the argument which they advanced to prove the impossibility of plurality in the case of the Prime Being. We have refuted that argument. And the philosophers have nothing else whereby to defend themselves.

This makes it clear that he who does not believe in the origination of bodies has no basis on which his belief in the Creator may be founded.

PROBLEM XI

REFUTATION OF THOSE PHILOSOPHERS WHO HOLD THAT GOD KNOWS THE OTHER, AND THAT HE KNOWS THE SPECIES AND GENERA IN A UNIVERSAL MANNER

W*E SAY:*

To Muslims, the division of Being into temporal and eternal being is an exhaustive division. And in their view, nothing is eternal, except God and His attributes; for everything else has a beginning in time—under the influence of God, and because of His will. From these opinions, belief in God's knowledge follows as what they consider to be a necessary conclusion. For the object of will is of necessity known to the willer. From this they further conclude that the Universe is known to Him; for it is willed by Him, and owes its origin to His will. All that is, originates from His will. And once it is proved that He is the willer and the knower of what he wills, it is evident that He must also be called the Living. And every living being who knows the Other must *a fortiori* have self-knowledge. Thus, the Universe becomes—in the Muslims' view—an object of God's knowledge. And it is possible for them to adopt this theory since they have clearly seen that God is the willer of the origin of the world in time.

But you have asserted that the world is eternal, and that it never originated because of God's will. How, therefore, do you know that He has knowledge of what is other than Himself? You must produce an argument to prove the point.

(The gist of Ibn Sīna's elaborate treatment of this problem, as set forth in various parts of his philosophy, can be reduced to the two following theses:)

(1)

In the first place, he says:

God is a being not-in-Matter. Every being not-in-Matter is pure intelligence. Every pure intelligence has all intelligibles

laid bare unto it; for it is the relation to Matter, and the occupation with it, which is the impediment in the way of the apprehension of things. Man's soul is occupied with the direction of Matter—i.e., body. When death brings its occupation to an end, and if it has not been contaminated by carnal appetites and ignoble attributes (which might come to it like an infection from the physical things), the realities of all the intelligibles are laid bare unto it as well. For the same reason, it is so decreed that all the angels know all the intelligibles, without a single exception; because they also are pure intelligences not-in-Matter.

We will say:

If by saying that God is a being not-in-Matter you mean that He is neither body, nor impressed upon body, but subsists by Himself, without location or a definite dimension, all this is indisputable. But there remains your assertion that he who has this attribute is a pure intelligence. Now, what do you mean by intelligence? If you mean something which knows all things, that is the very point at issue between us. How did you include it among the premises of the syllogism which would give you the desired conclusion? If, however, you mean something else (e.g., that, as an intelligence, He knows Himself), then that will be a position which your brethren among the philosophers might concede to you. But the conclusion at which you aim is that he who knows himself also knows the Other. So it will be said to you: "Why do you make this assertion? It is not a self-evident truth. Of all the philosophers, Ibn Sīna alone holds this view." How, therefore, can you claim that it is a self-evident fact? If, however, it is a matter of theoretical knowledge, what is the argument to prove it?

If it is said:

Pure intelligence has knowledge of things, because Matter is *the* impediment in the way of the apprehension of things. Therefore, where there is no Matter, there is no impediment.

we will answer:

We agree that Matter is an impediment, but not that it

is the only impediment. Their syllogism, which is a hypothetical syllogism, can be stated as follows:

If this were in Matter, it could not know things.
But it is not in Matter.
Therefore, it knows things.

This is an interpellation of the contrary of the antecedent, from which (it is agreed on all hands) the conclusion does not follow necessarily. It is like one's saying:

If this were a man, he would be an animal.
But this is not a man.
Therefore, he is not an animal.

Here the conclusion does not follow; for if not a man, he might yet be a horse—and, therefore, an animal. Doubtless, the contrary of the consequent follows as a necessary conclusion from the interpellation of the contrary of the antecedent, when a certain condition mentioned in Logic is fulfilled—i.e., when it is proved that the consequent and the antecedent are mutually convertible. And this will be possible only when between themselves they exhaust all the alternatives. For instance, the philosophers say:

If the Sun had risen, it would be daytime.
But the Sun has not risen.
Therefore, it is not daytime.

Here the conclusion is valid; for sunrise is the only cause of daytime. So the consequent and the antecedent are mutually convertible. (Explanation of these technical terms will be found in the book *Standard of Knowledge*, which we have written as a supplement to this book.)

(2)

(Ibn Sīna's second thesis may be stated as follows:)

Although we do not say that God is the willer of the origin of the world, or that the universe originated in time, yet we do say that the universe is His action, and that it

was produced by Him. The only point we wish to emphasise is that He never ceased to possess the quality which characterises agents. So He never ceased to be an agent. But beyond this much, we do not disagree with others. And as far as the fundamental question (whether the world is an action of God) is concerned, there is absolutely no disagreement. Since it is agreed on all hands that an agent must have knowledge of his action (we believe in God's knowledge of the universe), for we do consider the universe as His action.

The answer from two points:

Firstly, action is of two kinds: (i) voluntary action—viz., the action of a living being; and (ii) natural action—e.g., the radiating action of the Sun; the heating action of fire; and the cooling action of water. Now, knowledge of the action is necessary in the case of voluntary action only. (For instance, it is necessary in the arts of man.) But it is not necessary in the case of natural action. But according to you:

> The world is an action of God, following as a necessary consequence from His essence—by nature, or through constraint: not by way of will and choice. So the universe necessarily proceeds from His essence, as light necessarily proceeds from the Sun. And as the Sun has no power to withhold the light, or as fire has no power to withhold the heat, so God has no power to withhold His actions.

(May He be exalted far above what the philosophers say of Him!) Even if it is found permissible to call this sort of thing an action, still it will not require any knowledge on the part of its 'agent.'

If it is said:

Between the two things, there *is* a difference. The universe proceeds from His essence, because of His knowledge of the universe. The ideal representation of the universal system is the cause of the emanation of the universe. The principle of the universe is His knowledge of the universe. And His knowledge of the universe is identical with Himself. If He did not have the knowledge of the universe, the universe could not

be produced—which is not true of the emanation of light from the Sun.

we will answer:

On this point, your brethren disagree with you. They say that the existence of the universe necessarily follows from His essence in an order which is determined by nature and constraint, and which does not require that He be a knower. What absurdity do *you* find in this position? If you agree with the other philosophers in denying will, and if you do not say that the Sun's knowledge of light should be a condition for the emanation of light from the Sun (asserting, on the contrary, that light necessarily follows from the Sun), then the same explanation must be extended to God's knowledge. For nothing can prevent you from doing so.

Secondly, even if it is granted that the procession of something from an agent requires the knowledge by him of that which proceeds, yet God's action is, according to the philosophers, one—viz., the first effect which is a simple intelligence. It follows that He should not know any thing except it. Similarly, the first effect should know only that which proceeds from it. The universe has not been produced by God all at once. On the contrary, it came through intermediaries and indirectly connected developments and consequences. Therefore, that which proceeds from something which proceeds from God may not necessarily be known to Him. And from Him only one proceeds!

Knowledge is not necessary in the case of the indirect consequences of volitional action; how can it be so in the case of the indirect consequences of natural action? For instance, the movement of a stone from the top of a hill, which often has a volitional cause, necessitates the knowledge of the original movement; but it cannot necessitate the knowledge of the after-effects of that movement—i.e. developments for which the movement served as an intermediary, e.g., the stone's falling upon other things, and breaking them.

And to this, the philosophers have no answer.

If it is said:

Were we to judge that He knows nothing but Himself, it

would be extremely disgraceful. For the Other knows itself and God and other things. Therefore, it would stand above Him in order of nobility. But how can the effect be nobler than the cause?

we will answer:

This disgraceful element is a necessary consequence of the trend of philosophy—i.e., the trend towards the denial of the Divine will, and the denial of the beginning of the world. Therefore, you must adhere to it, as all other philosophers have done. Otherwise, it would be necessary for you to give up philosophy, admitting that the world owes its origin to the Divine will.

Further, it must be said to Ibn Sīna: How would you disprove those philosophers who said that greater knowledge does not indicate greater nobility? Since man is by nature imperfect, he needs knowledge in order to be perfected by it. He ennobles himself by the knowledge of the intelligibles—either to discover what is salutary for him in this world or the Hereafter; or to perfect his dark and imperfect nature. The same is true of all other creatures. But the Divine being needs no effort for perfection. If we can suppose that He will derive perfection from knowledge, we shall make His essence, *qua* essence, imperfect. And this is like what you have said concerning hearing, seeing and the knowledge of the particulars which fall under Time. You agree with all other philosophers in saying that God is free from these things: that the changeable things (which fall under Time, and which are divided into 'Was' and 'Will be') are not known to Him; and that the knowledge of the changeable things—if it were possible in His case—would necessitate mutability and receptivity in Him. Now, the denial of this in His case does not prove imperfection, but perfection. Imperfection lies only in the senses, and in the need for them. If man were not imperfect, he would not need the senses in order to guard himself against what makes him amenable to changes. Similarly, you assert, the knowledge of particular temporal events indicates imperfection. So if we know all the temporal events, and perceive all the sensible things, while God knows no particulars, and perceives no sensible things, and if His not knowing the particulars proves no imperfection on His

part, it follows that the knowledge of the intelligible universals should also be affirmed only in the case of other beings than the Divine. And His freedom from the knowledge of the intelligible universals would prove no imperfection any more than the absence of the knowledge of the particulars did. And there is no way out of this difficulty.

PROBLEM XII

TO SHOW THEIR INABILITY TO PROVE THAT GOD KNOWS HIMSELF EITHER

WE SAY:

Having recognised the origin of the world because of God's will, the Muslims proceed to infer knowledge from will, and life from knowledge and power. From life they further infer that, since all living beings are self-conscious, God Who is the Living must also know Himself. This is a position which is intelligible and sound. But you deny the Will and the Creation; and assert that whatever emanates from Him emanates of necessity and by way of nature. Therefore, what is the difficulty for *you* in believing that His being is a being which had the function of causing forth the first effect only: that from the first effect necessarily followed the second effect, and so on down to the end of the Order of Being; and that, in spite of all this, the First Cause does not know Himself—as fire (from which heat necessarily follows) and the Sun (from which light necessarily follows) do not know themselves or any thing else?

He who knows himself knows what emanates from him; thus he knows what is other than himself. And we have shown that, according to the philosophers' principles, God cannot know what is other than Himself. To those who would not agree with the generally held opinion, we have made such opinion inescapably binding, in accordance with their basic postulates. And when God is not to know the Other, it is not difficult to believe that He should not know Himself either.

If it is said:

Everyone who does not know himself is dead. How can God be like the dead?

we will answer:

This is what necessarily follows from your basic thought.

There is no difference between you and one who would say: (a) that everyone who has no volitional action; no power; no choice, and who does not hear and see, is dead; and (b) that he who does not know what is other than himself is dead. If it were possible to consider God as devoid of all these attributes, why need it be supposed that He could know Himself either?

If they revert to the position that all that is divested of Matter is essentially intelligence, and thus knows itself, we have made it clear that this is an arbitrary assumption for which no argument is available.

If it is said:

The argument is as follows: Beings are divided into the living and the dead. The living are worthier and nobler than the dead. God, Who is the Worthiest and the Noblest, must therefore be living. And every living one has self-consciousness. It is impossible that there should be living ones among His effects, while He Himself should not be living.

we will answer:

These are arbitrary assumptions. Why, let us say, is it impossible that from one who does not know himself should proceed another who knows himself—through many intermediaries, or through none? If the impossibility arises from the fact that (on this view) the effect will be nobler than the Cause, why is it impossible for the effect to be nobler than the Cause? Such an impossibility is not axiomatic.

Then, how will you disprove one's saying that God's nobleness consists, not in His knowledge, but in the fact that universal being is subordinate to His being? This can be proved as follows: The Other knows things besides himself, and sees, and hears; whereas God does not see or hear. If somebody were to say:

> Beings are divided into the seeing and the blind; and the knowing and the ignorant. And those who see or know are worthier,

then it would follow that God can also see, as He knows

things. But you would reject such a conclusion, saying that worth or nobleness does not consist in seeing or knowing things, but in being able to do without sight and knowledge, and in being of such a character as to produce the universe wherein there might be many who could see and know.

Similarly, therefore, worth and nobleness may not consist in self-knowledge, but in being the principle of other beings gifted with knowledge. And such nobleness is to be considered as peculiar to Him.

Thus, perforce, will the philosophers be driven to deny God's self-knowledge, since self-knowledge can only be inferred from will, and will can only be inferred from the temporal origin of the world. If there is error in regard to the question of the origin of the world, all the rest is bound to be erroneous—on the part of those who would understand things by means of theoretical investigations.

Thus, all that the philosophers have to say—to prove some of the Divine attributes, or to disprove others—has for its basis, not any cogent arguments, but sheer conjecture and surmises—too wild to be admitted even by the Jurists in their avowedly conjectural work. No wonder if the Intellect is confounded in its inquiries concerning the Divine attributes. The wonder is that the philosophers are so proud of their arguments, and flatter themselves with the idea that they know these things with certainty—whereas, in fact, their knowledge is vitiated by conceit and frivolity.

PROBLEM XIII

REFUTATION OF THEIR DOCTRINE THAT GOD (MAY HE BE EXALTED ABOVE WHAT THEY SAY) DOES NOT KNOW THE PARTICULARS WHICH ARE DIVISIBLE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE DIVISION OF TIME INTO 'WILL BE,' 'WAS,' AND 'IS'

THEY are all agreed on this. Those who believe that God knows nothing but Himself are obviously committed to it. But even those who hold that He knows the Other—the position adopted by Ibn Sīna—assert that He knows things by a universal knowledge which does not fall under Time, and which does not change through the Past, the Present, and the Future. And in spite of this, it is asserted (by Ibn Sīna who represents the latter) that "nothing—not even as much as a particle of dust, in the heavens, or on the earth—is hidden from His knowledge"—only that He knows the particulars in a universal manner!

First of all, we must understand their position; and then we will proceed to criticise it.

This position can be explained by an illustration. When the Sun is, after it had not been, eclipsed, and when later its brightness re-emerges, it has passed through three states: (i) There was a state when the eclipse did not exist, but its existence might be anticipated—i.e., one might say: 'It will be.' (ii) In the second state, it was actually existing—i.e., one might say: 'It is.' (iii) In the third state, it is again non-existent; but a short while ago, it had been—i.e., 'Was.' Now, corresponding to these three states, we have three different cognitions. For at first, we knew that the eclipse does not exist, but that its existence might be expected. Then, we knew that it is. And, finally, we know that it was, although at present it is not. Now, a succession (in the same place) of these three different and multiple cognitions necessitates a change in the cognisant being. For if, after the re-emergence of the Sun, one were to say that the eclipse is existing at present, this would not

be an act of knowledge, but of ignorance. Similarly, at the time of the existence of an eclipse, it would be ignorance to say that it is non-existent. This shows that no one of these cognitions can be substituted for another.

Now, (they assert) God can have no different states corresponding to these three states; for that would amount to change. He whose state does not differ cannot conceivably know these three aspects. Knowledge follows the object of knowledge. When the object of knowledge changes, knowledge changes as well And when knowledge changes, the knower must also change. But change is impossible in the case of God.

In spite of this, however, it is asserted by them that God knows the eclipse, and all its attributes and accidents by a knowledge which characterises Him from eternity to eternity, and which never changes. For instance, He knows:

> that the Sun and the Moon exist (for both have emanated from Him by the intermediation of angels whom the philosophers call pure intelligences):
>
> that the Sun and the Moon make revolutions:
>
> that their spheres intersect at two points—viz., the Head and the Tail:
>
> that sometimes the two are simultaneously stationed in their nodes; and
>
> that, as a result, the Sun is eclipsed—i.e., the body of the Moon comes between the Sun and the (terrestrial) observers, thus hiding the Sun from their eyes.

Also, He knows:

> that, when the Sun has passed beyond the node by a certain amount—say, one year—it will be eclipsed again:
>
> that the eclipse will cover the whole body of the Sun, or one-half, or one-third of it:
>
> that the eclipse will last an hour or two; and so on, and so forth to all the conditions and accidents of an eclipse.

For nothing is hidden from His knowledge. But His knowledge of these things remains the same before an eclipse, or during it, or after its expiration. And since it does not differ, it necessitates no change in His essence.

The same holds of His knowledge of all temporal events.

He knows that they are the effects of certain causes, and that the causes have some other causes, and so on, till the series stops at the rotatory motion of the Heaven. And He knows that the cause of celestial movement is the Soul of Heaven, the cause of whose movement is the desire for assimilation with God and with the Favourite Angels. Thus, All is known to Him—i.e., is laid bare to Him—in a single discovery which is homogeneous, and uninfluenced by Time. However, at the time of an eclipse, it cannot be said that He knows that it exists *now*. Nor, after the eclipse, can it be said that He knows that *now* it has cleared away. For nothing which is necessarily defined in relation to Time can conceivably be known to Him, for such knowledge would necessitate a change in the knower.

This much in regard to what is divisible into periods of Time. The same line of thought is taken by them in regard to what is divisible into Matter and Space—e.g., individual men or animals. They say that he does not know the accidents of Zaid or 'Amr or Khālid; but knows the Man-in-general, and his accidents and properties—by a universal knowledge. Thus, He knows that Man should have a body comprising various organs which are used to grasp, or walk, or apprehend, etc., and some of which are single, while others are in pairs—and that his faculties should be distributed among his physical parts, and so on, and so forth, to every attribute inside man: everything which belongs to his appurtenances, qualities, and inseparable accidents. So nothing is hidden from His knowledge, and He knows every thing universally. As far as the person of Zaid is concerned, it is distinguishable from that of 'Amr only for the senses, not for the Intellect. For the basis of distinction is the designation of a particular dimension; whereas the Intellect apprehends only the absolute and the universal dimension, or the universal space. When we say: *'This, and this,'* we allude to a relation which is possessed by the perceptible object *vis-a-vis* the percipient because of its being near to, or far from, him, or being situated in a particular direction. And this is impossible in the case of God.

This, then, is the basic principle in which they believe—and by which they have contrived the total destruction of religious laws. It implies that, for instance, whether Zaid obeys God or disobeys Him, God cannot know his newly

emerging states, since He does not know Zaid as an individual—i.e., as a person whose actions come to be after they had not been. So if He does not know the person, He cannot know his states and actions. Nor can He know of Zaid's infidelity or Islam, since He knows only the infidelity or Islam of Man-in-general in the absolute and universal manner, not in specific relation to individuals. Even so, they are bound to say that Muḥammad (may God bless him and grant him peace) proclaimed his prophecy, while God did not know that he had done so. And the same will be true of every other prophet, for God only knows that among men there are some who proclaim prophecy, and that such and such are their attributes; but He cannot know a particular prophet as an individual, for that is to be known by the senses alone. Nor can He know the circumstances arising out of an individual's particular character. For such circumstances are divisible in Time which measures his particular person. And the apprehension of those circumstances in all their diversity necessitates change in the cognisant being.

So this is what we intended to mention firstly to introduce their doctrine; secondly, to elucidate it; and thirdly, to point out its repulsive consequences. Now we will expose the fallacies involved in it, and show how they can be refuted.

Their fallacy lies in the assertion that:

These three states are different. And when different things pass in succession over the same thing, a change in that thing is the necessary result. If at the time of an eclipse, it were to be said that it 'will be' (as ought to be said before the eclipse), then he who makes this assertion must be an ignorant man, not a knower. But if he knows that it 'is,' while before it, he knew that it 'is not' but 'will be,' then his knowledge—and, consequently, his states—must have differed. Hence change necessarily follows; for change means nothing but a difference in the knower. He who did not know something, and then comes to know it, does undergo a change. He who had no knowledge that the eclipse 'is,' and then (at the time of an eclipse) acquires that knowledge, has undergone a change.

They re-enforce this thesis by saying that:

The states are of three kinds: (i) There is a state which is purely a relation, like your being on the left or the right side. This, being purely a relation, can by no means be termed an essential attribute. If something on your right is shifted to the left, it is only your relation, not your essence, which changes thereby. It is but the removal of one relation from the essence, to be succeeded by another—not the replacement of the essence itself by something else. (ii) Comparable to the first is the second state. If you have the power to move certain bodies which lie at hand, then the disappearance of all or some of those bodies will not change your vital energy or your power. For your power is the power to move, primarily, body-in-general; and, only secondarily, to move a particular body, insofar as it is body. Hence the relation of power to a particular body is not an essential attribute, but purely a relation. Therefore, the disappearance of bodies will necessitate only the severance of the relation, not a change in the state of the powerful one. (iii) The third state is one wherein the essence does undergo a change. This happens when, for instance, one who did not know becomes a knower, or one who had no power becomes powerful. This amounts to change. And a change in the object of knowledge necessitates a change in knowledge itself. For the reality of a particular knowledge consists in its relation to a particular object of knowledge as such. The relation to that object in a different way, evidently, forms a different knowledge. And the succession of such cognitions necessitates a difference in the knower's state. It is not possible to say that the essence has one knowledge which becomes the knowledge of 'Is' after having been the knowledge of 'Will be'; and which will become the knowledge of 'Was' after having been the knowledge of 'Is.' Knowledge is one, and all its states are similar. If its relations are replaced, then—because, in the case of knowledge, relations form the reality of its essence—their replacement necessitates the replacement of the essence of knowledge as well. Hence follows change—which is impossible in the case of God.

Objection from two points of view:

Firstly, how will you disprove one who says:

"God has only one knowledge of an eclipse at a particular time. Before the eclipse, this knowledge is the knowledge of 'Will Be'; at the time of the eclipse, this very knowledge is the khowledge of 'Is'; and after the clearance, it is the knowledge of the expiry of the eclipse. All these differences can be considered as relations which do not replace the essence of knowledge; and which, therefore, do not necessitate a change in the cognisant being. For such differences must be ranked as pure relations. If a person on your right comes in front of you, and then to the left, it is the relations which pass over you in succession; and he who changes accordingly is the moving person, not you. The same is true of Divine knowlege."?

We do admit that He knows things by a knowledge which is one from eternity to eternity; and that His state is unchangeable. The philosophers only desire to reject change; and to that extent, everyone will agree with them. But their statement that change is necessarily inferred from the affirmation of the knowledge of 'Is' at present, and of expiry after is not indisputable. Whence came to them this idea? Nay, if God creates for us a knowledge about Zaid's coming here tomorrow at sunrise, and then this knowledge is prolonged (so that neither another knowledge nor the lapse of this one is created) still at the time of the sunrise we will know—by the original knowledge—of Zaid's coming 'now,' and afterwards of his having come. And this one continued knowledge will be sufficient for the encompassing of the 'three states.'

There remains the position that:

The relation to a particular object of knowledge enters into the reality of knowledge. With the difference of the relations, the thing to which a relation was essential becomes different. And change results from the eventuation of difference and its successive occurrence.

Now, we will say: If this is true, you must follow in the footsteps of your brethren among the philosophers who say that:

God does not know any thing other than Himself. His self-knowledge is identical with His essence. Should He know the Man-in-general; the Animal-in-general; or the (inorganic) Matter-in-general—which are, obviously, diverse things—then the relations to these things would be different relations. Therefore, it would not be fit for the one knowledge to be the knowledge of different things. For that which is related being different, the relation must be different. The relation to the object of knowledge being essential to knowledge, there necessarily follows multiplicity *and* difference—not mere multiplicity *with* qualitative similarity. Of the qualitatively similar things, one may be substituted for another. But the knowledge of Animal cannot be substituted for that of (inorganic) Matter; nor the knowledge of whiteness for that of blackness. For the two cognitions are different things.

Besides, these Species and Genera, and the universal Accidents, whose number is unlimited, are different things. How can the different cognitions of these different things be compressed into one knowledge? And how can that one knowledge be identical with the essence of the Knower, without any thing being added to it?

Would that I could understand how any intelligent person can allow himself to disbelieve the oneness of the knowledge of a thing whose states are divisible into the Past, the Present, and the Future; while he would not disbelieve the oneness of knowledge which relates to all the different Genera and Species. Verily, the difference and the disparity among the diverse Genera and Species is more marked than the difference which may actually be found to exist among the states of a thing divisible in accordance with the division of time. If *that* difference does not necessitate multiplicity and difference, how can *this* do so either? Since it can be proved by a rational argument that the difference of the periods of Time is less significant than the difference of the Genera and Species and because it has been maintained that the difference of the Genera and Species does not necessitate multiplicity and difference, it must be recognised that the difference of the periods of Time cannot do so either. And since it does not necessitate difference, it follows that All can be encompassed by His knowledge which is one and runs from eter-

nity to eternity, and whose relation to its objects does not necessitate a change in the Knower's essence.

The second objection may be stated as follows:

What in principle prevents you from believing that God knows the particular things, even if that introduces change? Have you not held that this sort of change is not impossible in His case? Jahm the Mu'tazilī believed that His knowledge of the temporals is in Time. And some of the later Karrāmīyah believed that He is subject to temporal events. Now, the only reason why the generality of the People of Truth reject this view is that, once change occurs, the subject can never be free from changes. And that which is never free from changes is not eternal. But you believe that the world is eternal; and that, at the same time, it is subject to changes! So if you can lend credence to the changeableness of the eternal, nothing should prevent you from believing that the Divine knowledge does produce change in God.

If it is said:

We find this impossible, because God's knowledge, if in itself originated, will either originate from God, or from someone else. It is false to say that it can originate from Him. For we have shown that from the Eternal nothing which is temporal can proceed, and that he does not become an agent after not having been one (for that would necessitate change). (This we have conclusively shown in the problem of the creation of the world.) But if knowledge originates in Him from someone else, how can the Other be the cause of influence over Him or change within Him? If we admit such a thing, His states will change under compulsion or constraint emanating from the Other.

we will answer:

On your principles neither of the two positions is impossible:

As regards the opinion that it is impossible for an originated thing to proceed from the Eternal, we have refuted it in the problem of the creation of the world. Why do you

say so, since it is the first originated thing alone whose emanation is impossible in your view? The ground of impossibility is an originated thing's being the first thing of its kind. Otherwise, the temporal events have no temporal causes in an endless series, but there is an end—through the intermediacy of rotatory motion—at something which is eternal—viz., the soul of heaven, and its life. So the heavenly soul is eternal, and rotatory motion originates from it. And each one of the parts of motion originates and expires, and is therefore obviously renewed afterwards. Hence in your view, temporal events do proceed from the Eternal. But, it is stipulated, the states of the Eternal being similar, the perpetual flow of temporals from it has likewise similar states. So the states of motion are similar inasmuch as it proceeds from the Eternal. This shows that if the procession is recognised to be homogeneous and perpetual, everyone among the philosophers can admit the possibility of the procession of the temporal from the Eternal. Let God's temporal cognitions be of this kind.

As regards the procession of God's knowledge from the Other, we say: Why do you consider it to be impossible? It has only the following three (unexceptionable) implications:

Firstly, change. We have shown that it does follow from your principles.

Secondly, one's being the cause of change in another. This, too, is not impossible—in your view. So the origination of a thing may be the cause of the origination of God's knowledge about it—as, according to you, the appearance of the form of a coloured object within the range of vision is the cause of the impression of that form upon the vitreous humour by means of the air which intervenes between the seer and the pupil of the eye. If it is possible for inorganic Matter to be the cause of the impression of forms upon the eye—in other words, the cause of seeing—why should it be impossible for the appearance of the temporal phenomena to be the cause of God's knowledge about them? Just as the faculty of vision is prepared to perceive, and the appearance of a coloured object and the raising of the eyelids is the cause of the actual perception, so—you might say—the First Principle is prepared to receive knowledge, and there is transition from potentiality into actuality when the temporal object of knowledge comes into being. If this results in a change in the Eternal,

then a changeable eternal is not from your point of view impossible. If you assert that it is impossible in the case of the Necessary Being, then you will have no argument to prove such a being. As has been shown, all you can prove is that the series of causes and effects must stop somewhere. And it can stop at an eternal who is changeable.

Thirdly, the implication is that of the Eternal's changing under the influence of the Other, and the comparability of such a thing to constraint and external compulsion. Again, we will say: Why do you consider it to be impossible? You may believe that God is through intermediaries the cause of the appearance of temporal events; that the appearance of the temporal events is the cause of the appearance of His knowledge of them—or, in short, that He is the cause of His own acquisition of knowledge—but through intermediaries.

If you think that this looks like subjugation or external influence, then let it be so. For it does fit into the framework of your theories, since you have asserted that whatever proceeds from God does so by way of necessity and through nature, and that He has no power not to do it. This looks like subjugation or external influence, and points to the conclusion that in regard to what proceeds from Him, He is under compulsion.

If it is said:

This is no compulsion. For His perfection consists in His being the source of the procession of all things.

we will answer:

Then there is no compulsion in the former case either. For His perfection consists in that He knows all the things. Should we have a knowledge of all temporal phenomena, it would be a sign of perfection, not of deficiency or subjugation, on our part. The same may be true of God.

PROBLEM XIV

TO SHOW THEIR INABILITY TO PROVE THAT THE HEAVEN IS LIVING, AND OBEYS GOD THROUGH ITS ROTATORY MOTION

T*HEY SAY:*

The Heaven is living, and has a soul which is related to the heavenly body in the same way as our souls are related to our bodies. Just as our bodies move by will towards our purposes under the motive influence of our souls, so does the Heaven—the purpose of its rotatory motion being the worship of the Lord of the Universe—in a way to be described later.

(Their views on this question belong to a class whose possibility cannot be denied. For God does have the power to create life in any body. Neither the size of a body, nor its being round will preclude life. For no particular shape is an indispensable condition for life. In spite of their different shapes, all the animals are alike recipients of life. What, however, we do assert is that the philosophers are unable to know these things by rational demonstration. If these things were true, the prophets would know them through inspiration or revelation; but rational arguments cannot prove them. Or perhaps rational arguments can prove these things—if and when a suitable argument is available. But what the philosophers use as an argument is not fit to produce certainty; it only gives a probability.)

In their unconvincing theory, the philosophers say:

The Heaven moves. This is an empirical premiss. Every body which moves has a mover. This is a rational premiss. If a body were to move because of being body, then every body should move. Now, every mover either:

(i) resides in the moved body—e.g., nature which brings about the downward movement of a stone; or will which causes the movement of an animal; or
(ii) lies outside the moved body, but moves it by con-

straint—e.g., in the case of the upward movement of a stone.

If a body is moved by something within itself, then either:

(i) it will not be conscious of the movement. We call the mover in this case 'nature'—e.g., in the case of the downward movement of a stone; or

(ii) it will be conscious of the movement. We call such movement volitional and psychic.

From this exhaustive division, which revolves between affirmation and negation, we obtain three kinds of movement: constrained, natural, and volitional. If in any case two of them are inapplicable, the third must be applicable.

Now, it is impossible that the movement of Heaven should be constrained. For the constrainer which causes the movement must itself be another body caused to move either by constraint or by will. In any case, therefore, the series must stop at will. And if it is proved that somewhere among the heavenly bodies there is movement by will, what is the use of positing constrained movements anywhere? Ultimately, it will be just impossible to do without will. It is impossible to say that the Heaven is caused to move by constraint, and that God is its immediate mover. For if it were to be moved because of its being body, it would be necessary that every other body should be moved by the Creator in the same way. Consequently, in order to prove its distinction from other bodies, it must be assumed specially to have been invested with a distinguishing quality. And then this quality would be—either by will or by nature—the nearest cause of its movement. Nor is it possible to say that God causes the Heaven to move by His will. For His will is related to all the bodies in the same way. How can the body of the Heaven in particular get prepared specially to have its movement willed, while others were not? A special character is not acquired in vain. For that is impossible—as shown in the problem of the creation of the world. So when it is proved that it is proper for this body to have a quality which will be the principle of its movement, the first kind of movement—viz., constrained movement—is excluded.

There remains the natural movement. This is impossible, for nature by its bare self is never the cause of move-

ment. Movement means the running away from one place, and the seeking after another. If the place in which a body is agreeable, the body will not move. This is the reason why a wine-skin filled with air and floating on the surface of water does not move. If it is dipped into the water, it will move upwards to the surface of water. For when it finds an agreeable place, it comes to rest, and nature stands still. When it is transferred to a disagreeable place, it runs away from it to an agreeable one, as it did from the heart of water to the sphere of the air. Now, it is inconceivable that rotatory motion should be natural. For any site or position from which a body in rotatory motion may be supposed to run away will be returning to it. And that from which it runs away by nature cannot be the object of its seeking. This is why the wine-skin filled with air does not return to water, and why the stone which has reached the ground does not return to the air.

Therefore, the only alternative to be chosen is the third kind of movement—viz., volitional movement.

The objection to the foregoing may be stated as follows:

In addition to your theory, we can lay down three hypotheses which you will find no argument to disprove:

Firstly, the movement of Heaven may be supposed to be the result of the constraint exercised by another body which wills its movement, and causes it to revolve perpetually. This motive body may be neither a round body nor a circumference. So it will not be a heavenly body at all. This will refute the philosophers' dictum that heavenly movement is volitional, and that the Heaven is living. This suggestion of ours *is* possible; and nothing but the mere assumption of improbability can be brought against it.

Secondly, it might be said that heavenly movement is constrained, and that God's will is its principle. We do say that the downward movement of a stone is also constrained, which originates when God creates movement in the stone. And the same holds of the movements of all other inanimate bodies.

There remains their assumption of improbability with respect to the special relation of the will to the heavenly body, while all other bodies shared corporeality in common. We have shown that the eternal will has the function of

distinguishing something from its like. And the philosophers themselves had perforce to posit an attribute with such a function, when they specified the direction of rotatory motion and the position of the Pole. That we will not repeat here. To clinch the issue, it may be pointed out that their assumption of improbability with respect to the special determination of a body to which the will is related, but which has no attribute to distinguish it, recoils upon them when they introduce an attribute to make distinction. To be more explicit, we will say: Why did the heavenly body come to possess a distinguishing attribute because of which it is differentiated from other bodies? All other bodies are also bodies. Why did this one come to have what they do not? If the cause of this is found in another attribute, the inquiry will be directed to that 'another attribute,' and so on, until at last the philosophers will be forced to regard the will as self-explanatory—admitting that among the Principles there is something which singles out one thing, so as to invest it exclusively with a distinguishing attribute.

Thirdly, it may be granted that the Heaven is specifically determined to have an attribute which is the principle of its movement, as they believe with respect to the downward tendency of a stone. But, then, possibly, like the stone, the Heaven will not be conscious of the movement. The philosophers' statement that that which is sought by nature cannot be that which is avoided for the same reason is a deliberate misrepresentation. For there are no numerically disparate places, even according to them. On the contrary, the body is one, and its rotatory motion is one. Neither the body nor its movements actually have parts; it is only in the Imagination that it can be divided. So this movement is neither a seeking after a place, nor a running away from another. It is possible that there should be created a body which has within itself an aptitude which demands circular motion. So the movement itself will fulfil the requirement—not that the aptitude will demand the seeking after a place to attain which movement is to be made.

When you say that every movement is made either because a place is sought, or another avoided, and if you think that this relation is necessary, then you make the 'seeking after' the end of nature, and make movement itself a secondary factor which is desired not in itself, but as a

means to it. And we say that it is not improbable for movement itself to be the end, and not merely a means to the place supposed to be sought. What is there to disprove such an assumption?

Therefore, it is clear that the position adopted by the philosophers—even if it is supposed to be more probable than any other hypothesis—does not definitely exclude the alternative hypotheses. If follows that their assertion that the Heaven is living is an arbitrary and groundless assumption.

PROBLEM XV

REFUTATION OF WHAT THEY CONSIDER TO BE THE PURPOSE WHICH MOVES THE HEAVEN

THEY SAY:

Through its movement, the Heaven obeys God, and seeks to be nearer to Him. For all volitional movement is directed towards a purpose. It is inconceivable that an action or a movement should proceed from a living being, unless doing it be better than not doing it. If to do something is the same as not to do it, no action will conceivably take place.

'Seeking to be nearer to God' does not mean the winning of His favour, or the avoidance of His displeasure. For in His holiness, He is above favour and displeasure. Whenever such words are used, they have a metaphorical significance, designating the will to grant rewards or the will to inflict punishment.

Nor is it possible that the 'seeking to be nearer' should express itself through an effort for proximity in space. Such a thing is impossible.

The only explanation which remains is the explanation in terms of an effort for closer relationship in respect of attributes. For His being is the perfect being in contrast to which all other beings are imperfect. And this imperfection has within itself differences of degrees. The angels are the nearest to Him in respect of attributes—not in space. So the term 'Favourite Angels' (close to God) means those intellectual substances which are unchangeable, imperishable and immutable; and which know things as they are. When man comes closer (in respect of the attributes) to the angels, he comes closer to God. The highest limit to which man can attain is similarity to angels.

So it has been established what the 'seeking to be nearer to God' means. It has been shown that it envisages a close relationship only in respect of attributes, and that it is possible in the case of man, if he knows the realities of things, and remains for ever in the most perfect state

which is possible for him. Remaining in the state of the highest state of perfection is possible only for God. As regards the Favourite Angels, all the perfection possible for them is actually present for them—insofar as there is nothing potential in them which should advance towards actuality. Therefore, among beings other than the Divine, the angels have the highest perfection.

By the heavenly angels are meant the souls which move the heavens, and which are in the heavens—not merely potentially. The perfections of the heavenly souls are divided into those which are actual—e.g., the round shape and appearance which is present—and those which are potential—e.g., the appearance in any position or place. There is no ascertainable position, but it is possible for the Heaven to encompass it. Actually, all the positions are not occupied at once; for the simultaneous occupation of so many of them is impossible. However, the complete and incessant occupation of individual positions being impossible, the Heaven aims at occupying them by species. So it goes on incessantly seeking one position after another position: one place after another place. This possibility never comes to an end. Therefore, the heavenly movements never come to an end. What the Heaven aims at is the assimilation of itself to the First Principle by attaining the highest perfection which it possibly can. And that is what the obedience of the celestial angels to God means. The assimilation is achieved in two ways:

Firstly, by complete occupation by species of all the positions which are possible for it. That is the object of its primary intention.

Secondly, the cumulative effect of the movements of the Heaven (which includes difference of relations—e.g., three-sided or four-sided formations, or conjunction or opposition—and the difference of celestial aspects in relation to the Earth) is the overflow of Good towards things under the sphere of the Moon. Thence originate all the temporal events. So this is the way how the heavenly soul derives perfection; for every intelligent soul is by nature interested in having perfection.

Objection to this:

Even in the premises of this theory there is something to

which objection may be taken. But we would not linger over them. Let us pass on to the purpose by reference to which you concluded the whole thing. We can disprove it in two ways:

Firstly, the desire to gain perfection by being in all the places may be regarded as an indication of stupidity, rather than devotion. For one might compare it to the behaviour of a man who, having nothing to do and with all his needs having been satisfied, stands up and begins to turn round and round in his house or in the city, thinking that this will bring him nearer to God. Will he be on the way to perfection, since he is trying to be in all the places possible for him? If he says:

> Being in all the places is possible for me; but I cannot combine all of them by number. So I am taking them all by species. For in any event that is the way to perfection and to nearness to God.

then such an assertion will be attributed to stupidity. The rejoinder to him will be: Movement from one place to another is no perfection worth contending for. And there is no difference between this case and the situation described by the philosophers.

Secondly, we will say: The purpose you have mentioned could be achieved by a Westward moment. Why, then, is the first movement Eastward? Are not the movements of the universe in one direction? If there is a purpose behind their difference among themselves, could not the same purpose be achieved by reversing the course taken by the difference? Thus, if the Eastward movement were Westward, and *vice versa*, the reversal could still produce all those effects which have been mentioned by them—namely, the phenomena resulting from the difference of movements, such as three-sided or four-sided formations, etc. The same applies to the complete occupation of all the places and positions. For all that is possible for the Heaven is that it should move from one place to another. What, then, has happened to it to prevent it from moving now from one side, now from another (so that it could uitilise all that is possible—if the utilisation of all that is possible were an index of perfection)?

All this points to the conclusion that such theories are

mere speculation which leads nowhere. The secrets of the kingdom of Heaven cannot be discovered through such speculations. Only the prophets and the saints discover these secrets by inspired wisdom, not by rational methods. This is why the philosophers, who take up the discussion where the prophets left it, have been unable to explain the directions of movement, and to show the cause of the choice of particular directions.

Some of the philosophers said:

The Heaven could not derive perfection from indefinite movements in *any* direction. The systematic character of the terrestrial phenomena requires the difference of movements and the definiteness of directions. That which impels the Heaven towards movement as such is the desire to be nearer to God; but that which impels it towards movement in a certain direction is its desire for the overflow of Good to the lower world.

[But this is false for two reasons:

Firstly, if such a thing can be imagined, it will have to be maintained that by its nature the Heaven should seek rest, and avoid motion and change. For, as a matter of fact, seeking rest would be the cause of its assimilation to God, who is not susceptible to change. And motion is change. But He selects motion for the Heaven in order that Good may overflow. This would benefit all other beings; while motion—however repugnant to His nature—cannot be burdensome or tiring to Him. What can prevent you from taking this view?

Secondly, no doubt, the terrestrial phenomena originate from the difference of relations (which results from the difference of the directions of movement). But then let the first movement be Westward, and let the subsequent movements be Eastward. That, too, can produce difference whereby different relations would be established. Why should one particular direction have been specified? What these different relations require is that there should be difference of directions as such. But as far as this purpose is concerned, no direction can be shown to be preferable to the opposite direction.]

PROBLEM XVI

REFUTATION OF THEIR THEORY THAT THE SOULS OF THE HEAVENS ARE AWARE OF ALL THE PARTICULARS WHICH ORIGINATE IN THE WORLD

THEY SAY:

The Preserved Tablet means the souls of the heavens. The impression of the particulars of the world upon the souls of the heavens is like the impression of the memorables upon the faculty of memory, which is located inside the brain of man. In neither of these two cases is that which receives impressions like a hard and broad body upon which writing is inscribed, as children write upon a slate. For the multiplicity of this writing requires something extended on which to be written. And if the writing is infinite, the material bearing it will be likewise infinite. But an infinite body is inconceivable; and infinite lines on a single body are not possible. And an infinite number of things cannot be delineated by a finite number of lines.

They assert that:

The heavenly angels are the souls of the heavens. The cherubim—i.e., the Favourite (or drawn-near) Angels—are the immaterial intelligences, i.e., self-subsisting substances, which do not exist in space, and which do not act upon bodies. It is from these intelligences that particular forms descend upon the heavenly souls. The intelligences are nobler than the heavenly souls. For the former give, while the latter receive. He who gives is nobler than he who receives. Therefore, the nobler of the two is symbolically called the Pen. Says God (exalted be He): 'He taught by the Pen.' The Pen is like the engraver which gives: like a teacher—whereas he who receives is comparable to a tablet.

(This is their thesis. Our criticism of it is to be different from the criticism of their thesis in the preceding problem. For what they said there is not impossible. It only purports to show that the heaven is a living being which moves by

reason of a purpose. Now, that thesis is possible. But this one tends to affirm that a creature can have the knowledge of infinite particulars. Such a thing has actually been held to be impossible. Therefore, we demand that they prove it; for in itself it is but a claim.)

And they try to prove it by saying:

It has been proved that the rotatory motion of heaven is volitional. And will follows the thing willed. And a universal will can be directed towards an object of will that is universal. But from the universal will nothing proceeds. For every actual existent is definite and particular; while the universal will bears the same relation to all individual particulars. Therefore, nothing can proceed from it. It is necessary that there should be a particular will for a definite movement. Hence the sphere, in a definite and particular movement from one point to another definite point, has got to have a particular will for that movement. It follows that it has an imaginative representation of particular movements by means of a bodily faculty. For particular things are perceived by bodily faculties alone. And every will does of necessity depend on an imaginative representation—i.e., knowledge of the willed thing, be it particular or universal.

Since the sphere has an imaginative representation or comprehension of particular movements, it must by consequence comprehend all that necessarily follows from those movements—namely, the variety of its relations to the Earth, which result from the fact that some of its parts are rising, while others are setting; some are in the middle of the sky for some people, and down below for others. Similarly, the sphere knows the consequences of the difference of its relations which emerge anew from the movement, such as the six-sided or four-sided formations, or conjunction or opposition, and so on to all the celestial phenomena. And all the terrestrial phenomena are to be traced back to the celestial phenomena, either without any intermediary, or with one or more than one intermediary. In short, every thing which exists in time has a temporal cause, and so on, until in the ascending order the series comes to an end with the everlasting movements of the heavens, some of which movements are caused by others.

Thus the series of causes and effects reaches its upper limit in particular celestial movements. And that which has an imaginative representation of the movements must also have the representation of the consequences of those movements, and of the consquences of the consequences, and so on to the end of the series. Therefore, the sphere knows what will take place in the future; for the occurrence of all that is likely to take place becomes necessary by virtue of its cause, when the cause is realised. We do not know what will happen in the future; for we do not know all the causes of such happenings. We could know the effects, if we had the knowledge of the causes. For instance, if we knew that fire will come into contact with a piece of cotton at a particular time, we would know of the burning of that piece of cotton. Or when we know that a certain person will eat, we know that his hunger will be satisfied. Or when we know that a certain person will tread over a certain spot where a treasure lies hidden—beneath something so fragile that when someone walks over it, he is bound to stumble upon the treasure—we know that this man will become rich on account of the treasure. But we do not know these causes. Sometimes, a few of these causes are known to us; consequently, we have an intuitive anticipation of the occurrence of the effect. If we could know most of the causes, or the most powerful among them, we could have a clear presumption about the occurrence of the effects. And if we could know all the causes, we certainly would have the knowledge of all the effects. But the celestial things are many; and they have a way of mixing with the terrestrial phenomena. Therefore, it is not in man's power to be aware of them. On the contrary, the souls of the heavens know them, because they know the primary causes, their effects, the necessary effects of those effects, and so on to the end of the series.

For this reason, they assert:

In sleep one sees what will happen in the future. This is so, because of his contact with the Preserved Tablet, and the perusal of it. Sometimes, that which he discovers at that time sticks to his memory in its original form. But sometimes, the faculty of the Imagination quickly transforms it into a symbol; for it is the nature of that faculty to transform things into symbols, which may bear some relation to the original, or may have been changed to their opposites. Thus the real percept disappears from the memory, leaving behind an imaginary form. Consequently, there is need for the interpretation of what has been represented by the Imagination through a symbol. For instance, a man is symbolically represented by a tree; a woman by a sock; a servant by some household utensil, and a custodian of charitable funds by linseed oil. The linseed oil is the cause of the lamp, which is the cause of light. From this principle, therefore, the science of the interpretation of dreams branches out.

And they assert:

Contact with the souls of the heavens is vouchsafed, when there is no obstruction. In our waking life, we are preoccupied with what the senses and the passions bring to us. Our interest in sensuous things prevents us from achieving that contact. But when in sleep our sensuous preoccupations are partially abated, the capacity for contact with the souls of the heavens is restored to us.

And they assert:

In this way, a prophet has a glimpse into the Hidden World. The psychic powers of a prophet are so high that the outward senses do not submerge them. It is for this reason that he sees in waking life what others see only in dreams. Even in the case of the prophet, the imaginative faculty represents through symbols what is seen. Sometimes, the actual thing remains in his memory; at others, it is a symbol of it which remains. Therefore, this kind of inspiration requires to be interpreted, even as dreams require interpretation. If all that is to be did not exist in the Preserved Tablet, the prophets could not know the Hidden Things in dreams or in waking life. But the Pen 'has dried over what is going to be till the Day of Judgment.' What this means we have described.

(So this much we desired to reproduce to make their theory understandable.)

The answer:

We will say: How will you disprove one who says that God enables the prophet to know the Hidden Things, and that, therefore, he knows them, without any preparation having been made by him? Similarly, it may be said, he who has a dream comes to know the hidden things, because God, or one of the angels, enables him to know them. Therefore, all that you have described is superfluous; there is no argument to prove it. Nor can you advance an argument to prove things like the Preserved Tablet and the Pen which have been mentioned in the Holy Law. The meaning you have given to these things is not recognised by the followers of the Sacred Law. Since it is not open to you to approach these things from the point of view of that Law, all that remains for you to do is to take the rational point of view. But even if the possibility of all that you have mentioned is taken for granted (it can be taken for granted inasmuch as the denial of the finitude of the known things is not a necessary condition for it), still its existence cannot be known, and its reality cannot be verified. The source of the knowledge of these things is the Sacred Law, not Reason.

The rational argument you advanced to begin with is based on many premises. We will not go to the length of refuting all of them. However, we will take up three of them for criticism.

The first is your assertion that the movement of the Heaven is volitional. We have already considered this question, and shown how your claim can be refuted.

Secondly, even if in the spirit of compromise this argument is taken for granted, still your assertion that this volitional movement of the Heaven requires particular representation corresponding to particular movements will be objectionable. Indeed, you would not admit that there are parts in the celestial body. For this body is one, and its division is possible only in the Imagination. Still less divisible is its movement, for that is a continuous whole. Therefore, it may suffice for the sphere to have a desire for the complete utilisation of all the places possible for it—as they themselves have maintained. And for that purpose, a universal will and a universal representation will suffice.

Let us give an example of the universal and the particular

will to make it clear what the philosophers mean. If a man has a general intention of going on pilgrimage to the House of God, his is a universal will from which no movement will proceed. For movement occurs as a particular thing, in a definite direction, and to a certain extent. If the man directs himself to the House, he will have incessantly renewed representations—e.g., of the place he treads along, of the direction he takes, etc. Each particular representation follows a particular will for movement from the place to which a preceding movement has brought him. So this is what they mean by a particular will which is said to follow a particular representation. This meaning is indisputable. For there are different directions leading to Mecca, and the distance is not definite. Hence the man on Pilgrimage needs the specification of one place after another place, and one direction after another direction, by advancing from one particular will to another.

But in the case of the celestial movement, there is only one direction; for a spherical body is self-revolving and moves within space beyond which it never goes. It is just movement which is willed in this case. There is only one direction, only one style, and only one pattern of movement. Therefore, it is like the downward tendency of a stone. The stone seeks the Earth by the nearest way—viz., the straight line. As far as the determination of the straight line is concerned, the stone does not need the renewed emergence—renewed as new conditions of being near to the End, or distant from it, or of having attained to it, or departed from it, arise—of an extraordinary cause, over and above its universal nature which seeks the Centre. Similarly, therefore, in the case of the celestial movement, a universal will for movement will suffice, and no additional factor will be required. If the philosophers assume that an additional factor will be required, they make an arbitrary assumption.

Thirdly, what is an utterly arbitrary assumption is their assertion that when the sphere has the representation of particular movements, it also has the representation of the subordinates and the consequences of those movements. Such a thing is sheer nonsense. It is like one's saying:

> Since a man moves, and knows his movement, he should also know whatever necessarily follows from his movement—e.g., the parallel or unparallel positions, i.e., his relation

to bodies which are above him, or below him, or on his sides. And when he walks in the sun, he should know the spots on which his shadow falls, and the spots on which it does not fall; the cooling effects of the interception of the rays of the Sun from those spots; the contraction of the parts of the Earth under his foot, and the separation of some other parts; the effects on his internal humours which have developed some warmth through the movement; the transformation of his bodily parts into sweat, and so on to all other events inside his body, or outside it, for which the movement is a cause, or a condition, or a preparatory or a stimulating principle.

This is nonsense, which cannot occur to any intelligent person, and by which only the ignorant can be taken in. And this is what the arbitrary assumption of the philosophers amounts to.

Moreover, we will say: Do these analysable particulars which are known to the soul of the sphere exist at present, or would you include among them such things also as are expected to happen in the future?

If you confine them to the present, it will contradict the awareness—on the part of the sphere—of the Hidden Things, and the awareness—on the part of the prophets, in their waking life: and on the part of the rest of mankind, only in dreams—of that which will be in the future through the intermediacy of the sphere. In that case, the purpose of your argument will be defeated: for the argument is based on the assumption—which is arbitrary—that he who knows something knows its subordinates and consequences, so much so that if we could know all the causes of things, we would know all future events. The causes of all the events may be present now, i.e., they may be contained in the celestial movement: yet this motion leads to its effect only through one or more than one intermediary.

But if the 'analysable particulars known to the soul of the sphere' extend to the future, which is infinite, how can the soul of the sphere know in detail the particulars of an infinite future? How can the soul of a creature contain, at one time wherein there are no successive states, infinite and innumerable detailed and particular cognitions? He whose intellect does not testify to the impossibility of such cognitions has cause to lament the desperate condition of his intellect.

If they try to take the same stand against our doctrine of Divine knowledge, let it be known that it is agreed on all hands that the relation of Divine knowledge to its object cannot be compared to that between a creature's knowledge and its object. Whenever the soul of the sphere performs the same function as the soul of man, it follows that the two souls belong to the same kind: for being a percipient of particulars—through intermediaries—is their common characteristic. The validity of this comparison may not be conclusively proved: but there is strong probability for it. And even if this strong probability were not there, the comparison would at least be *possible*. And mere possibility would refute their claim that the evidence to the contrary is conclusive.

If it is said:

By its substance, the human soul, too, has the right to perceive all things. But its preoccupation with the results of desire, anger, greed, malice, envy, hunger, pain, and in short the accidents of the body and the results of sensuous functions diverts its attention. For when the human soul attends to one thing, it ignores another. But the celestial souls are free from these qualities. No distraction befalls them; and no care or sensation can engross them. Therefore, they know all things.

we will answer:

How do you know that there is no distraction in their case? Is not their worship of the First Principle, and their longing for Him a distraction or preoccupation, which might prevent them from having the representation of 'the analysable particulars'? Again, what is there to prevent one from supposing that there can be some other impediments besides anger, desire, or the sensuous impediments in general? How do you know that impediments are confined to that which we observe in our own case? In the case of men with mature minds, high aspirations or the desire for prominence is a preoccupation, which, however, can neither be imagined by children, nor recognised by them as a preoccupation or impediment. How, then, can one know the impossibility of something which is in this sense a preoccupation or impedi-

ment to the heavenly souls?

This much we intended to take up for discussion out of the sciences called by the Philosophers 'Metaphysical.'

(*The Physical Sciences*)

The sciences called by them 'physical' are many. We will mention some of them, so that it may be seen that the Sacred Law does not require a dispute over them, except on a few points which we have mentioned.

These sciences are divided into principal and subsidiary sciences. The principal sciences are eight: (i) The discussion of all that relates to body, *qua* body (i.e., division, motion, and change); and all that appertains to movement, or follows from it (i.e., Time, Space, and the Void). This is the subject-matter of the book called *Physics*. (ii) The inquiry concerning the various kinds of the component parts of the world (e.g., the heavens, and all that is in the hollow of the sphere of the Moon—viz., the four elements); the nature of these things, and the cause of the location of each one of these in a definite place. This is discussed in the book called *De coelo*. (iii) The inquiry concerning the laws of generation and corruption: development and reproduction and growth and decay; transformations; and the manner of the preservation of species, in spite of the corruption which overtakes individuals because of the two—i.e., Eastward and Westward—celestial movements. This is discussed in the book called *De generatione et corruptione*. (iv) The inquiry concerning the accidental conditions of the four elements whose mixture results in meteorological phenomena—e.g., clouds, rain, thunder, lightning, the halo, the rainbow, thunderbolts, winds, and earthquakes. (v) The study of the mineral substances. (vi) The science of botany. (vii) The study of animals. It forms the subject of the book called *Historia animalium*. (viii) The study of the animal soul, and the faculties of perception, showing that the soul of man does not die because of the death of the body, but that it is a spiritual substance whose annihilation is impossible.

The subsidiary sciences are seven: (i) Medicine. It aims at discovering the principles governing the human body; its various conditions (e.g., health and disease); the causes of

these conditions, and their symptoms—so that disease may be prevented, and health may be preserved. (ii) Astrology. It is an estimate, based on the figures and constellations of stars, as to what will happen to the world and to people; how new-born babes will fare, and how the years will progress. (iii) Physiognomy. It infers moral character from physical appearance. (iv) Interpretation of dreams, which is an elucidation, derived from dream-images, of what the soul has observed of the Hidden World, and the imaginative faculty has represented through a different symbol. (v) The talismanic art, which combines celestial forces with those of some terrestrial bodies, so as to produce from the combination another force which will work wonders in the world. (vi) The art of magic, which combines earthly substances to produce strange things from them. (vii) Alchemy, which aims at changing the properties of mineral substances, so that finally gold and silver may be produced through some controlled device.

The Sacred Law is not necessarily opposed to any one of these sciences. However, we shall select from them four points on which we have to criticise the philosophers:

(i) Their postulate that the connection observed to exist between causes and effects is a necessary connection, and that it is not possible or feasible to produce a cause which is not followed by its effect, or to bring into existence an effect independently of the cause.

(ii) Their assertion that human souls are self-subsisting substances which are not impressed upon bodies, and that death means the severance of their connection with the bodies, when their directive function ceases. For, they argue, the soul exists in itself in any event. And, they assert, this is known by a rational argument.

(iii) Their assertion that the extinction of these souls is impossible; and that once having been produced, they have an everlasting existence whose annihilation is impossible.

(iv) Their assertion that the return of the souls to the bodies is impossible.

Criticism of the philosophers on the first point is necessary, for on that criticism is to be built the affirmation of the miracles which mark a departure from the usual course of events—e.g., the Rod turning into a serpent; the revivi-

fication of the dead; and the splitting of the Moon. He who thinks that the natural course of events is necessary and unchangeable calls all these miracles impossible. Thus, the philosophers interpret the Quranic references to the revivification of the dead, saying that it means the supersession of the Death-arising-from-ignorance by the Life-resulting-from-knowledge. Or, they interpret the Rod's devouring the magic of the magicians, by saying that it means the refutation of the doubts of the disbelievers by the Divine proof which was manifested at the hands of Moses. As regards the splitting of the Moon, they often deny the fact, and assert that the transmission of the Tradition has not been continuous and trustworthy.

And it is only on three points that the philosophers affirm extraordinary miracles:

(i) In regard to the faculty of imagination. They assert:

When this faculty becomes mature and strong, and if sensuous preoccupations do not distract it, it catches a glimpse into the Preserved Tablet. Thereupon, the forms of particulars which will take place in the future are impressed upon it. This happens in waking life in the case of the prophets; and only in sleep in the case of all other men. This, then, is the prophetic property of the faculty of imagination.

(ii) In regard to a property of the faculty of theoretical reason. Say the philosophers:

This property actually amounts to an intuitive power—viz., the quickness of transition from one object of knowledge to another. A man who has a sharp intelligence awakens to the proof, when only that which has been proved is mentioned to him; or when only the proof is mentioned to him, he awakens to that which has thereby been proved. In other words, he discovers it out of himself. Generally, when the middle term occurs to him, he awakens to the conclusion; or when only the two terms which occur in the conclusion are presented to his mind, the middle term which joins the terms of the conclusion arises in his mind. And people are divided into different

classes in respect of this power. There are those whose awakening is self-determined. Then there are those who need some stimulus, however slight, in order to awaken. Finally, there are those who will not awaken, in spite of a stimulus, until they have taken considerable pains. Since it is possible that the side of deficiency should have its extreme end in those who have no intuition at all (so that, in spite of all stimuli, they are incapable of understanding the intelligibles), it is also possible for the side of possession or potency to have its extreme end in one who will awaken to all the intelligibles, or to most of them, in the shortest and the quickest time. And the difference is quantitative as well as qualitative—according as the awakening extends to some problems or to all of them, and according as it is more or less quick and immediate. Therefore, many a pure and holy soul has an intuitive understanding of all the intelligibles, which (understanding) is continuous and takes the shortest time. Such an one is the prophet, whose theoretical faculty is a miracle. He need not be taught the intelligibles; for, as it were, he learns by himself. And that is the quality mentioned in the Verse: 'Its oil would well-nigh give light though no fire were in contact with it, light upon light.'

(iii) In regard to the practical faculty of the soul. Say the philosophers:

This faculty develops to such an extent that physical things can be influenced and controlled by it. For example, when our soul imagines something, the limbs and their faculties serve it, moving towards the direction imagined to be desirable. Thus, when a man imagines something sweet, his mouth waters, and the salivary faculty, which causes saliva to flow from its sources, comes into action. Similarly, when a man imagines sexual intercourse, a certain faculty comes into action, and the (genital) organ becomes excited. Or, when a man walks over a plank which is elevated, with its two sides supported on two walls, he has the possibility of falling overwhelmingly presented to his imagination. Consequently, his body becomes passive to the imagination; and he falls. If the plank rested on ground, he would walk over it, and would

not fall. And this is so, because the bodies and the bodily faculties are created to be the servants and the subordinates of the soul. And the service differs according as the soul is more or less pure and powerful. Therefore, it is not improbable that the power of a soul should be so great that the physical forces outside its own body should have to serve it. For the soul is not impressed upon body; it has only a certain inclination towards, or interest in, directing it, the inclination or the interest having been created to be part of its nature. If, therefore, the physical parts of its own body can obey the soul, it will not be impossible for such parts outside the body to do the same. This is the reason why

> when a man's soul contemplates the blowing of winds; the falling of rains; the gathering of thunderbolts, or the trembling of the Earth (in order to swallow up a people) —which are all natural phenomena whose occurrence depends on the appearance of Heat or Cold or Motion in the Air—

then such Heat or Cold appears in the soul, and these phenomena arise therefrom, although no perceptible physical cause is present. This is the miracle of a prophet. But such a thing is bound to occur *in* the Air which is prepared to receive it. It is not possible for the miracle to go to such an extent as to transform a piece of wood into an animal, or to split the Moon which is incapable of being split.

(So this is their opinion about the miracles. We do not deny anything mentioned by them here; for such things do belong to the prophets. But we must criticise them for stopping just where they do, and for denying the transformation of the Rod into a serpent, or the revivification of the dead, etc. Therefore, this question necessitates an inquiry for two reasons. Firstly, in order to prove the miracles. Secondly, in order to uphold a doctrine on which all the Muslims are agreed—namely, that God has power over everything. Let us, therefore, pass on to the intended inquiry.

PROBLEM XVII

REFUTATION OF THEIR BELIEF IN THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF A DEPARTURE FROM THE NATURAL COURSE OF EVENTS

In our view, the connection between what are believed to be the cause and the effect is not necessary. Take any two things. *This* is not *That*; nor can *That* be *This*. The affirmation of one does not imply the affirmation of the other; nor does its denial imply the denial of the other. The existence of one is not necessitated by the existence of the other; nor its non-existence by the non-existence of the other. Take for instance any two things, such as the quenching of thirst and drinking; satisfaction of hunger and eating; burning and contact with fire; light and the rise of the Sun; death and the severance of the head from the trunk; healing and the use of medicine; the loosening of bowels and the use of a purgative, or any other set of events observed to be connected together in Medicine, or Astronomy, or Arts, or Crafts. They are connected as the result of the Decree of God (holy be His name), which preceded their existence. If one follows the other, it is because He has created them in that fashion, not because the connection in itself is necessary and indissoluble. He has the power to create the satisfaction of hunger without eating, or death without the severance of the head, or even the survival of life when the head has been cut off, or any other thing from among the connected things (independently of what is supposed to be its cause).

The philosophers deny this possibility; indeed, they assert its impossibility. Since the inquiry concerning these things (which are innumerable) may go to an indefinite length, let us consider only one example—viz., the burning of a piece of cotton at the time of its contact with fire. We admit the possibility of a contact between the two which will not result in burning, as also we admit the possibility of the transformation of cotton into ashes without coming into contact with fire. And they reject this possibility.

There are three points from which the discussion of the question can be started:

Firstly, the opponent may claim that fire alone is the agent of burning, and that being an agent by nature (not by choice), it cannot refrain from doing what it is its nature to do—after it comes into contact with a subject which is receptive to it.

This is what we deny. We say that it is God who—through the intermediacy of angels, or directly—is the agent of the creation of blackness in cotton; of the disintegration of its parts, and of their transformation into a smouldering heap or ashes. Fire, which is an inanimate thing, has no action. How can one prove that it is an agent? The only argument is from the observation of the fact of burning at the time of contact with fire. But observation only shows that one is *with* the other, not that it is *by* it and has no other cause than it. To take another example, it cannot be contradicted that the advent of the spirit and of the motive and cognitive faculties into the sperm of animals is not a development out of the natures which are pent up in heat and cold and moisture and dryness. By the act of procreation, the father is not the agent of the son; or of the son's life, vision, and hearing, or of any other thing he may have. Obviously, all these things are observed to exist *with* some other conditions. But we cannot say that they exist *by* them. On the contrary, they derive their existence from God—either directly, or through the intermediacy of angels to whom these temporal events are entrusted. (This argument is valid against the philosophers who believe in God; and it is they whom we address here.) So it is clear that existence *with* a thing does not prove being *by* it.

Let us illustrate. Suppose there is a blind man whose eyes are diseased, and who has not heard from anyone of the difference between night and day. If one day his disease is cured, and he can consequently see colours, he will guess that the agent of the perception of the forms of colours which has now been acquired by his eyes is the opening of the eyes. This will not be absolutely untrue, inasmuch as given the soundness of the eyes: and their being open: and the obstruction being removed: and the object before him having colour, it follows that he must be able to see, and it would be unintelligible if he were not. But when the Sun is set, and the atmosphere is dark, he will acquire the knowledge that the light of the Sun was the cause of the impression of colours

upon his sight. Therefore, how can our opponent safely ignore the possibility that:

(a) among the Principles of Being there should be causes from which flow the temporal events which are observed to be connected with each other;

(b) unlike bodies in motion, such temporal events should not be liable to destruction or leimination by us, and

(c) that if they were so liable, only then could we apprehend their separability from each other, and would consequently understand that their cause lies beyond what we observe?

If true to their principles, the philosophers cannot avoid such a hypothesis. And this is why the masters among them have agreed that these accidents and events which occur at the time of contact between bodies—or, in general, at the time of varying relations between bodies—in fact emanate from the Giver of Forms—who is an angel or angels. Even so, they say, the impression upon the eye of the forms of colours emanates from the Giver of Forms, sunrise and the sound eye and the coloured object being only preparatory and contributory factors in order to make the subject receive a form. And they have extended this explanation to every temporal event. Hence stands refuted he who would assert that fire is the agent of burning: or bread is the agent of the satisfaction of hunger: or medicine is the agent of health, and so on to all other causes.

In the second place, we can take issue with one who admits that the temporal phenomena emanate from the Principles of the Temporals, but *believes that*:

The capacity to receive the forms is derived from *these* causes which are observed, and which exist *here*. Emanation from the Principles themselves takes place by way of necessity and nature. It is like the emanation of light from the Sun which is involuntary and inevitable. And the receptive subjects are distinguished from one another by their different capacities. For instance, a polished body receives the rays of the Sun and reflects them, so that some other place shines by the reflected light. But a tarnished body does not receive the rays. Or the air does not prevent light from spreading; whereas a stone does prevent it. Or one thing softens under the Sun, while another hardens. Or the Sun whitens one thing (e.g., the washerman's clothes), but blackens another (e.g., the washerman's face). So the prin-

ciple is one; but its effects are diverse, because of different capacities in the receptive subjects. Similarly, the Principles of Being give unsparingly and ungrudgingly whatever may proceed from them; any failings whatsoever must be attributed to the recipients.

This being so, whenever we suppose fire with all its qualities, and suppose two similar pieces of cotton which are exposed to fire in the same way, how can we conceive that one of them should burn, and the other should not? There is no alternative for the other piece.

(From this idea, they come to disbelieve the story that when Abraham was thrown into fire, burning did not happen, although fire continued to be fire. They assert that this cannot happen, unless fire should be devoid of heat (which would put an end to its being fire), or unless Abraham's person or body should turn into a stone or something else which might resist the influence of fire. And, they add, neither *this* nor *that* is possible.)

To this, our answer is twofold:

In the first place, we will say: We do not agree that the Principles do not act by choice, or that God does not act by will. The refutation of this assertion of the philosophers has already engaged our attention in the problem of the creation of the world. And once it is proved that the Agent creates by His will the burning of a piece of cotton at the time of its contact with fire, Reason will consider it to be possible that He may not create the burning while the contact has taken place.

If it is said:

This might lead one to entertain the most egregious absurdities. Once it is denied that effects necessarily follow from causes, and if it is maintained that an effect is to be ascribed to the will of the Creator, and that the will itself has no particular well-defined course, but that its manifestations may be varied and arbitrary, then each one might persuade himself to believe that:

(a) In front of him, there are ferocious beasts; widespread conflagration; lofty mountains, and hostile forces equipped with arms; and that he fails to see them, because

God has not created for him the sight of them.

(b) One who left a book in his house might return to find it transformed into a slave-boy intelligent and resourceful; or into an animal. Or having left a slave-boy in the house, one may return to find him transformed into a dog. Or having left ashes, one may find musk in their place. Or one may find stone transformed into gold, or gold into stone. And when asked concerning the change, he may say: "I do not know what is now in the house. All I know is that I left a book there. Perhaps it has turned into a horse, defiling my library with its excrement." Or he might say: "I left a jar of water in the house. Perhaps it has changed into an apple tree."

And all this should be perfectly intelligible, since God is omnipotent, and it may not be necessary for a horse to be procreated, or for a tree to grow from a seed! Nay, it may not be necessary for either to grow from any thing. Perhaps God would create things which had never before existed. So one who sees a man whom he had not seen until now might hesitate to guess whether that man was born at all. He might say: "Maybe, this man was one of the fruits sold in the market. But now the fruit has been transformed into a man, because God has power over every thing, and all such transformations are therefore possible. Hence my hesitation."

In visualising possibilities of this kind one might go to any length. However, let this much suffice here.

In reply to the foregoing, we will say:

If you could prove that in regard to things which 'can exist' there cannot be created for man a knowledge that they 'do not exist,' then these absurdities would be inescapable. We have no doubt in regard to the situations described by you. For God has created for us the knowledge that He would not do these things, although they are possible. We never asserted that they are necessary. They are only possible—i.e., they may, or may not, happen. It is only when something possible is repeated over and over again (so as to form the Norm), that its pursuance of a uniform course in accordance with the Norm in the past is indelibly impressed upon our minds.

It is possible for a prophet to know—after the manner described by the philosophers—that a certain traveller will not return tomorrow. Although the return is possible, still the fact that it is not to happen can be known. Or look at a common man. It is known that he does not know anything of the Hidden World, and that without learning he cannot know the intelligibles. In spite of this, say the philosophers, he can know exactly what a prophet knows, if his soul and intuition acquire sufficient strength. But the philosophers know that this possibility has never happened. Now, if in extraordinay times, God breaks the Norm by causing such a thing to happen, then our cognitions (that a certain possible thing 'does not happen') will slip out of our hearts and will not be recreated by Him. Therefore, there is nothing to prevent us from believing that:

(a) something may be possible, and may be one of those things to which God's power extends;

(b) in spite of its being possible, it might have been known as a rule in the past that God would not do it; and

(c) God may create for us a knowledge that He would not do it in *this* particular instance.

So the philosophers' criticism is nothing but obstinate fault-finding.

Our second answer, which will enable us to get rid of the philosophers' captious criticism, is as follows:

We agree that fire is so created that when it finds two pieces of cotton which are similar, it will burn both of them, as it cannot discriminate between two similar things. At the same time, however, we can believe that when a certain prophet was thrown into the fire, he was not burnt—either because the attributes of fire had changed, or because the attributes of the prophet's person had changed. Thus, there might have originated—from God, or from the angels—a new attribute in the fire which confined its heat to itself, so that the heat was not communicated to the prophet. Hence, although the fire retained its heat, its form and its reality, still the effect of its heat did not pass onwards. Or there might have originated a new attribute in the prophet's body which enabled it to resist the influence of fire, although it had not ceased to be composed of flesh and bones.

We see that one who covers himself with asbestos sits down in a blazing furnace, and remains unaffected by it. He who has not observed such a thing will disbelieve it. Therefore, our opponents' disbelief in God's power to invest fire or a person's body with a certain attribute which will prevent it from burning, is like disbelief on the part of a man who has not observed asbestos and its effect. Things to which God's power extends include mysterious and wonderful facts. We have not observed all those mysteries and wonders. How, then, can it be proper on our part to deny their possibility, or positively to assert their impossibility?

Also in this way can be seen the possibility for recalling the dead to life, or changing a rod into a serpent. That is, Matter can receive every accident. Dust and all other elements are transformed into plants. Having been eaten by animals, plants are transformed into blood. Blood becomes sperm. Sperm fertilises the womb, and develops into a living being. This is the usual course of events extending over a long time. Why should the opponent refuse to believe that God may have the power to rotate Matter through all these phases in a shorter time than is usually taken? And if a shorter time is admissible, there is no bar against the shortest one.

So this is how the action of the natural processes can be accelerated to produce what is called a prophet's miracle.

If it is said:

Does this proceed from the prophet himself, or from one of the Principles of Being—at the prophet's instance?

we will answer:

When you admitted the possibility of the occurrence of rains, thunder, and earthquake by the power of the prophet's soul, did you mean that they proceed from the prophet himself, or from some other principle? We will reply to your question as you do to ours. It behoves both of us to relate this to God—whether immediately, or through the intermediacy of the angels. However, let us add, the time qualified for the occurrence of a miracle comes only when the prophet's resolution is directed to it, and when, as a means

of strengthening the system of the Sacred Law, its appearance becomes a specific condition for the establishment of the System of Good. This, therefore, is the determinant in favour of existence. In itself, the thing is possible: and the Principle is generous and bountiful. Nevertheless, the emanation from Him does not take place, until the need for the existence of the emanant operates as the determinant, and it becomes a specific condition for the establishment of the System of Good. And it cannot be such a condition, unless a prophet stands in need of it to prove his prophecy in order to bring about the propagation of Good.

All this fits very well into their theory. In fact, they are bound to draw such conclusions, since they have opened the door to the special character of a prophet by means of a property which is contrary to the ordinary qualities of men. The degrees of this special character cannot be exhausted by intellectual comprehension. Why should it be necessary for one, who believes in any degree of this special character, to disbelieve an account of it which has been handed down on the strength of uninterrupted testimony, and which finds its confirmation in the Sacred Law?

In fine, from the facts:

(a) that only the sperm receives the form of an animal;

(b) that the animal faculties flow on to it from the angels who are—according to the philosophers—the Principles of Being;

(c) that the sperm of man gives birth only to a man, and the sperm of a horse only to a horse—since the origination of the latter from a horse is most apt to determine the selection of the form of a horse, in contradistinction to all other forms, for the offspring which, therefore, can receive only the form so determined. For the same reason, barley does not grow from wheat, nor an apple from the seed of a pear;

(d) that, further, we see many species of animals which grow out of dust, and do not reproduce their kind—e.g., the worms. There are some other species which grow out of dust, but also reproduce their kind—e.g., the mouse, the snake, and the scorpion, and

(e) that the growth of such animals out of dust, and their different capacities to receive forms have for their causes things which are hidden from us, and which it is impossible for human faculties ever to discover. For their

forms do not come to them from the angels in mere frivolity or caprice. On the contrary, only that form comes to the subject to which the subject is specifically receptive because of its own preparation. And the preparations are different and multiple, and—according to the philosophers—their principles are to be found in the configurations of stars, and in the different relations of celestial bodies in course of their movement, it is plain that the principles of preparations have within them mysterious and wonderful things. For this reason, those versed in talismanic arts can use their knowledge of the properties of mineral substances and of the stars to procure combinations of celestial powers with mineral properties. Thus, they take some of the terrestrial figures, and by seeking out a particular horoscope for them, they can produce mysterious and wonderful things in the world. For instance, they often drive away snakes or scorpions or bugs from a city, or do some other thing of the kind which their talismanic science may have enabled them to do.

Seeing that the principles of preparations are innumerable, and that we cannot discover their secret or exhaust their number, whence can we know that it is impossible that there should be certain preparations in some bodies which (bodies) might pass through all the phases of transformation in the shortest time, so as to receive the form for which they were prepared—thus giving rise to a miracle? Disbelief in such a thing betrays a lack of spirit on the disbeliever's part, and his unfamiliarity with the High Beings, and unawareness of the Secrets of God (glory to Him) in the world of created beings and in Nature. He who observes the wonders which are revealed by sciences will never hesitate to admit the possibility of God's power extending to those things which have been related as prophets' miracles.

If it is said:

We agree with you that God's power extends to all that is possible. And you agree with us that no power extends to that which is impossible. Now, things are divided into three kinds: (i) those whose impossibility is definitely known; (ii) those whose possibility is definitely known; and (iii) those in regard to which the Intellect is hesitant, affirming neither their possibility nor impossibility. What

is your definition of the Impossible? If it is the combination of affirmation and negation in the same thing, then say that of every two things, *This* is not *That*, nor *That This*, and that therefore the existence of neither presupposes the existence of the other. Further, say:

(a) that God has the power to create will without the knowledge of the object of will; or knowledge without life; or

(b) that He has the power to cause the movement of a dead man's hand, causing him to sit up, write out a book, or pursue some other art while his eyes may be open, and his vision concentrated on what is before him; and

(c) that still the man may not be able to 'see,' and may have no life or power—for his systematic actions have been created by God, by causing his hand to move, and by directing the movement Himself.

When such a thing is regarded as possible, all distinction between voluntary and spasmodic movements will disappear. No controlled action will be an indication of knowledge or power on the part of the agent. Further, it will be reasonable to maintain that He has the power to change the Genera—e.g., substance into accident; knowledge into power; black into white, and sound into smell—just as He has the power to change inorganic Matter into an animal, or a stone into gold. And many other absurdities will follow; in fact, their number will be unlimited.

The answer:

No one has power over the Impossible. What the Impossible means is the affirmation of something together with its denial; or the affirmation of the particular together with the denial of the general; or the affirmation of two together with the denial of one. That which does not fall under these heads is not impossible. And that which is not impossible is within power.

The combination of blackness and whiteness is impossible; for by the affirmation of the forms of blackness in a subject we understand the negation of whiteness, and the existence of blackness. Therefore, if the negation of whiteness is understood by the affirmation of blackness, then the affirmation of whiteness together with its (understood) negation will be impossible.

It is not possible for one person to be in two places at the same time. For by his being in the house we understand his not-being in the not-house. Therefore, it is impossible to suppose his being in not-house together with his being in house which only means the denial of his being in not-house. Similarly, by will we understand the seeking after something which is known Now, if the seeking is supposed, but knowledge is not supposed, then there will be no will. For the supposition will have within itself the negation of what we understand by will.

Nor is it possible that knowledge should be created in inorganic Matter. For by inorganic Matter we understand something which has no cognition. If cognition is created in it, it will be impossible to call it inorganic Matter in the sense in which we understand it. If in spite of the new-created cognition, the stone does not cognise, then it will be impossible to name as knowledge this new-created thing which does not enable its subject to have any cognition whatsoever. So this is the reason why the creation of knowledge in inorganic Matter is impossible.

As regards the transformation of Genera, some of the *Mutakallimun* believe that God has power over it. But we maintain that it is unintelligible for something to become another. For instance, if blackness becomes power, does blackness remain, or not? If it disappears, it does not become, but only passes away, and something else comes into existence. If it still exists together with power, it has not become, but something else has just been added to it. If blackness remains, and power is not there, then there is no becoming at all. The whole thing remains as it was.

When we say that blood becomes sperm, we mean that one and the same Matter has put off one form to take on another. So the final outcome is that one form has passed away, and another has come into existence, while Matter remains unchanged beneath successive forms. Again, when we say that water becomes air because of heat, we mean that Matter which had received the form of water has now discarded that form to receive another. So the Matter is common; it is only its attributes which change. Similarly, therefore, we may speak of the Rod becoming a serpent, or of dust becoming an animal. But between the Substance and the Accident there is no common Matter. Nor is there any

common Matter between blackness and power, or between any other two Genera. Hence the impossibility of transformation in their case.

As regards the case in which God causes the hand of a dead man to move, and places him on the footing of a living man, so that he may sit up and write, till the movement of his hand results in coherent writing, we must say that in itself it is not impossible. For we ascribe all temporal events to the will of One who acts by choice. But it is to be rejected insofar as it is subversive of the usual course of events. Your statement that the possibility of such a thing will destroy the probative value of the adjustment of an action as an indication of knowledge on the agent's part is not true. For it is God who is the agent; He makes the adjustment, and performs the action—through the dead man.

As regards your statement that there remains no distinction between voluntary and spasmodic movements, we will say that we know such a thing from ourselves. When in our own case, we observe a distinction between the two states, we designate the cause of distinction as power. And then we conclude that what actually happens is only one of the two possible things—i.e., either the state in which movement is produced by power, or the state in which it is produced not-by-power. So when we look at someone else, and see many coherent movements, we acquire the knowledge of his power over the movements. Now, this knowledge is one of those cognitions which are created by God, and which depend upon the continuance of the regular course of events. Knowledge of this kind can only tell us of the existence of one of the two possible things. But, as shown earlier, it does not prove the impossibility of the other alternative.

PROBLEM XVIII

OF THEIR INABILITY TO GIVE A RATIONAL DEMONSTRATION OF THEIR THEORY THAT THE HUMAN SOUL IS A SPIRITUAL SUBSTANCE WHICH EXISTS IN ITSELF; IS NOT SPACE-FILLING; IS NOT BODY, OR IMPRESSED UPON BODY; AND IS NEITHER CONNECTED NOR DISCONNECTED WITH BODY—AS GOD IS NEITHER INSIDE THE WORLD NOR OUTSIDE IT, OR AS THE ANGELS ARE

THE consideration of this problem requires the description of their theory of the animal and human faculties:

The animal faculties are divided by them into two: motive and perceptive. The perceptive faculties are of two kinds: external and internal. The external perceptive faculties consist of the five senses. These are impressed upon bodies. The internal perceptive faculties are three:

(i) The faculty of fantasy, which is located in the forepart of the brain, behind the faculty of sight. In this faculty remain the forms of seen things, when the eyes are closed. Indeed, the data of all the five senses are impressed upon it. Hence it is called the *sensus communis*. But for it, he who saw white honey, and could not perceive its sweetness until he tasted of it, would not perceive the sweetness without tasting it—as he did before—even on seeing it a second time. But in this faculty there is something which judges that this white thing is also sweet. It follows that this 'something' is a judge working with the combination of two things—viz., colour and sweetness. For only thus can it judge of the existence of one from that of another.

(ii) The estimative faculty perceives the meanings, whereas the preceding one perceives the forms. Form means something which depends upon Matter—i.e., body—for its existence. By meaning, on the other hand, is understood something whose existence does not require body, although accidentally it may be in body—e.g., hatred or kindliness. For instance, the goat perceives the colour and shape of a wolf. These things cannot but be in body. But it also perceives the wolf's hostility towards it. Or the lamb per-

ceives the shape and colour of its mother, then her kindliness and agreeableness. Therefore, it runs away from the wolf, but follows its mother. Unlike colour or shape, it is not necessary for kindliness or enmity to be in bodies, although accidentally they may be.

Thus the estimative faculty is distinguished from the preceding one; and it is located in the hindmost ventricle of the brain.

(iii) The third internal perceptive faculty is called sensitive imagination in the case of animals, and cogitation in the case of man. Its function is to compose sensible forms with one another, or to superimpose meanings upon forms. It is in the middle ventricle of the brain, between the faculties of retention and memory. It enables a man to imagine a flying horse or any other combination which he may never have observed. This faculty could, as will be seen presently, more properly be connected with the motive faculties, not the perceptive ones. The knowledge of the location of these faculties is derived from the Art of Medicine. When one of the ventricles of the brain is affected, these things—i.e., perception, etc.,—are also disturbed.

Further, (they assert) the faculty upon which are impressed the forms of the data of the five senses conserves those forms—which (forms) therefore persist after having been received. When something conserves another, it does not do so by the faculty by which it receives. For instance, water receives, but does not conserve. Wax receives by its moisture; but, unlike water, it conserves—by its dryness. Therefore, the conserving faculty is not a receiving one. So it is called 'retention.'

The meanings impressed upon the estimative faculty are likewise conserved—by the faculty which is called 'memory.'

So the internal perceptions, when the faculty of sensitive imagination is included among them, are five, just as the external are five.

The motive faculties are divided into (a) that which moves in the sense that it impels towards movement; and (b) that which moves in the sense that movement is the result of its direct efficiency.

The motive faculty which moves in the sense that it impels towards movement is the faculty of appetence. When

the form of an object of desire or aversion is impressed upon the faculty of fantasy (which we have mentioned above), the faculty of appetence impels the active motive faculty towards movement. It has two subdivisions:

(i) Faculty of desire, which rouses to movement that brings about approximation to things imagined to be necessary or useful in the search for pleasure.

(ii) Faculty of anger, which rouses to movement whereby it is sought to keep away that which is imagined to be harmful or deleterious, and thus to overcome it. With the action of this faculty is completed the coordination of the faculties which results in the activity called action.

The active motive faculty comes into play in the muscles and the nerves. Its function is to contract the muscles and to pull the tendons and ligaments, which are connected with the limbs, towards the position where this faculty runs its course; or to relax or expand them so that they tend away from the position.

These, then, are the faculties of the animal soul, described here in a brief and general way.

The Human Rational Soul

It is also called (by them) the Communicative Soul. For, apparently, being the choicest fruit of Reason, communication by language is *the* rational activity. Hence the relation between the two terms.

The rational soul has two faculties: the theoretical, and the practical. Each one of these two is called Reason, but this is so because the name is common to them. The practical faculty is the motive principle of the human body, urging it towards those human activities which are marked by coordination, and whose coordination is derived from the deliberation characteristic of man.

The function of the theoretical faculty, which is also called Speculation, is to apprehend the realities of the intelligibles, which are free from Matter, Space, and Dimension—i.e., the universal judgments which are called States or Aspects by the *Mutakallimīn*, and the Abstract Universals by the philosophers.

Thus the soul has two faculties, corresponding to two different planes. Speculation or the theoretical faculty

corresponds to the plane of the angels, from whom the soul derives real cognitions. It behoves this faculty perpetually to be receptive to what comes to it from above. The practical faculty, on the other hand, brings the soul into relation with things of a lower order, viz., the body; the governance of body, and the reform of the moral habits. It is desirable that this faculty should govern all the bodily faculties; that the latter should be ready to learn the manners it has to teach them; and that they should be subservient to it. Not the practical faculty, but the bodily faculties should be the passive recipients of influences; for otherwise, the physical qualities would generate in the soul those servile attitudes called the Vices. Let the practical faculty be dominant, so that the soul may thereby acquire attitudes wich are called Virtues.

(This is a brief summary of their detailed account of the animal and human faculties. Even this much is lengthy enough, although we have omitted the description of the Vegetative Faculties, which were not relevant to our purpose. Nothing of what the philosophers have said here is like those things which the Sacred Law lays us under an obligation to disbelieve. For they are observable facts, which—by God's will—form part of the regular course of events. However, we intend to question their claim that by rational arguments they can know the soul's being a substance which exists in itself. Ours is not the attitude of one who would not admit God's power over such a thing, or would maintain that religion actually contradicts this view. On the contrary, we will show in the discussion of Resurrection that religion lends its support to this view. But we dispute their claim that the Intellect alone is the guide in this matter, and that therefore one need not depend on religion in regard to it.

So we demand that they produce their arguments. And they would assert that they have many:)

(1)

In the first argument, they say:

The rational cognitions subsist in the human soul. These cognitions are not infinite, and in them there are indivisible units. It follows that the substratum of these cognitions

must also be indivisible. But all bodies are divisible. Therefore, the substratum of the rational cognitions is not body. This can be put in accordance with the conditions of the logical figures. To do that in the aptest way, one might say:

(i) If the substratum of knowledge were a divisible body, then the knowledge subsisting in it would be divisible.

(ii) But the knowledge subsisting in it is not divisible.

(iii) Therefore, the substratum is not body.

This is a hypothetical syllogism in which the contrary of the antecedent follows as an indisputable conclusion from the interpellation of the contrary of the consequent. There can be no doubt about the validity of the figure of the syllogism, or about the two premises. For in the first premiss it is stated that every thing which subsists in a divisible substratum is divisible; and that if the divisibility of the substratum of knowledge is supposed, then the divisibility of knowledge will be axiomatic and unquestionable. In the second premiss it is stated that knowledge which is one and subsists in man is indivisible. For it is impossible to consider it to be divisible *ad infinitum*. If it is considered to be divisible only to a certain extent, then it will consist of units which cannot be divided any further.

In short, we know things in such a way that we cannot suppose the extinction of some of them, while others remain. For 'some' and 'others' are inapplicable to them.

Objection from two points:

Firstly, it might be said: How will you disprove one who says that the substratum of knowledge is an individual atom which, although filling space, is indivisible? This idea is found in the theories of the *Mutakallimin*. This idea having been adopted, the only difficulty which remains is that it may be regarded as improbable. That is, it might be said: How can all the cognitions subsist in the individual atom, while all other atoms surrounding it are left vacant and unoccupied? But this assumption of improbability is no good to the philosophers, for it can be directed against their own theory. Thus, one might ask, how can the soul be something one, unspatial, undesignated, neither inside the body nor outside it, and neither connected nor disconnected with anything corporeal? However, we do not like to make

much of this point. For the question of the indivisible part has been discussed at very great length, and the philosophers have a number of mathematical arguments for it which, if considered by us, would make the present discussion too lengthy. One of those arguments may be related here. Say the philosophers:

> If the individual atom is between two other atoms, does one of its two sides come into contact with the same thing as the other does, or are the two things different? It is impossible that the two should be identical; for then the two sides of the atom would coincide. For if A touches B, and B touches C, then A will be in touch with C. If, on the other hand, things in contact with the two sides of the atom are different, that only proves multiplicity and division.

Such a difficulty cannot be solved without a lengthy discussion. However, we are under no obligation to consider it. Therefore, let us pass on to the next point.

In the second place, we will say:

Your statement that every thing which subsists in body must be divisible stands refuted by your own description of the faculty by which a goat perceives a wolf's enmity. That (perception) is something one and indivisible, because enmity has no parts some of which might be supposed to have been perceived, while others were not. And, according to you, the perception does reside in a bodily faculty, inasmuch as the soul of animals is something impressed upon bodies, and incapable of surviving death. And all the philosophers are agreed on this point. Now, even if it were possible for them to concoct the supposition of the division of the data of the five senses: of the *sensus communis*; and of the retentive faculty, still it would be impossible for them to suppose the division of the 'meanings' for which it is not a condition to be in Matter.

If it is said:

The goat does not perceive the absolute enmity divested

of Matter. It only perceives the enmity of a particular wolf which has an objective appearance—viz., the enmity associated with his person and figure. But the rational faculty apprehends realities which are divested of Matter and objectivity.

we will answer:

The goat perceives the colour and the figure of the wolf, and then his enmity. Now, if colour is impressed upon the faculty of sight, and so is figure, and if both are divisible by the division of the substratum of sight, then what is that by which the goat perceives enmity? If it is a body, the perception must be divisible. And I wonder what would be the content of this divisible perception! Will it be a perception of a part of enmity? If so, how can enmity have a part? Or will every part of the perception be the perception of the whole of enmity? If so, enmity will be known over and over again—because of the existence of the perceptions in each part of the substratum.

This, then, is the doubt which will create difficulties for them in their argument. They must try to remove it.

If it is said:

This means that there is self-contradiction in the intelligibles. But the intelligibles are irrefragable. Since it has not been possible for you to doubt the two premises—namely, that the 'one' knowledge is indivisible; and that that which is indivisible cannot subsist in a divisible body—it is not possible for you to doubt the conclusion.

The answer:

Our only purpose in writing this book was to show the inconsistency and the self-contradiction involved in the philosophers' theories. And that purpose has been achieved, inasmuch as we have shown that one of the two things—viz., either the theory of the rational soul, or the explanation of the estimative faculty—must be abandoned.

Further, we will say, from the contradiction involved in their thesis, it is clear that the philosophers are unmindful

of where in their syllogism confusion lies. Perhaps the source of confusion is their assertion that, if impressed upon body, knowledge would be impressed, as colour is impressed upon the coloured object; and that, consequently, like the division of colour by the division of the coloured object, knowledge would be divided by the division of the substratum. The unsatisfactory thing here is the word 'impression.' Possibly, the relation between knowledge and its substratum is different from that between colour and the coloured object. That is to say, it is different from that which is said to be commensurate with the substratum, and impressed upon it, and spread through its extremities, so that the division of one will divide the other. It is possible for knowledge to be related to its substratum in a different way. It is possible that because of that relation the division of the substratum should not divide knowledge itself. Perhaps, therefore, knowledge is related to its substratum in the same way as the perception of enmity is related to its physical substratum. The ways in which attributes are related to their substrata are not confined to a single pattern. Nor is our knowledge of their details absolutely reliable. Therefore, judgments about them, unless based on a perfect knowledge of the details of the relation, will be unreliable judgments.

Now, to sum up. There is no denying the fact that things mentioned by the philosophers raise a strong presumption of probability. What is denied here is that they can be known by a knowledge which is certain, uncontested, and indubitable. We have seen how far it is open to doubt.

(2)

In their second argument, the philosophers say:

If the knowledge of 'one' rational—i.e., divested of Matter—object of knowledge were impressed upon Matter in the same way as accidents are impressed upon physical substances, then, as shown above, the division of the physical substratum would also divide knowledge necessarily. But if it is not impressed upon, and commensurate with, the substratum, and the word 'impressed' is objectionable, then we can express the same thing in a different way.

Thus, let us ask: Is there a relation between knowledge and the knower, or not? It is impossible to cut off all the relation; for in that case, it will not be possible to show why his being the knower of it is more appropriate than anyone else's being the knower of it. But if there is a relation, it must be one of the following three kinds: (i) Either there will be a relation with each one of the many parts of the substratum; or (ii) with some of the parts as distinguished from others; or (iii) with none of them.

Now, it will be false to say that there is a relation with none of the parts; for if there is no relation with the units there can be none with their aggregate either. The aggregate of dissimilar things is still a dissimilar thing.

Again, it will be false to say that there is a relation with some parts of the substratum. For in that case, the parts with which knowledge is not related will have nothing to do with knowledge. Therefore, it will be possible for us to exclude them from consideration.

Again, it will be false to say that there is relation between each supposed part of the substratum and the essence of knowledge. For if there were a relation with the entire essence of knowledge, then that which is known to any one part would be, not a part of the object of knowledge, but the whole object of knowledge as such. And then the known thing would be known over and over again, actually for an infinite number of times. But if each part were to have a relation with the essence of knowledge different from that of any other part, then the essence of knowledge would be conceptually divisible. And we have shown that the knowledge of something one in all respects is not even conceptually divisible. Finally, if each part of the substratum were to have a relation with something out of the essence of knowledge which was different from that with which another part was related, then the divisibility of knowledge because of this relation would be all the more evident. And the division is impossible.

From this it will be seen that the sense data impressed upon the five senses are nothing but representations of particular and divisible forms; for perception means the appearance of the image of the percept in the percipient's soul. And each part of the sensible image has a relation with a part of the bodily organ.

Objection:

Our objection to this argument is the same as to the preceding one. For the substitution of the word 'relation' for 'impression' does not remove the doubt about the impression of the wolf's enmity upon the goat's estimative faculty (as described by them). Obviously, the goat has a perception, and the perception is related to it, and the relation is determined in the same way as you have mentioned. For enmity is not a measurable and quantified thing whose image could be impressed upon a quantified body, and whose parts would bear a relation to the parts of that body. The measurableness of wolf's figure is not enough. For the goat perceives something else besides the figure, and that 'something' is enmity, or hostility, or unkindliness. And this enmity which is additional to figure has no quantity or measure. Nonetheless, it is perceived by a quantified body. Therefore, in this way, the present argument is rendered problematical, no less than the preceding one.

Should one say here:

Why did you not counter these arguments by saying that knowledge subsists in an indivisible, although space-filling, substance—viz., the individual atom?

we would answer:

The theory of the individual atom belongs to Mathematics; and the explanation of the individual atom requires a lengthy discourse. Moreover, even that theory does not remove all the difficulties. For it would follow that power and will should also be in the individual atom. Man's action is inconceivable without power and will. And will is inconceivable without knowledge. The power of writing is in the hand and the fingers. But the knowledge of it is not in the hand; for in case the hand should be cut off, knowledge would not disappear. Nor is the will in the hand; for one can be willing to write, even when the hand is paralysed. If in such a case, one fails to write, the failure is to be attributed to the absence of power, not to the absence of will.

(3)

In the third argument, the philosophers say:

If knowledge were in a part of the body, then that part, as distinguished from all other parts of a man's body, would be the knower. But man is called a knower; and being a knower is attributed to him as a whole, not to a particular place within him.

(This is silly. For man is also called a seer, a hearer, and a taster. And these attributes are also predicated of the animals. But this does not show that sensuous perception does not reside in the body. Nay, this is a permissible liberty taken with the words. For instance, it is said: 'He is in Baghdād.' Although the man is actually in only one part of Baghdād, not the whole of it, still he is related to the whole.)

(4)

In their fourth argument, they say:

If knowledge were to subsist in a part, say, of the heart or the brain, then it would be possible for its contrary—i.e., ignorance—to exist in another part of the heart or the brain. And then one might be a knower and an ignorant person at the same time and in relation to the same thing. Since such a thing is impossible, it is clear that the substratum of knowledge is also the substratum of ignorance. It is impossible that two contraries should coexist in this substratum. If it were divisible, the existence of knowledge in one part and of ignorance in another would not be impossible. For two contraries existing in two different places are not mutually exclusive. For instance, the mottled colouring combines contrary colours in the same horse, but in different places; and blackness and whiteness coexist in the same eye, but in different parts of it.

Now, this is not necessarily true of the senses; for sense perceptions have no contraries. One only does, or does not, perceive; and between the two states there is the antithesis of being and non-being. No doubt, we say that one perceives by one of his parts—e.g., the eye or the ear—and not by the

whole body. And there is no self-contradiction involved in such a statement. And this statement cannot be superseded by your statement that being a knower is contrary to being ignorant, and that the judgment applies to the whole body. For it is impossible that the judgment should refer to anything other than the substratum of the cause of the judgment. Therfore, the knower is that substratum wherein knowledge subsists. If the name is given to the whole of which the substratum is a part, this will be a metaphorical use. For instance, one is said to be in Baghdād, whereas he is in only a part of it. Similarly, one is said to be a seer; although, evidently, the judgment about seeing does not apply to the hands or the feet, but refers to the eyes exclusively. The opposition between judgments is like the opposition between their causes; for judgments exclusively refer to the substrata of the causes.

Nor can this position be invalidated by one's saying that the substratum in man which has the capacity to receive knowledge and ignorance is the same, and that knowledge and ignorance come to it as contraries. For you have held that every living body is capable of receiving knowledge and ignorance. You have not laid down any other condition besides that of life; and to you all the parts of the body are on par so far as the receiving of knowledge is concerned.

Objection:

This will recoil upon you in the case of desire, appetite, and will. For these things are possessed by men and animals alike, and they *are* impressed upon bodies. It is impossible that an animal or man should hate what he loves, thus combining within himself hatred and love for the same thing—in such a way that hatred exists in one substratum, and love in another. But this does not prove that hatred and love do not subsist in bodies. The reason why their combination is impossible is that, although the number of these faculties is large, and they are distributed among different organs, yet they are held together by one bond—viz., the soul. This bond belongs to man and animal alike. So with this bond holding them together, it is impossible for the diverse faculties to acquire relations which are—with reference to the bond—mutually exclusive. But this does not prove that the soul is not impressed upon body; indeed, in the case of animals,

it actually is.

(5)

In their fifth argument, they say:

If the intellect were to perceive the intelligibles by a bodily organ, it could not know itself. But the consequent is impossible, since the Intellect does know itself. It follows that the antecedent must be impossible.

We will say:

Doubtless, the contrary of the antecedent may follow as the conclusion from the interpellation of the contrary of the consequent. But this happens only when it is proved that there is a necessary connection between the consequent and the antecedent. Now, in your argument, it is not clear whether the connection between the two is necessary. How will you prove it?

If it is said:

The argument is as follows: Being in body, sight does not relate to sight. Vision is not seen; nor can hearing be heard. And the same holds of all other senses. So if the Intellect were to perceive by a bodily organ, it could not perceive itself. But in truth, the Intellect knows itself, as it knows what is other than itself. Every one of us knows himself, as he knows the Other. And we also know that we know ourselves as well as others.

we will answer:

For two reasons, the point made by you is invalid.

Firstly, in our view, it is possible for sight to relate to itself, thus becoming the sight of the Other as well as of itself—just as the knowledge possessed by any one of us is the knowledge of the Other as well as of itself. Although such a thing is contrary to the regular course of events, we admit the possibility of a departure from that course.

The second reason is even more cogent. We admit this

impossibility of self-perception in the case of the senses. But why is it that something which is inapplicable to some of the senses is considered to be inapplicable to all of them? What is the difficulty in believing that, in spite of the common corporeality of all the senses, the judgment about the senses with respect to perception may differ from one case to another? In fact, sight and touch do differ—inasmuch as the tactual perception is not acquired until there is contact between the object and the organ of touch (and the same applies to taste), whereas the case with sight is just the reverse. The removal of contact is a prerequisite for visual perception, so much so that if the eyes are closed, the colour of the eyelids cannot be seen just because of their contact with the organ of sight. This difference between sight and touch does not make the two differ with respect to dependence upon body. Why, then, is it improbable that that which is called the Intellect should be one of the bodily senses, differing from the other senses insofar as it perceives itself?

(6)

In their sixth argument, they say:

If the Intellect were to perceive by a bodily organ as the sense of sight does, then like any other sense it would be unable to perceive the organ. But in fact, it does perceive the brain, or the heart, or whatever may be called its organ. It follows that the Intellect has no organ or substratum. For otherwise, it would not be able to perceive it.

Objection:

Our objection to this argument is the same as that to the preceding one. It is not improbable that sight should perceive its own substratum although here the question of what is the usual thing comes up. Again, we might say (as we did in the preceding argument): Why should it be impossible for the senses to differ in this respect, even though all are alike impressed upon bodies? Why do you say that nothing which exists in body can perceive its physical substratum? Why do you make a universal judgment based upon a few particulars? That is a procedure whose invalidity is agreed

on all hands. Logic tells us (how valid the inference is) when a universal judgment is based on one or more than one particular instance. For instance, it is believed that every animal moves its lower jaw at the time of eating. This inference is made because, through the inductive observation of animals, we have found that all the animals whom we saw did the same. But this shows our failure to take cognisance of the crocodile which moves its upper jaw. Now, the philosophers have come across only the five senses through inductive observation. Having found these senses constituted in a certain manner, they pass judgment upon all senses. Maybe, however, the Intellect is a sense bearing the same relation to all other senses as the crocodile does to all other animals. On this view, therefore, the senses will, in spite of their common corporeality, be divided into those which do, and those which do not, perceive the substratum. In fact, they are already divided into those which perceive their object when it is not in contact with them (e.g., sight), and those which do not perceive until there is such contact (e.g., taste or touch). So the description given by the philosophers is not conducive to certainty, however plausible it may be.

If it is said:

We rely, not merely on the inductive observation of the senses, but on a rational argument. Thus, we say, if the heart or the brain were the soul of man, the perception of the heart or the brain could never be inaccessible to him. On the contrary, that knowledge would always be present, because man is never devoid of self-perception. The essence of none of us is inaccessible to his essence. On the contrary, we are perpetually affirming ourselves by ourselves. But as far as the heart or the brain is concerned, no one perceives them, and no one believes in their existence, until he has heard the story of the heart or the brain, or observed another man anatomically. So if the Intellect were to subsist in body, it would be necessary for it either always to perceive the body, or never to perceive it at all. But neither of the two alternatives is true. For sometimes a bodily organ is known; sometimes, not.

The point may be elucidated as follows: The perception which subsists in a substratum perceives the substratum

because of the relation between the two. And it is inconceivable that perception should bear any other relation to the substratum than that of subsisting in it. Therefore, it will always perceive the substratum. If, however, this relation is not sufficient, it will never perceive the substratum, insofar as it can bear no other relation to the substratum than that of subsisting in it—just as if it were to know itself, it would know for ever, not being inattentive at any time.

we will answer:

Man is always conscious of, and inattentive to, himself—inasmuch as he is conscious of his body, or his physical constitution. No doubt, the name of the heart, or its from, or its figure is not definite in his consciousness, yet he affirms himself, *qua* body—so much so that he affirms himself by reference to his clothes or his house. But the Self mentioned by the philosophers has no such associations as the house or the clothes (hence the inadequacy of the idea). It is clear that the fundamental affirmation of body is inseparable from self-consciousness. If one is inattentive to its figure or name, this may be like his inattention to the substratum of smell (viz., the two protuberances in the forepart of the brain which resemble the two nipples of the breast). Everyone knows that he perceives smell by his body; but everyone does not conjure up the specific character or the shape of the substratum of the perception—even when he is aware that the substratum is nearer to the head than to the back, or nearer to the inner part of the nose than to the inner part of the ear. Similarly, man is conscious of himself and knows that his ego which constitutes him is nearer to his heart than to his feet. For he can suppose the survival of his ego, while the feet do not exist. But he cannot suppose the survival of the ego, while the heart does not exist. Therefore, it is clear that the philosophers' statement that sometimes man is aware, and sometimes unaware, of body is not true.

(7)

In their seventh argument, they say:

Faculties which perceive by bodily organs are exhausted

by the incessant activity of perceiving. For incessant motion corrupts bodies, and leads to their exhaustion. Similarly, powerful things which are perceived through an intense exertion weaken these faculties, and sometimes corrupt them to such an extent that, having perceived the powerful things (e.g., a loud noise, in the case of hearing; or a dazzling light, in the case of sight), they are unable to perceive lesser and weaker ones. Therefore, the corrupting effect leaves the ear or the eye unable to perceive a low voice or minute visible things. Even so, one who has tasted of very intense sweetness is unable to perceive the sweetness of lesser intensity.

Just the reverse is the case with the rational faculty. Its continuous apprehension of the intelligibles does not tire it. The cognition of the more distinct things (viz., things whose truth is self-evident) gives it greater strength, rather than weakness, in order to apprehend less distinct things (viz., things known by inferential knowledge). If sometimes the rational faculty appears to be exhausted, this results from the fact that it had employed the faculty of fantasy, and received its assistance. It is the physical organ of the faculty of fantasy which gets weaker, and consequently fantasy does not serve the Intellect.

(This is the same technique as we found in the preceding argument. Let us reaffirm that it is not improbable for the physical senses to differ in respect of these things. Something proved in the case of some of the senses need not be true of others. Nay, even for the bodies it is not improbable to differ—so that some of them are liable to be weakened by motion of a certain kind; while others are in a position, not to be enfeebled, but strengthened by that motion (which anyhow exercises an influence over them). On this assumption, there will be a cause producing a new potency in some of the bodies, because of which they will not be adversely affected by motion. And all these assumptions are perfectly possible inasmuch as it is not necessary to universalise a judgment which is found applicable to a few things.)

(8)

In their eighth argument, they say:

The faculties which reside in parts of the body get weak-

er when, at about the age of forty, physical growth stops. From that time onwards, sight or any other physical faculty is much weaker than it used to be. But in most cases, the rational faculty grows stronger in that period; and this rule is not disproved by the fact that apprehension of the intelligibles is not feasible, when disease overtakes the body, or when senile decay brings about dotage. Once it is recognised that at least *sometimes* the rational faculty grows stronger, while the body is getting weaker, it will be clear that the former is self-subsisting. And then, even if at some other time the derangement of the rational faculty is found to accompany that of the body, it will not follow that the former depends upon the body. For if (in a hypothetical syllogism) the consequent itself is interpellated, no conclusion follows. Thus, we can say:

(i) If the rational faculty were to subsist in body, the weakness of the body would weaken it invariably.

(ii) But the consequent is impossible.

(iii) Therefore, the antecedent is impossible.

If, however, we say that the consequent exists in some cases, it does not necessarily follow that the antecedent should exist.

The cause of this (independence of the rational faculty) is that the soul has an action *per se*, when it is not distracted by, or preoccupied with, anything else. In general, it has two different functions: one in relation to the body (viz., the direction and the control of it); and the other in relation to its principles and its essence (viz., the apprehension of the intelligibles). These two functions are mutually exclusive, and opposed to each other. So when the soul is preoccupied with one, it is diverted from the other. It is impossible for it to combine the two. The diverting influences or the preoccupations arising from the body are sensation, imagination, desires, anger, fear, grief, and pain. When you begin to reflect over the intelligibles, the effect of all these diverting things on you will remain in abeyance. Sometimes, mere sensation hinders the apprehension of the intelligibles, even though the organ of the Intellect may not have been afflicted, or its essence disordered. In any case, the cause of the failure to apprehend the intelligibles is the soul's preoccupation with one function at the expense of the other. For this reason, the intellectual function is interfered with by pain and sickness and fear; for they are all diseases of the brain.

And how can it be regarded as improbable that the actions of the soul in two different directions should be mutually exclusive? For mutual exclusion results from multiplicity even in one and the same direction. For instance, fear makes a man forget pain; desire makes him forget anger; and inquiry into one intelligible makes him forget another intelligible.

An indication that disease which befalls body does not affect the substratum of cognitions is this: when a man recovers health, he does not have to learn his cognitions anew. On the contrary, the entirety of his soul as it had been is restored to him. Therefore, all his previous cognitions come back without being relearnt.

Our objection is to be stated as follows:

The increase and decrease of faculties have innumerable causes. Some of the faculties grow stronger in early life, others in the middle of it, and yet some others towards the end of it. This division takes into account the Intellect as well. The philosophers can only claim a knowledge of some of the causes (of the increase and decrease of faculties), however important they may be. It is not improbable that, in spite of their similarity in respect of subsistence in body, sight and smell should differ from each other. This difference may result in the sense of smell growing stronger after the age of forty years, whereas the sense of sight might become weaker. In fact, these faculties do differ in the case of the animals. Some animals have a comparatively strong sense of smell, others have a strong sense of hearing, and some others have a powerful sight. Such differences arise from the different constitutions of the animals. And it is impossible to give an exhaustive account of the differences of constitutions. So it is not unreasonable to maintain that the constitution of sense organs differs among individuals from one state to another. One of reasons why the weakness of sight precedes that of the Intellect may be that sight is prior to the Intellect. The activity of seeing starts in the earliest parts of life, whereas the Intellect ripens at the age of fifteen, or even later (as we may observe in the case of different men). Similarly, it is said that the effect of old age on the hair of the head precedes its effect on the hair of the beard; for the hair of the head is prior. All these facts require careful investigation.

But if the investigator is not prepared to trace them back to the regular course of events, it will not be possible for him to base upon them a reliable knowledge. For the hypotheses concerning the causes of the strength and weakness of faculties may be innumerable. To rely upon only one of them—as the philosophers have done—is not conducive to certainty.

(9)

In their ninth argument, they say:

How can body with all it accidents constitute man? The bodies are constantly subject to dissolution. What they lose through dissolution is replaced by food. Take for example a new-born baby. In the years to come, he will fall ill and become lean. Afterwards, he will recover, and grow fatter and stronger. And then it will be possible for us to say that he does not retain any one of those parts which existed at the time of his birth. Nay, first of all his being consisted of the parts of sperm. But in an advanced stage of his life, no part of sperm remains within him. For all those parts have dissolved; and others have come to replace them. Therefore, *this* body is different from *that*. And yet we say that *this* man is the same as *that*, and that the congnitions he had acquired in early childhood remain within him; although his physical parts may all have been changed and replaced. It follows that the soul's existence is independent of the body, and that the body is an instrument of the soul.

Objection:

This hypothesis breaks down, when in the case of animals and plants the earlier and later stages of existence are compared. Just as a man is said to be the same, so is an animal or a plant said to be the same as it was in the past. And this does not prove that the animal or the plant has a being other than the physical one. Further, the conservation of imagined forms may be cited in refutation of what has been said (by the philosophers) on knowledge. For the imagined forms remain from childhood to advanced age, even though all the parts of the brain may have been replaced. If here the philosophers assert that all the parts of

the brain are not replaced, then the exceptional character might belong to the heart as well; for the heart and the brain are alike physical. And in that case, how will it be possible for the body as a whole to have been replaced? We would rather say that even if a man lives for a hundred years, still parts of the sperm which begot him would remain within him. They cannot totally disappear. For *this* man is what he is by virtue of something which persists within him. His case is not different from that of a tree or a horse which remains the same in *this* stage as it was in *that*. So, in spite of many a dissolution and replacement, parts of the sperm do remain.

We can illustrate the point. Pour a pint of water into a vessel. Pour another, so that the two should mix up. Take one pint out of the vessel. Pour another into it. Again, take a pint out of it, and pour another into it. And do the same thing for a thousand times. Still at the last round we shall be able to judge that the vessel retains some part of the first water; and that no pint is taken out of it, but a part of the first water exists in it. For the first water existed in the second round; the third round consisted of parts of the second round; the fourth one, of the parts of the third; and so on to the last one. And this will be a legitimate inference from the philosophers' principles, since they have admitted the possibility of the infinite division of bodies. So the absorption of food into the body, on the one hand, and the dissolution of its parts, on the other, may be compared to the pouring of water into a vessel and the draining of water out of it.

(10)

In their tenth argument, they say:

The rational faculty apprehends the general rational universals or the States (as the *Mutakallimīn* call them). It apprehends the absolute Man; while a particular human person is perceived by the senses. The absolute Man is not the particular person whom we can observe. For the observable person is in a particular place, has a particular colour, a particular measure, and a particular position; whereas the absolute Man is divested of all these things. It includes all that falls under the name 'man'; even though it had no observ-

able colour, or measure, or position, or place. It includes all that may called 'man,' and for which it is possible to come into existence in the future. Nay, even if man does not exist at all, the reality of Man—divested of particular qualities—will subsist in the Intellect. The same applies to all other particular objects observed by the senses. For the Intellect abstracts from them their universal reality which is divested of Matters and Positions. The attributes of this universal reality may be divided into: (a) those which are essential—e.g., corporeality in the case of plants and animals, or animality in the case of man—and (b) those which are accidental—e.g., whiteness or length in the case of a man or a tree. We judge the essential or accidental character of these attributes in relation to the genus—i.e., Man or Tree, or anything else we may have apprehended (not in relation to the particular object which is observed by the senses). This shows that the universal which is divested of all sensible associations is an object for the Intellect, wherein it exists. And this intelligible universal is undesignated, non-local, and unquantified.

Now, the universal intelligible may derive its non-local and immaterial character either:

(i) from that which is universalised. But this is impossible. For that which is universalised *did* possess dimension, position, and quantity.

Or (ii) from that which universalises—viz., the rational soul. If so, it is necessary that the soul should be non-local, undesignated, and unquantified. Otherwise, if the soul were to possess these things, then that which subsists in the soul would possess them as well.

Objection:

The universal posited by you as subsisting in the Intellect is inadmissible. Only that which subsists in the senses comes to subsist in the Intellect. The difference, however, is that in the senses it subsists as an unanalysable whole; whereas the Intellect can analyse it. When the analysis is made, then—as far as particularity is concerned—the analysed thing which is isolated from its associations by the Intellect is still like that which is not isolated from its associations. Again, the difference is that that which exists in the Intellect

is conformable to the intelligible object and to all other things like it in the same way. It is in this sense that it is said to be universal—namely, that there is in the Intellect the form of the intelligible which has been isolated from its associations, and which was first perceived by the senses; and that the relation of this form to all other individuals which belong to the same genus is one and the same. So if having seen a man, one sees another man, no new form will come into being—as it would if he were to see a horse after having seen a man (whereby two different forms would have come into being).

Such a thing happens even in the case of bare sensations. When one sees water, a form comes into being in his fantasy. When, afterwards, he sees blood, another form comes into being. But if he sees another water, no new form will arise. On the contrary, the form which has been impressed upon his fantasy will represent every individual water. Therefore, in this sense such forms have often been assumed to be universal. Similarly, when one sees a hand, there arises in his fantasy and in the Intellect the form of the position of the parts of the hand as related to one another—namely, the expansion at the palm, the division into fingers, the end of the fingers at the nails, even the size of the hand, and its colour, etc. So when he sees another hand exactly similar to the first one, no new form will arise. Rather, the second observation will be incapable of giving anything new to the fantasy, just as the observation of another water in the same vessel and of the same quantity will not give anything new. But when he sees another hand which differs from the first one in colour or measure, then he will have a new form—viz., that of the different colour or measure. But there will be no new form of a hand; for the smaller and black hand is as much of a hand as the larger and white hand. The two differ only in colour and measure, etc. So that which is common to the two hands will not produce a new form; because *that* form is identical with *this*. Only that in which the second hand differs from the first one will produce a new form.

This, then, is the meaning of the universal in relation to the Intellect as well as to the senses. When the Intellect apprehends the form of body in an animal, it does not acquire a new form of corporeality from that of the tree—as the fantasy does not acquire a new form from the preception of two waters at two different times, or in general no new form is acquired

from the perception of any two things which are exactly similar. And this meaning of the universal affords no ground for the affirmation of a universal which is absolutely non-local.

No doubt, sometimes the judgment of reason does show the possibility of existence of something which is non-local and undesignated. For instance, it judges of the existence of the Creator of the world. But whence comes the idea that the existence of the Intellect in body is inconceivable? In the case of the Creator, that which is abstracted from Matter is the Intelligible-in-Himself which is independent of the Intellect and intelligent persons. But in the case of any other thing which has a basis in Matter, the explanation we have given shall apply.

PROBLEM XIX

REFUTATION OF THEIR THESIS THAT, HAVING COME INTO BEING, THE HUMAN SOULS CANNOT BE DESTROYED; AND THAT THEIR EVERLASTING NATURE MAKES IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR US TO CONCEIVE OF THEIR DESTRUCTION

LET us demand their arguments for this thesis. And they have two arguments:

(1)

In their first argument, they say:

The souls can perish (if they perish at all) because of the following things:

(i) The death of the body; or

(ii) the occurrence of the contrary of the soul which comes to replace it; or

(iii) the power of a powerful agent.

Now, it is false to say that the soul might perish because of the death of the body. For the body is not the substratum of the soul, but only an instrument used by the soul with the intermediation of the faculties which subsist in the body. The corruption of the instrument does not necessitate the corruption of one who uses it—unless the latter were subsisting in, or impressed upon, it, as the animal souls or the bodily faculties are. Because the soul has two actions: one with and the other without the help of this instrument, therefore the action performed with the help of the instrument (namely, imagination, or sensation, or desire, or anger) will undoubtedly undergo corruption or destruction, when the body is corrupted or destroyed. But the other action of the soul (viz., the cognition of the intelligibles divested of Matter) is performed without the help of the body. As far as the soul is cognisant of the intelligibles, it does not need the body at all. On the contrary, its preoccupation with the body diverts its attention from the intelligibles. And since now it is clear that

the existence of the soul and one of its two functions are independent of body, it follows that its constitution does not depend on body.

Again, it is false to say that the soul might perish because of the occurrence of its contrary. For the substances have no contraries. The only perishable things in the world are the accidents and forms which pass in succession over Things. The form of water perishes because of the occurrence of its contrary—viz., the form of air. But Matter which is the substratum of these forms is absolutely imperishable. And in the case of a substance, which exists in no substratum, perishing because of the occurrence of a contrary is also inconceivable. For that which is not in a substratum has no contrary, as contraries come to pass in succession over the same substratum.

Finally, it is false to say that the power of a powerful agent might destroy the souls. For non-existence is nothing. Therefore, it is inconceivable that the power of any agent should cause it to eventuate.

(This is exactly what they said in the problem of the everlasting existence of the world. We have settled this question, having dwelt upon it at length.)

Objection to the foregoing may be taken from several points:

In the first place, it is based upon the theory that the death of the body does not cause the death of the soul, because the soul does not subsist in body. That theory is based upon the position taken by the philosophers in the preceding problem. And that position is unacceptable.

Secondly, although they do not consider the soul as subsisting in body, yet it is evident that there is a connection between the soul and body, wherefore a soul does not come into existence unless a body exists. This view has been adopted by Ibn Sīna and some other thinkers who searched after the truth through independent inquiry, and who rejected Plato's thesis that the soul is eternal and that its relation to body is accidental. The position taken by these thinkers in their independent inquiry is as follows:

"If the soul was one before the existence of bodies, how did it get divided? The division of that which has no magni-

tude or quantity is unintelligible. If, however, it is asserted that no division took place, still it will be an absurd assertion. For, evidently, the soul of Zaid is other than that of 'Amr. If the two were one, the cognitions of Zaid would be the cognitions of 'Amr; because knowledge is one of the essential attributes of the soul, and the essential attributes enter into all the relations of the essence. And if the souls form a plurality, what is the cause of plurality? This cause cannot be found in Matters, or places, or times, or attributes; for there is nothing in all these to necessitate a difference of quality among the souls. This is not the same case as that of souls *after* the death of the body, because in the opinion of one who believes in the immortality of souls, the departed souls do differ in quality, insofar as each acquires from its body a different proclivity. No two souls can have the same proclivity; because proclivities result from the moral character, and like external physiognomy, the moral character can never be the same in any two instances. For if the moral character or the physiognomy of Zaid were the same as that of 'Amr, we would confuse one with the other."

Since it is proved by this argument:

that the soul comes into existence when the sperm enters the womb;

that because of its physical constitution the sperm is prepared to receive the soul (which will be its director); and that it does not receive the soul merely because it is just a soul. For two sperm-drops begetting twins may be within the same womb and at the same time equally prepared to receive souls. Then two souls emanate—directly or through intermediaries—from the First Principle to be related to the embryonic bodies. Thus the soul of *this* body cannot be the director of *that* body, nor the soul of *that* body the director of *this* body. This special relation can arise only from a special affinity between a particular soul and a particular body. For otherwise, the body of one of the twins would not be more apt than that of the other to receive *this* particular soul; because there were two souls which came into existence simultaneously, and there were two sperm-drops equally prepared to be directed by souls.

the question arises: What is the cause of the special affinity between a particular soul and a particular body? If it is a soul's being impressed upon body, then the elimination of the body will eliminate the soul as well. But if there is some other cause to explain the connection between *this* particular body and *this* particular soul (so that the connection is a condition for the soul's coming into existence), then how can it be improbable that this very connection should also be a condition for the soul's survival? Therefore, when this connection is severed, the soul will perish. And its existence will not reappear until God (holy and exalted be His name) causes such reappearance by way of the reinfusion or resurgence of life, as religion teaches us in the doctrine of Resurrection.

If it is said:

The connection between the soul and the body results from a natural inclination or instinctive affection created by God in the soul in favour of *this* particular body. This affection draws the soul towards *this*, and away from all other bodies. At no time does it leave the soul; but keeps it imprisoned in the particular body, so that no other body can receive its attention. But this does not make it necessary for the soul to be corrupted by the corruption of the body towards whose direction it has an instinctive affection. Nay, sometimes, this affection remains even after the soul's departure from the body, if in life the soul's preoccupation with the body has been strong enough to divert its attention from the abnegation of desires and from the inquiry into the intelligibles. Then this persisting affection causes the soul pain, because the soul has been deprived of the instrument whereby the object of its affection could be attained.

As regards the definite relation between, say, the body and the soul of Zaid even in the earliest stage of existence, obviously it has a cause whereby the soul and the body are suited to each other. So *this* body becomes fitter than any other body for *this* soul because of its exceedingly suitable character. Hence the definite relationship between the soul and the body is determined. But it is beyond the power of man to know the definite character of such instances of mutual fitness. If, however, we fail to discover the details,

this cannot shake our belief in the fundamental need for the cause of a definite relation. Nor will it be harmful to our assertion that the soul does not die because of the death of the body.

we will answer:

Since the mutual fitness of body and soul is invisible to us, and because it is this mutual fitness which demands a definite relation, it is therefore not improbable that this unascertainable mutual fitness should be of such a kind as to make the immortality of the soul dependent upon the continuance of the body, wherefore the corruption of the body should cause the corruption of the soul. That which is unascertainable affords no ground for the judgment as to whether it demands a necessary interrelation between the soul and body, or not. Maybe, the relation between the soul and body is necessary for the existence of the soul; and the soul will therefore perish when this relation is severed. It is therefore clear that no reliance can be placed upon the argument which has been advanced by the philosophers.

The third objection is that it is not unreasonable to maintain that the destruction of the souls may be caused by the power of God (exalted be He)—as we have conclusively shown in the problem of the indestructibility of the world.

The fourth objection is that we do not admit that the three ways of destruction mentioned by you exhaust all the possibilities. How will you prove that destruction in any other way besides these three is inconceivable? Since the division made by you does not revolve between affirmation and negation, it is possible to add a fourth one to the three possibilities. Therefore, perhaps destruction will take place in a fourth or even a fifth way other than the three mentioned by you. To limit the number to three is not supported by an argument.

(2)

In their second argument, which is their mainstay, they say:

The extinction of a substance which does not exist in a subject is impossible. In other words, the simples are

absolutely indestructible.

In this argument, the first thing to be proved is that the death of the body does not necessitate the extinction of the soul. The reason for this has been considered above. Next, it is to be maintained that it is impossible for the soul to perish because of anything else than the death of the body either. For when something perishes by any cause whatsoever, it follows that it had the potentiality for corruption before its corruption actually took place. That is, the possibility of extinction precedes actual extinction, just as in case of a temporal event, the possibility of existence precedes existence. The possibility of existence is called the potentiality of existence; and the possibility of extinction is called the potentiality for corruption. Just as the possibility of existence is a relative attribute which requires something in which to exist (so as to be a possibility in relation to it), so does the possibility of extinction require something in relation to which it could be a possibility. This is the reason why it is said that (as shown in the problem of the eternity of the world) every temporal existence needs a preceding Matter in which the possibility of the existence of that temporal existent, or its potentiality, should reside. So Matter in which the potentiality of existence resides is the recipient of the existence which occurs. And that which receives is other than that which is received. Therefore, the recipient and that which is received (and which is other than the recipient) exist together at the time when that which is received occurs. Similarly, therefore, it is necessary that the recipient of non-existence should exist at the time when non-existence occurs—so that something passes out of it into non-existence, just as something in it had come to exist. Now, that which passes out of it into non-existence is other than that which remains. And that which remains is that in which the potentiality for, or the receptivity to, or the possibility of non-existence resides—just as that which remains at the time of the occurrence of existence is not that which occurs, but that in which the potentiality for the reception of the occurrent resided. From this it follows that anything to which non-existence occurs is composed, on the one hand, of that which passes into non-existence; and, on the other hand, of that which receives non-existence, and which remains at the time of the occurrence of non-existence (because it was the bearer

of the potentiality for non-existence before the occurrence of non-existence). This bearer of potentiality is Matter; and that which passes out of it into non-existence is Form.

But the soul is simple. It is a non-composite Form divested of Matter. If in it the composition of Form and Matter is supposed, we shall thereby reintroduce into the discussion Matter which is the primary Root or Stuff; for it will be necessary for the series thus started to end at such a fundamental principle. Thus we shall arrive at the impossibility of the extinction of this primary principle, and that is called the soul—as we have already seen the impossibility of the extinction of the Matter of bodies. For in either case, Matter is eternal and everlasting. Forms come into existence in it, and pass into non-existence out of it. It has the potentiality for the occurrence of forms to it, and the potentiality for the extinction of forms out of it. For it is equally receptive to the two contraries. And from this it is clear that every being which has a unitary essence is imperishable.

This may be set forth in another way. The potentiality of the existence of a thing is before its existence. Therefore, it is other than that thing, which (thing) cannot be the potentiality of existence itself. This can be understood in the light of the fact that one who has a sound vision is said to be a potential seer. That is, he has the potentiality for vision, which means that the quality indispensable for the eye in order to perform sound vision exists. If, however, actual vision is delayed, the delay is to be ascribed to the failure of some other condition. So the potentiality, say, for the sight of blackness exists in the eye before the actual sight of blackness. When the sight of blackness is actually attained, the potentiality for the sight of blackness will not coexist with the actual sight of blackness. For once sight is attained, it will not be possible to say that it exists actually as well as potentially.

This premiss having been proved, we proceed to say: If a simple thing were to perish, the possibility of perishing should have been possessed by that thing before actually perishing, for that is what potentiality means. And, further, it must have also possessed the possibility of existence. For that whose non-existence is possible cannot be necessary. Therefore, it must be possible of existence; and by the potentiality of existence we only mean the possibility of existence.

So the conclusion to be drawn from this will be that there can be combined within the same thing the potentiality for its own existence and the actual attainment of its existence, or that its actual existence can be identical with the potentiality for its existence. But we have shown that the potentiality for sight which resides in the eye is other than actual seeing. It cannot be identical with actual sight; for that means the existence of the same thing actually as well as potentially—which are mutually exclusive terms. Nay, when something is potential, it cannot be actual; and when it is actual, it cannot be potential. So the affirmation of the potentiality of the non-existence of a simple thing before actual non-existence carries within itself the affirmation of the potentiality for existence as concurrent with the state of actual existence. And that is impossible.

[This is exactly the same thing as we have dealt with in the problems of the eternity and of the everlasting existence of the world (wherein the philosophers had recourse to the assumption of the impossibility of the temporal origin of Matter and the elements, and the impossibility of their non-existence). The source of confusion is their postulate that possibility is an attribute which requires a subject in which to exist. We have exposed the specious character of this assumption; and we will not repeat our criticism. For the question remains the same in this problem as it was in those problems. It makes no difference whether one is speaking of a material or a spiritual substance.]

PROBLEM XX

REFUTATION OF THEIR DENIAL OF THE RESURRECTION OF BODIES

THEY deny the return of souls to bodies: the existence of a physical Paradise and Hell: the Ḥūr with large eyes, and everything which has been promised to man by God. And they maintain that these things are symbols mentioned to common men in order to facilitate their understanding of spiritual reward and punishment which are superior to those of a physical character. This being opposed to the belief of all the Muslims, we propose first to explain what the philosophers believe with respect to the things to come; and then to state our objections to all those elements which are opposed to Islam.

They say:

After the death of the body, the soul continues to have an everlasting existence either in the state of indescribably great pleasure, or in the state of indescribably great pain. In some cases, the pain or pleasure will be everlasting; in others, it will pass away in the course of time. As regards its degrees, men have different ranks which are marked by as great a variety as characterises their mundane ranks. Thus:

(i) the eternal pleasure is for the pure and perfect souls,
(ii) the eternal pain is for the imperfect and impure souls, and
(iii) transient pain is for the impure but perfect souls.

And the soul can attain absolute bliss only by means of perfection and purity or cleanliness. Perfection is derived from knowledge, and purity from virtuous action.

Knowledge is required because the rational faculty derives nourishment and pleasure from the cognition of the intelligibles, as the faculty of desire finds pleasure in the satisfaction of a desire; or the faculty of sight finds pleasure in looking at beautiful forms, and so on to all other faculties. It is the

body: the physical preoccupations, and the physical senses which prevent the rational faculty from discovering the intelligibles. It would be proper for an ignorant soul to be aggrieved, even in the life of this world, by the loss (on account of its ignorance) of the pleasures of the soul. But its preoccupation with the body makes it forgetful of itself, and diverts its attention from its own grief, as for instance one stricken with fear is insensitive to pain, or one suffering from frostbite is insensitive to fire. So if the imperfection of the ignorant soul remains till the severance of the connection with the body, the soul will be in the same situation as the man who suffers from frostbite. When exposed to the fire, the latter is insensitive to the pain caused by it. But he is suddenly overwhelmed with the consciousness of extreme agony, when the effects of frostbite disappear.

Sometimes, although a soul does cognise the intelligibles, yet the pleasure it derives from the cognitions is slight and falls short of what naturally it ought to have been. This is again due to physical preoccupations and the soul's interest in the objects of carnal desires. And this is like what happens when a sick man, who has bitterness in his mouth, gets disgusted with wholesome sweetness, and seeks to avoid that very food which is really the most adequate cause of pleasure for him. So he fails to find pleasure in wholesome things because of the effects of sickness.

Different is the case of the souls perfected by knowledge. When death puts an end to the physical preoccupations, their condition is like that of one who has recovered from sickness. Sickness prevents a man from perceiving pleasure. But when the accidental affliction is over, the perception of pleasure is overwhelming. Or the condition of the liberated soul may be compared to that of a lover. Suppose that the lover is asleep: or unconscious, or intoxicated, when his mistress comes to him. At first, he cannot notice the cause of his pleasure. But when he wakes up, he will have an overwhelming consciousness of the pleasures of union (which has been preceded by long separation). As a matter of fact, all these pleasures dwindle into insignificance in comparison with intellectual and spiritual pleasures. But people cannot be enabled to understand the latter, until they are symbolically represented through such things as may be observed in this life. For instance, if we would make a child or a eunuch understand the pleasure

of sexual intercourse, we must represent it to the child by reference to play which is the most pleasant thing to a child, and to the eunuch by reference to a wholesome meal enjoyed from an intense appetite. So the child or the eunuch will realise the fundamental character of the pleasure, although he will know that the representative symbol itself does not constitute the pleasure of sexual intercourse, for the symbol (in the case of the eunuch) is perceived only by the organ of taste.

There are two arguments to prove that intellectual pleasures are worthier than physical pleasures:

Firstly, the state of the angels is nobler than that of beasts and swine. Now, the angels do not experience sensuous pleasures like those of mating and eating. Their pleasure consists in the consciousness of the perfection and beauty which characterise them because of their insight into the realities of things, and their approximation to the Lord of the Universe (not in space, but in the order of beings). Since all beings emanate from God in order and through intermediaries, it is obvious that the intermediaries nearer to Him should possess a higher rank.

Secondly, man himself often prefers intellectual pleasures to sensuous pleasures. For instance, one who seeks victory over an enemy renounces for its sake the comfort of home and hearth. Nay, even for the sake of victory in a game of chess or dice one goes without a meal all the day long. Although such a victory is but a trifle, he would not mind the pain caused by hunger. Similarly, one who is interested in the maintenance of his dignity and prestige hesitates to deal with his mistress in such a way as to be known to others. At last, he decides to preserve his dignity, and restrains his passions, lest the contemptible passions should disgrace him. Obviously, the preservation of his dignity is more pleasant to him. Again, sometimes a brave man sallies forth to face vast hordes of warriors, because he holds the danger of death in contempt, being more absorbed in what he imagines to be the pleasure of posthumous praise and admiration for his intrepidity.

So the intellectual pleasures in the Hereafter will be far superior to the sensuous pleasures of this world. But for this fact, the Prophet (may God bless him and grant him peace) would not have reported God to say: "I have reserved for My virtuous worshippers what no eye ever saw, no ear ever heard, and which never occurred to the heart of man."

And says God (exalted be He): "No soul knows what comfort of the eye lies concealed in store for them." This, then, is the cause of the need for knowledge. And of all cognitions, the most beneficial are the purely intellectual—viz., the knowledge of God: of His attributes: of His angels: of His books, and of the way in which things derive their being from Him. As regards other cognitions, only those which are a means to the purely intellectual cognitions are beneficial by virtue of this character. Those which are not even a means to the purely intellectual cognitions—e.g., Grammar, or Philology, or Poetry, or other specialised sciences of various kinds—are only arts and methods like any other art or method.

Next, virtuous conduct and worship are required in order to purify the soul. During its connection with the body, the soul is prevented from cognising the realities of things, not because it is impressed upon body, but because it is preoccupied with the body, inclining towards carnal desires, and having affection for the requirements of the body. This inclination or affection represents a psychic proclivity, which is deepened and strengthened by prolonged concern with carnal desires and continued interest in the sensible causes of pleasures. Consequently, even after the death of the body, it is impossible for the soul to get rid of this proclivity which is, therefore, an oppressive and distressing factor for two reasons:

Firstly, because it prevents the soul from attaining its proper pleasure—viz., the union with the angels and the insight into the beautiful divine things. And the body, with which before death the soul used to be preoccupied, will not be there to divert its attention from its grief.

Secondly, because the soul still retains its interest in the causes of worldly pleasures. But having been deprived of its instrument—i.e., the body, through which the soul used to contrive to attain those pleasures—its condition will be extremely miserable. Suppose that there is a man who loves his wife: enjoys his property: has affection for his children: delights in his wealth, and takes pride in his dignity. Now, suppose that his mistress is killed: he is dismissed from his position: his children and women are taken prisoner: his wealth is taken away by his enemies, and his prestige is utterly fallen. Such a man will undoubtedly have the most clear and visible cause of grief. Nevertheless, as long as he

lives, he can hope for the restoration of things like those he used to have; for the world is always moving on from To-day to the Morrow. But what will the soul do, when its hope will be cut off because death deprived it of the body?

Deliverance from such psychic proclivities is not possible, unless the soul abstains from carnal desires: turns away from the world, and betakes itself to the struggle for the attainment of knowledge and piety. If these conditions are satisfied, then, while it is yet in the world, its connection with worldly things will be cut off, whereas the connection with things of the Hereafter will grow stronger. So when death comes, the soul will experience the same relief as a prisoner does when he is set free. And then will it find everything it could have sought. That is its Paradise.

But it is not possible for the soul to outgrow or to obliterate all the physical qualities; for the needs of the body attract it towards them. Nonetheless, it can make its connection with the body weaker. This is the reason why God (exalted be He) says: "Every one of you shall have to approach it; this is the irrevocable decree of thy Lord." When its connection with the body has been weakened, the agony caused by the soul's separation from the body will not be very great. On the contrary, the soul will learn to enjoy those divine things which it will have discovered after the death of the body. This will shortly obliterate the effects of its departure from the world and its lingering inclination towards worldly things. An analogy of the soul's condition is to be found in the case of a man who sets out from his own country towards another where he might attain a high position and magnificent authority. Separation from his family and native land may distress his soul, and he may feel unhappy. But these effects will wear off, when he gets accustomed to the pleasure he derives from the elevation born of power and authority.

The utter negation of physical qualities not being possible, religion enjoins upon us the choice of the mean between all opposite extremes in morals. Tepid water which is neither hot nor cold is equally free from either of the two opposite qualities. One should neither hoard wealth nor squander it away; for the one will engender avarice, while the other will make him a spendthrift. Similarly, one should neither shrink back from everything nor meddle with

everything; for the former is cowardice, while the latter is rashness. In the first case, he ought to aim at generosity which is the mean between miserliness and extravagance; in the second, at courage which is the mean between cowardice and rashness. And so on to all other moral qualities. The science of morals is lengthy; and the Sacred Law fully takes its details into consideration. Reform of the moral character is not possible, unless regard is had in conduct for the Sacred Law. If egotism is the principle of conduct, the subject will be like one who "sets up his own desires as his god." On the contrary, one should be bound by the Sacred Law, acting or refraining from action at its behest, not by his own choice. Only then will his moral character be reformed.

He who lacks knowledge and virtue is damned. Says God (exalted be He): "He is indeed successful who causeth it to grow; and he is indeed a failure who stunteth it." One who combines moral and intellectual greatness is the Devout Sage; and his reward will be absolute bliss. He who has intellectual, but not moral, greatness is the unreligious Scholar. Punishment awarded to him will last a long time; but it will not be perpetual, for after all his soul had been perfected by knowledge. Although in contrariety to the substance of his soul, physical accidents had tainted him with impurity, yet this impurity can be effaced in the course of time, because in that stage of the soul's existence, the accidental causes of impurity will not be renewed. He who has virtue but no knowledge will yet be saved, and will experience no pain. But he will not attain perfect bliss.

Moreover (assert the philosophers), as soon as one dies, Doomsday begins for him. As regards the expressions used in the Sacred Law, they are intended to serve as an allegory, for man's understanding fails to apprehend these spiritual pleasures and pains. Therefore, these things have been described through symbols; but at the same time it has been pointed out that really spiritual pleasures are far above what is found in the description.

(This, then, is the philosophers' theory.)

We shall answer:

Most of these things are not opposed to religion. We do not deny that the pleasures in the Hereafter are superior to

sensible pleasures. Nor do we deny the immortality of the soul separated from the body. But we know these things on the authority of religion, as expressed in the doctrine of Resurrection. No doubt, the Resurrection will not be comprehensible, if the immortality of soul is not taken for granted. But we take objection, as we did before, to their assertion that mere reason gives them final knowledge of these things. Moreover, there are elements in this theory which do come into conflict with religion. Such are the denial of the revivification of bodies: the denial of physical pains and pleasures in hell and paradise, and the denial of the existence of paradise and hell as described in the Qur'ān. What is there to prevent one from assenting to the possibility of the combination of physical and spiritual pains or pleasures? The verse: "No soul knows what lies concealed in store for them" only means that no soul knows *all* those things. Similarly, from the words: "I have reserved for My virtuous worshippers what no eye ever saw" the existence of things of supreme worth can be inferred, but the negation of any other thing besides them does not necessarily follow. Rather, the combination of the two will be conducive to greater perfection. And that which has been promised to us is the most perfect thing. Hence it follows that the combination of the two is possible; and therefore it is necessary to assent to this possibility in accordance with religion.

If it is said:

What we find in the sacred texts is only an allegory proportioned to the limitations of common understanding, just as the verses and traditions with an anthropomorphic import are allegories used to facilitate understanding (since the popular imagination is too coarse for the Divine attributes).

The answer:

It is arbitrary to equate the latter instance to the former. There are two reasons why the two instances should be kept apart:

Firstly, the words in the verses and traditions which have an anthropomorphic import bear interpretation on the same principle as governs conventional metaphors in Arabic.

But the description of paradise and hell and the details of these things are so plain that there is no room left for interpretation. What remains is that one might consider such texts to be fraudulent—i.e., suggesting something untrue with a view to people's well-being. But that is beneath the dignity and the sanctity which characterise prophecy.

Secondly, rational arguments have proved the impossibility of things like space: or dimension: or a physical form: or an organic hand: or an organic eye, or the capacity for motion and rest, in the case of God. Hence the need for the interpretation (of the sacred texts where they occur) by means of rational arguments. But things of the Hereafter promised to us are not impossible for the Divine omnipotence. Therefore, it is necessary to stick to what the text *prima facie* means, and not to take it out of the context where it occurs, and from which it derives its significance.

If it is said:

Rational arguments have actually proved the impossibility of the resurrection of bodies, even as they have proved the impossibility of anthropomorphic attributes being possessed by God (exalted be He).

then we will demand that they state what those arguments are. And they proceed from various points to argue their theory:

(1)

In the first place, they say:

The supposition of the soul's return to body involves three alternatives:

In the first place, it may be said (as some of the *Mutakallimīn* have held) that man is body, and that life is merely an accident which depends on body: that the soul which is supposed to be self-subsisting, and is called the director of the body, does not exist; and that death means the discontinuance of life, or the Creator's abstaining from creating life. Therefore, resurrection will mean (a) the restoration by God of the body which had perished; (b) the recommencement of the existence of the body; and (c) the restoration of life which had

perished. Or it may be said that the Matter of the body would remain as dust, and that resurrection means that this dust will be collected and composed into the figure of a man, wherein life will be created for the first time. So this is one alternative.

In the second place, it may be said that the soul is an existent which survives the death of the body, but which will be returned at the time of resurrection to the original body when all the parts of that body have been collected. This is another alternative.

In the third place, it may be said that the soul will return to *a* body, whether it is composed of the same parts as the original body had, or of some other parts. Consequently, the returning one would be *that* man, insofar as the soul is *that* soul. Matter is irrelevant here, because man is not man by virtue of Matter, but by virtue of soul.

Now, all these three alternatives are false.

The first one is evidently false, because when life as well as the body has disappeared, the recreation of it would be the production of something similar to, but not identical with, what had been. But return, as we understand it, implies the supposition of the continuity of one thing as well as the emergence of another. For instance, when one is said to resume generosity, the meaning is that the generous person continues, but that having given up generosity he returns to it. That is, he returns to something which is generically the same as what he originally had, but differs from it in number. Therefore, the return is not to the original thing itself, but to something like it. Again, when one is said to return to a city, the meaning is that he continued to exist elsewhere: that formerly he had been in the city, and that now he resumes his being in the city which is similar to his original state. If there is nothing which continues, and if, on the contrary, there are two similar but numerically different things between which time intervenes, the conditions prerequisite for the application of the word 'return' will not be complete. One might escape this consequence by saying what the Mu'tazilah say—namely, that the non-existent is a positive thing, and that existence is a state which occurs to the non-existent as an accident: comes to an end, and returns afterwards. Thus the meaning of the word 'return' will be determined by reference to the continuity of an entity. But this amounts to the elimination of the

concept of absolute non-being which is pure negation, by affirming a permanent entity to which existence may return. Hence its impossibility.

If one in favour of this alternative

artfully tries to defend it by saying that the dust of the body is imperishable, and that therefore this dust will be the continuing entity to which life is restored,

we will reply:

This being so, it will be correct to say that dust regains life, after life had disappeared from it for a while. Now, this will not be the return of a man, or the reappearance of his former self. For a man is not what he is by virtue of the Matter and the dust of which he is composed. All his physical parts, or at least most of them are replaced by food; and he is still the same as he was at first by virtue of his spirit or soul. So in case life or spirit should perish, the return of that which has perished will not be intelligible. At the most, something similar to it can be brought into existence. If God creates human life in dust which formed the body of a tree, or a horse, or a plant, this will be the first-creation of a man. The return of that which does not exist is unintelligible. The returning entity must be an existent; it returns to a state it had before—rather, to a state like the former one. So the returning entity is dust—returning to the attribute of life. But man's body does not make him what he is. For the body of a horse often becomes man s food, which goes to the making of a sperm-drop, which begets another man. But one cannot say that a horse has become a man; for it is the form of horse, not the Matter of it, which makes a horse what it is. And (in the present instance) the form of a horse has perished, and nothing but the Matter of it remains.

Now, to consider the second alternative—viz., the supposition of the continuity of the soul, and its return to the original body. If such a thing could be conceived, it would be 'return' properly so called; it would mean the resumption by the soul of its function of directing the body, after having been separated from it by death.

But this is impossible. The body of a man is reduced to

dust, or eaten by worms and birds, and then changes into blood or vapours, and gets inextricably mixed up with the air, the vapours, the water of the whole world.

If such a thing is supposed on the strength of the belief in Divine omnipotence, then it will be inevitable

(i) either that only those parts should be recombined which were present at the time of death. This would necessarily lead to the resurrection of people whose limbs had been amputated: or whose ears and nose were cut off, or whose limbs were defective, in exactly the same form as they had in the world. But this is disgusting, particularly with reference to the people of Paradise, even though they may have been created defective in the original life. It would be most unseemly to cause them to reappear with all the deformities they had at the time of death. This is, therefore, the difficulty which arises, if the supposition of return is confined to the recombination of the parts present at the time of death.

(ii) or that all those parts should be recombined which had ever existed during one's lifetime. This is impossible for two reasons:

Firstly, because if a man eats another man (the custom prevails in some places, and it occurs frequently at the time of famine), then the resurrection of the two will be very difficult. For Matter will be the same, because the body of the eaten person will have been absorbed as food into the body of the eater. And the restoration of two souls to one body is not possible.

Secondly, because it will be necessary that the same part should be resurrected as liver and heart and a hand and a leg at once. For it has been proved by the art of Medicine that some organic parts derive nourishment from the residuary nourishment of others. Thus parts of the heart provide nourishment for the liver, and so on to all other members. So if we suppose some specific parts which had been the Matter of all the organs, to which organ will they be returned? Nay, one need not bring in the hypothesis of a man eating another in order to establish the impossibility mentioned in the first objection. If you look at any portion of land, you will come to know that particles of dust in it have been the bodies of men. Thus, in course of time, when land is irrigated and cultivated, dust becomes fruits and vegetables on which beasts and animals are fed. Then dust becomes flesh. And

when animals are eaten by us, dust finally becomes our body. So all Matter which can be designated has been the body of men. It changes: from the dust of dead bodies to plants, from plants to flesh, and from flesh to a living being. The consequences of this explanation furnish yet another—i.e., a third—reason for the impossibility of resurrection. Namely, the souls departed from bodies are infinite in number, whereas the number of bodies is limited. Therefore, the Matters of men which are to be used at the time of resurrection will be outnumbered.

Finally, the third alternative—viz., the restoration of a soul to a body made of any Matter or dust—is impossible for two reasons:

Firstly, Matters which receive generation and curruption are restricted to the Hollow of the sphere of the Moon. No addition to them is possible, and they are infinite in number. On the other hand, the souls departed from bodies are infinite in number. Therefore, the Matters will be outnumbered by the souls.

Secondly, dust as long as it remains dust cannot receive direction from the soul. In order for such reception to take place, it is necessary that the elements should mix together, so that the mixture resemble the composition of sperm. Mere wood or iron does not receive direction from the soul. Nor is it possible to cause man to reappear out of wood or iron. There can be no man until there is an organism composed of flesh and bones and humours. And whenever the body and its constitution are prepared for the reception of a soul, they are entitled to the origination of a soul from the principles which are the Givers of Souls. Consequently, according to the hypothesis under consideration, two souls will simultaneously come to belong to one body. This is impossible; and the refutation of such an hypothesis will also refute Metempsychosis. For this hypothesis is exactly the same as that doctrine, since it is based on the assumption that after its deliverance from body, the soul will resume the control of a body which will not be the original one. So the same argument is valid against this hypothesis as against the doctrine of Metempsychosis.

The objection to the foregoing may be stated as follows:

How can you disprove one who chooses the last alter-

native, and believes that the soul is immortal, and is a self-subsisting substance? And this does not come into conflict with religion. On the contrary, the verse: "Think not of those who are slain in the way of Allah as dead. Nay, they are living. With their Lord they have provision," shows that religion is in favour of it. Further evidence can be found in the words of the Prophet (peace be on him): "The spirits of virtuous men are in the crops of green birds hanging below the Throne." There are other traditions which speak of the consciousness possessed by spirits of charities and alms offered in their behalf, of the questions asked by *Munkir* and *Nakir*, and of the punishment in the grave. All these things point to the immortality of the soul. At the same time, however, religion teaches us to believe in resurrection which will be accompanied by the resurgence of life. And by resurrection is meant the resurrection of bodies. And it is possible to effect resurrection by restoring the soul to a body, whether made of the same Matter as the original one was: or made of the Matter of any other body, or of a Matter created for the first time. For it is the soul, not the body, which makes us what we are. All the parts of our body are continually changing from infancy to old age because of leanness and fatness, and because of the changes caused by food. And these changes make our constitution differ from one part of our life to another. Still we continue to be the same as we ever were. So this is a proper object for Divine omnipotence. And this will be the return of the soul. Having been deprived of its instrument (i.e., body), it was prevented from experiencing physical pains and pleasures. Now, that a similar instrument is given to it again, this is return in the truest sense of the word.

Their contention that the infinity of the souls and the finitude of Matters make resurrection impossible is absurd and groundless. It is based on the eternity of the world, and the perpetual succession of rotatory motion. But one who does not believe in the eternity of the world considers the number of souls departed from bodies to be finite and commensurable with the number of existing Matters. Even if it is granted that the number of souls is larger, God has the power to create anew any number of Matters. To deny such power is to deny that He can bring anything into existence. And that position has been refuted in the problem of the

origin of the world.

As regards the next cause of impossibility – viz., similarity to the doctrine of Metempsychosis—let there be no dispute over words. Whatever religion teaches us we must believe, even if it is the doctrine of Metempsychosis. However, we reject that doctrine as far as this world is concerned. But resurrection we cannot reject, whether it is or is not the same thing as Metempsychosis.

Your assertion that every constitution which is prepared for the reception of a soul is entitled to the origination of a soul from the Principles implies that it is nature, not will, which explains the origin of a soul. And this has been refuted in the problem of the origin of the world. How is it that you do not find it contradictory to your principles even to say that the origination of a soul is called forth, and that (no soul existing there at the time) one is brought into existence for the first time? It remains for you to say

> Why, then, did it not get connected with constitutions prepared (for the reception of the soul) in the wombs, before resurrection, even in this world of ours?

The answer will be: Perhaps departed souls require preparations of a different kind, and the causes of such preparations are not complete until the time of resurrection. And it is not improbable that the preparation required by the perfect souls which have departed from bodies should be different from the one required by souls which have come into existence for the first time, and which have not derived perfection from directing the body for a while. And God (exalted be He) best knows such requirements: their causes, and the times of their presence. Since religion introduced these things, and because these things are possible, it is necessary for us to assent to them.

(2)

In the second place, they say:

> It is beyond the power of anyone to transform iron into a textile fabric, so that it may be used as a turban. Such a thing would not happen until the parts of iron broke up into elements. The causes which govern iron should first reduce it to simple elements. The elements should be recombined and passed through various phases of development so as to acquire the form of cotton. Cotton should acquire the form of yarn. Yarn should acquire a definite texture—viz., the texture of the particular piece of cloth. It is absurd to say that iron can become a turban made of cotton, without gradual passage through these phases.

> No doubt, it may occur to man that gradual transformation through many phases may be brought about in the minimum of time, the length of which may not be perceived by man. Consequently, he will suppose that the whole thing happened all of a sudden.

> This having been understood, if follows that if the resurrected man's body were to be made merely of a stone, or a ruby, or a pearl, he would not be a man. He cannot conceivably be called a man, unless he has acquired a particular shape, resulting from the composition of bones, nerves, flesh, cartilage, humours, and the simple parts which precede the compound ones. There can be no body without organic parts: no composite organic parts without bones and flesh and nerves: no simple constituents like the bones and flesh and nerves without the humours; and the four humours cannot exist, unless their Matters are furnished by food. There can be no food without animals and plants, which are the sources of meat and vegetables. There can be no animals and plants, unless the four elements mix together under certain conditions which are far too many to be analysed by us. It is, therefore, clear that unless all these things are there, the re-emergence of a body, to which the soul might return, is not possible. And the causes of these things are many. Let us ask: "Is it possible that dust should become man, when only the word 'Be' is addressed to it?" No, it is necessary that the causes of its gradual transformation through various phases should operate. And the causes are: (a) fertilisation of a womb by a drop which comes out of the marrow of a man's body: (b) this drop is assisted by the blood of the menses and by food for a while: (c) then it grows to be a lump: (d) then a clot: (e) then an embryo: (f) then an infant: (g) then a youth; and (h) then an old man. So it is unintelligible that the whole thing should be achieved merely by uttering the word 'Be.' For no words can be addressed to

dust; and its becoming a man without passing through these phases is impossible. And its passing through these phases, without the operation of certain causes, is impossible. Therefore, resurrection is impossible.

Objection:

We agree that gradual transformation through these phases is necessary, if dust is to become man, just as it is necessary if iron is to become a turban. For if iron remains iron, it cannot be a piece of cloth. It must have become cotton which is spun and woven. But the transition may possibly take an instant, or any other length of time. It has not been explained to us whether the resurrection will take the shortest time possible, or any other length of time. The collecting of bones: then clothing them with flesh, and causing the whole thing to grow will take a long time. So this is not the question at issue. What requires consideration is whether the progress through these phases can be brought about by mere power operating without intermediaries, or by one of the natural causes. Now, to us both are possible, as we have shown in the first problem of Physics, where we discussed the nature of the regular course of events, claiming that things observed to be connected with each other are not necessarily connected, and that a departure from the regular course of events is possible. So these things may be brought about by Divine omnipotence, even when their causes do not exist.

Secondly, we might say that although these things depend on a cause, still it is not one of the conditions for them that the cause should be well known. Nay, the treasure-house of things to which Divine power extends includes mysterious and wonderful things which have not been discovered by man. Their existence can be denied only by such a person as believes that only those things exist which he has observed. This is like some people's rejection of magic, sorcery, talismanic arts, and the miraculous deeds performed by prophets or saints. All these things are generally agreed to be established facts, owing their origin to some mysterious causes which cannot be discovered by all men. Suppose that there is a man who has never seen how a lodestone attracts iron. If he is told of it, he will not believe it. "For," he will say, "it is inconceivable that a piece of iron should be

attracted, unless there were a thread tied to it to draw it." Such a thing is what from his experience he understands attraction to mean. But when he himself will observe mag netic attraction, it will fill him with wonder. And then he will come to know how his own knowledge had failed to encompass the mysterious effects of Omnipotence.

Similarly, when these atheists, who deny resurrection, will themselves be resurrected and enabled to see the wonderful things created by God, they will repent themselves of their disbelief—and repentance will not avail them! It will be said to them: "This is what you used to disbelieve"—like one who disbelieves mysterious properties and things. Suppose that a man is created in such a way that he is gifted with a mature intellect even at the time of birth. If you say to him:

> This sperm-drop, which is dirty and whose parts are homogeneous, will develop in the womb into various organs made of flesh and nerves and bones and muscles and cartilages and fat. Thus it will have eyes which will consist of seven different strata of constitution; and the tongue and the teeth whose softness and hardness make them so different from each other, in spite of their contiguity; and so on to all other wonders of human nature.

then, having heard of all these things, such a person will deny them more emphatically than was done by the atheists who said: "Are we going to be brought back to life, when we are rotten bones?" He who rejects the possibility of resurrection does not reflect whence he came to know that the causes of existence are limited to his own observation. It is not improbable that the method of the revivification of bodies should be different from anything ever observed by him. Some of the traditions say that at the time of resurrection it will rain, and that the raindrops will be like sperm-drops. So these drops will mix up with dust to beget human bodies. It is not improbable that the Divine causes should include something of this kind which it is not possible for us to discover, and that such a thing should call forth the resurrection of bodies and their capacity for the reception of reassembled souls. Can there be any ground for the rejection of such a possibility, other than the mere assumption of improbability?

(3)

If it is said:

The Divine action has one unchangeable and recurrent pattern. For this reason, He has said: "The execution of Our purpose is but a single act, like the twinkling of an eye." Further, He says: "Thou canst not find any change in the ways of God." If the causes, which you have imagined to be possible, existed, then it would be necessary for them to come into operation over and over again. This recurrence would be infinite; and the existing system of emergence and development in the universe would also be infinite. Recurrence and revolution having been granted, it is not improbable that once in every millennium the pattern of things should change. But this change itself must be perpetually along the same lines; for the ways of God do not change.

And now to pass on to space. The Divine action proceeds from the Divine will. The Divine will has no specific direction. If it had a specific direction, its system would change because of the difference of dimensions. But the will having no specific direction, whatever proceeds from it governs the First and the Last in like manner—as we see in all causes and effects.

So if you admit the possibility of the perpetuity of development and procreation on the basis of what is observed at present, or admit the possibility of the return of this pattern, after however long a time, according to the law of recurrence and revolution, then you will have precluded the Judgment, the Hereafter, and any other thing of the same kind which follows from the letter of the Sacred Law. For this admission will imply that this existence of ours has been preceded by many a resurrection, as it is to return for many a time afterwards, and this order of precedence and succession will tend to make the series infinite.

But if you say that the Divine *modus operandi* can change into something generically different: that the changed *modus* will never return; and that the duration of possibility can be divided into three periods, namely:

(i) Before the creation of the world, when God was and the world was not;

(ii) After the creation of the world, which brought about the existence of the world together with that of God; and

(iii) The process of resurrection which brings the duration of possibility to an end.

then this view will exclude all uniformity and system; for it makes the Divine *modus* changeable. But that is impossible. It may be possible in the case of a will which changes through a variety of states. But the eternal will has one invariable course. The Divine action partakes of the nature of the Divine will, which has a uniform mode of operation, so that it does not change because of different temporal relations. This (they further assert) is not incompatible with our affirmation that God is omnipotent. We do say that He has the power to effect resurrection, resurgence of life, and all other possible things—in the sense that if He would, He could do them. In order for our statement to be true, it is not a condition that He should be actually doing or willing them. This is like what we mean when we say: "Such and such a person has the power to cut off his own neck, or to burst his own belly." This statement is true, in the sense that the person could do so, if he so would. But we know that he neither wills it, nor does it. And when we say that he neither wills nor does it, we do not contradict the earlier statement that he has the power—in the sense that he could do it, if he so would. As logic explains, the categorical propositions do not contradict the hypothetical. Our statement: "He could do it, if he would," is a hypothetical affirmative proposition. And our statement: "He never willed, nor did," contains two categorical negative propositions. The negative categorical propositions do not contradict the affirmative hypothetical.

So the argument which proves that His will is eternal and unerring also proves that the course of His action must be systematic, and that if sometimes it varies, the variation itself must be systematic and uniform, so as to recur and return perpetually. For no other basis for this variation is possible.

The answer:

This is allied to the theory of the eternity of the world—

viz., that the Divine will is eternal, and therefore the world must be eternal. We have refuted that theory, and shown that reason allows the assumption of three stages—namely,

(i) when God existed and the world did not exist.
(ii) when the world is created: first, to have the order we observe at present; and, next, to have a new order which is promised to exist in paradise and hell.
(iii) when everything disappears, and God alone remains.

This assumption is perfectly possible, although religion indicates that the reward and punishment in paradise and hell will be everlasting.

This problem, however formulated, is based on two questions: (a) the origin of the world, and the possibility of the emanation of the temporal from the Eternal; and (b) departure from the regular course of events, either through the creation of effects independent of causes, or through the origination of causes along lines different from the regular course of events. And we have settled both these questions.

CONCLUSION

I*F SOMEONE SAYS:*

Now that you have analysed the theories of the philosophers, will you conclude by saying that one who believes in them ought to be branded with infidelity and punished with death?

we shall answer:

To brand the philosophers with infidelity is inevitable, so far as three problems are concerned—namely

(i) the problem of the eternity of the world, where they maintained that all the substances are eternal.
(ii) their assertion that Divine knowledge does not encompass individual objects.
(iii) their denial of the resurrection of bodies.

All these three theories are in violent opposition to Islam. To believe in them is to accuse the prophets of falsehood, and to consider their teachings as a hypocritical misrepresentation designed to appeal to the masses. And this is blatant blasphemy to which no Muslim sect would subscribe.

As regards the rest of the problems (e.g., the philosophers' version of Divine attributes, and their doctrine of Unity, etc.), the philosophers' views have close affinity with those of the Mu'tazilah. Indeed, the philosophers' theory of the necessity of natural causes is what the Mu'tazilah have explicitly stated in the doctrine of Necessary Consequences. And the same holds of all other views held by the philosophers (in the rest of the problems). One or another of the Muslim sects has actually reiterated them. So he who would brand the 'innovators' among the Muslims with infidelity can do the same in the case of the philosophers. And he who hesitates to do so in the case of the 'innovators' may hesitate to do so in the case of the philosophers, as far as these questions are concerned. But it is not our purpose to consider whether the Muslim 'innovators' are Muslim, or not. Nor do we intend to inquire

what parts of the 'innovations' are sound or unsound. For that will take us far beyond the scope of this book. And God (exalted be He) is the Giver of the strength to pursue rectitude.

THE END

NOTES

P. 1, *ll. 13-16*: To initiate us . . . by the imagination.

Literal translation: To grant us access, when we have departed from the House of Delusion, to that happiness and delight: that prosperity and success, the summit of which towers above the highest ascent(s) of the understanding(s), and the extremities of which outdistance the range(s) of the darts of the imagination(s).

***ll. 18-20*: "that which no eye ever . . . heart of man."**

Apostolic tradition. The tradition, quoted in full in the *Iḥyā'* (Cairo, l.n.t.h.i.,—1357/1938, p. 3012), reads as follows:

وقال جابر قال لنا رسول الله صلعم الا احدثكم بعرف الجنة ؟ قال قلت بلى يا رسول الله صلى الله عليك بابينا انت و امنا قال ان فى الجنة غرفا من اصناف الجوهر كله يرى ظاهرها من باطنها و باطنها من ظاهرها و فيها من النعيم واللذات والسرور ما لا عين رات ولا اذن سمعت ولا خطر على قلب بشرا (تخريج الحافظ العراق - ابو نعيم من رواية الحسن عن جابر) -

***ll. 35-37*: "turn men . . . to come."**

Qur'ān: XI, 22 (Sale's trans.).

P. 2, *ll. 5-8*: In the second place . . . notions.

Literal translation: And the basis of this disbelief is no other than theoretical inquiries which result from stumbling over the periphery of doubt where one's attention is diverted from the path of rectitude. Also, it results from being inveigled into trivial notions which are as false as the glitter of mirage.

***l. 10*: People of wilful innovations = اهل البدع والاهواء.**

P. 3, *l. 5*: sterile genius.

Literally: tailless genius.

***l. 24*: two fundamental principles.**

Literally: (these) two poles.

P. 4, *l. 12*: for prolixity is their manner.

Reading خطبهم طويل with CE, footnote 4, p. 8 in Bouyges.

***ll. 24-25*: by saying: "Plato . . .**

Aristotle's words are: 'We had perhaps better consider the universal good and discuss thoroughly what is meant by it, although such an inquiry is made an uphill one by the fact that the Forms have been introduced by friends of our own. Yet it would perhaps be thought to be better, indeed to be our duty, for the sake of maintaining the truth even to destroy what touches us closely, especially as we are philosophers or lovers of wisdom; for, while both are dear, piety requires us to honour truth above our friends.' (Section 6, p. 1096 a: *Ethica Nicomachea*, tr. by D. W. Ross.)

Pp. 6-7, *ll. 39-40; 1-3*: The Sun . . . prayer. باب (١٣) لا تنكسف الشمس لموت احد كتاب (١٦) الكسوف.

Apostolic tradition : الجامع الصحيح للبخارى p. 270 in Vol. I of Krehl's ed.

P. 7, *ll. 16-17* : When . . . Him.

Apostolic tradition (?).

P. 8, *ll. 27-30* : I will refute . . . etc.

Lit. trans : I will make their position appear to be impure. It will be cut to pieces through various objections. Sometimes my objections will force them into the position of . . .

P. 10, *ll. 8-12* : In the Art of . . . Intellects.

Is Ghazālī referring to a formal classification actually made by an author (or authors) ? Or is the word 'book' used in the sense of a book in Aristotle's works (i.e., a chapter) ?

l. 18 : Jurists.

The word in the text is اصوليين. Shahrastānī defines اصول as (a) knowledge of the Divine attributes and unity : or (b) just knowledge—the subject of *Kalām*—as distinguished from 'obedience'—the subject of *Fiqh*.

l. 26 : Demonstration.

كتاب البرهان is Aristotle's Posterior Analytics. (See Vbg. p. 75.)

P. 11. Sections vii, viii, ix, xi, xiii : the First (Principle).

Perhaps the Absolute would be a better translation of الاول. But the problems enumerated here are largely concerned with the First Principle.

Pp. 11-12. Sections xiv, xviii, xix :

Reading فى ابطال قولهم with G, H, O, R, footnote 32, p. 19 ⎫
F, P, V, 42, p. 19 ⎬ in Bouyges.
G, N, O, 47, p. 20 ⎭

P. 12, *l. 18* : Standard of Knowledge.

Reading معيار العلم with E, G, L, M, N, O, V, footnote 7, p. 20 in Bygs.

P. 14, *ll. 32-33*. I should have . . . problem.

Lit. trans. : I would have had to blacken an enormous number of leaves over this problem.

Ghazālī's analysis of the philosophical theories of the world.

The intention expressed in the First Preface (pp. 4-5) does not seem to have been carried out in the present instance.

Usually, Ghazālī's references to the 'ancients' are not very precise : (for instance, see p 22, ll. 13-14). However, his reference to Plato (l. 13 on this page) may be considered to reflect the divergence of views on this point. Aristotle is definitely of the opinion that :

> 'Plato alone asserts the creation of time, saying that it had a becoming with the universe, the universe according to him having had a becoming.'—Physica, p. 251 b, ll. 13-18.

But the passage Aristotle had in mind (Timaeus, 38 B) has been 'interpreted' (in Ghazālī's sense of the word) by as modern a Platonist as A. E. Taylor (see his commentary on Timaeus, p. 184).

Galen's book (l. 16 on this page) was, according to Ibn al-Nadīm, available in Arabic through Thabit (Ibn Qurrah ?)'s translation. (See al-Fihrist, p. 45.)

P. 15, *l. 30* : unless there were a change . . .

Reading من غير تغير امر فى القديم with O, footnote 6 ⎫
من قدرة with M, O, footnote 7 ⎭ p. 25 in Byg.

P. 15, *ll. 30* : most clever.

Ghazālī does not find the argument contemptible, as the Arabic words اخيل or اخبل would suggest. The translation adopted here takes its cue from the Latin heading : Hoc est potissimum argum. (P. 25 in Byg.)

P. 16, *ll. 23-24* : when all the conditions . . . are complete.

Lit. trans. : when it is complete with reference to the conditions of its causality, and with respect to its components and ingredients.

P. 17, *l. 36* : morals.

The word in the text is عادات. In this paragraph, the discussion turns to psychological, as distingnished from physical, causes and effects.

l. 40 ; p. 18, *ll. 1, 10, 11, 12, 15* : inclination.

Usually, the word عزم means resolve or determination. The choice of the word 'inclination' to translate it is somewhat arbitrary : but that is the way to express the unusual sense Ghazālī (or the author quoted by him) has given to the word.

P. 18, *ll. 3-4* : an inner agitation . . . an action.

Literally : an agitation inside a man which newly emerges during an action.

ll. 27-28 : the beginning . . . imagined.

Literally : to whose initial phase the Imagination cannot soar.

ll. 37-39 : Or, to use . . . term ?

The judgment questioned here would read : "The eternal will could not (have) originate(d) the world."

P. 19, *ll. 6-8* : And no one would suspect . . . untrue.

Lit. trans. : And there is no doubt concerning the fact that they do not defy the intellect(s) out of malice, and in spite of knowledge to the contrary.

P. 25, *l. 26* : The question . . .

The comparison of the Divine and the human will does not follow as the conclusion from the preceding explanation. Hence the translation made here has got to be somewhat 'independent,' so that هذا may emerge as the object of يحقق.

P. 53, *l. 26* : Principles of Belief.

This is one of the 'books' in the *Iḥyā'*. See pp. 95-130, Vol. I of the *Iḥyā'* in مصطفى البابى ed. of 1358/1939.

P. 54, *l. 35* : Abū Hudhayl al-'Allāf.

The reference embodies a general summary of al-'Allaf's well-known position.

P. 66, *ll. 33-34* : '*does* strike,' '*does* burn,' '*does* cut.'

Lit. trans. would be : does (i e., performs the action of) striking, etc.

P. 80, *ll. 31-33* : I did not . . . creation.

Qur'ān : XVIII, 49.

l. 34 : Qur'ān : XLVIII, 6.

P. 88, *ll 27-28* : Think . . . essence.

حديث ابن عباس ان قوما تفكروا فى الله عز و جل فقال النبى صلى الله عليه وسلم تفكروا فى خلق الله ولا تتفكروا فى الله فانكم لن تقدروا قدره ابو نعيم فى الحلية بالمرفوع

منه باسناد ضعيف و رواه الاصبهانى فى الترغيب والترهيب من وجه اخراسح منه و رواه الطبرانى فى الاوسط والبيهقى فى الشعب من حديث امن عمرو و قال هذا اسناد فيه نظر قلت فيه الوازع بن نافع متروك (تخريج الحافظ العراق - احياء العلوم - الجزو الرابع - مطبعة مصطفى البابى - ص ٥١٠) -

P. 99, *l. 11*: definitory formula.

Following is the definition of القول الشارح (ص ٢ الرسالة الشمسية) :

وقد جرت العادة بان يسمى الموصل الى التصور قولا شارحا والموصل الى التصديق حجة.

But if the definition of 'man' is included (as it is in the text) in the قول شارح about him, we shall obtain from it something more important than mere تصور.

P. 109, *l. 1*: Problem VI.

Reading المسئلة السادسة فى ابطال مذهبهم فى نفى الصفات with B, I, footnote 1, p. 163 in Byg.

Ghazālī takes up the 'five categories of plurality' (see p. 108, l. 30). Thus, 1 and 3 are discussed in this (VI) problem, 2 in IX, 4 in VII, and 5 in VIII.

P. 145, *l. 6*: Interpellation.

This is Aloys Sprenger's translation of the word استثناء in كتاب كشاف اصطلاحات الفنون which contains his translation of الرسالة الشمسية.

P. 153, *ll. 14-16*: "nothing . . . knowledge."

Qur'ān : XXXIV, 3.

P. 172, *ll. 6-18*:

This paragraph forms the heading in the Arabic text. The present arrangement was found preferable for reasons of proportion and balance.

l. 6: Preserved Tablet.

Qur'ān : LXXXV, 22.

l. 29: 'He . . . pen.'

Qur'ān : XCVI, 4.

Pp. 181-182, *ll. 41; 1*: the Rod . . . the Moon.

Miracles performed by the prophets Moses, Jesus and Muḥammad respectively.

P. 191, *l. 1*: asbestos.

The dictionary equivalent of طلق is 'amianthus.'

P. 201, *ll. 1-8*: Therefore, the substratum . . . body.

The argument would be coherent if the Arabic sentence read :

و كل جسم فينقسم فدل ان محلها (= محل العلوم العقلية) ليس جسما

This is the form in which the argument is stated in the following syllogism. However, the variants given by Byg. (i.e., R, U, V, Y in footnote 6 on p. 304) support the reading محلها, but do not support ليس جسما.

P. 202, *ll. 11-12*: For if A . . . with C.

Lit. trans. : The meet-er of the meet-er is (itself) a meet-er.

P. 212, *l. 29*: ego.

Literally : 'he-ness.'

P. 217, *ll. 20-23*: For the first water . . . last one.

Lit. trans. : For the first water existed in the second round, and the third is next to the second, and the fourth to the third, and so on to the last one.

P. 231, *l. 40*: would not have reported . . .

Reading . . . قال . . . حاكيا عن الله with G, footnote 4, p 349 in Byg.

P. 232, *ll. 1-2*: "No soul . . . them."

Qur'ān : XXXII, 17.

P. 233, *ll. 19-20*: "Every . . . Lord."

Qurā'n : XIX, 72.

P. 234, *ll. 10-11*: set up . . . god.

Qur'ān : XXV, 45; XLV, 22.

ll. 15-16: "He . . . stunteth it"

Qur'ān : XCI, 9, 10 (Pickthall's trans.).

P. 235, *l. 15*:

Qur'ān : XXXII, 17.

ll. 17-18: I have . . . saw.

و قوله اعددت لعبادى الصالحين has been interpreted as an evidence of the fact that Ghazālī regards a passage from the Bible ("But as it is written, eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, neither have entered into the heart of man, the things which God hath prepared for them that love him." I. Corinthians, ii, 9) as a Quranic verse. (See D. B. Macdonald's *The Life of al-Ghazālī* . . . — p. 76—in *The Journal of the American Oriental Society*, Vol. XX, 1899.)

On p. 1, where the 'tradition' first occurs, it is not clear what in Ghazālī's view the source of these words might have been But the context in which it occurrs on p. 280 definitely shows that it is a Ḥadīth Qudsī—i.e., an apostolic tradition in which God speaks in the first person (as He does in the Qur'ān). Hence most of the variants given by Boyg (on p. 349 : footnote 4) add words which clarify this position.

In the present instance, the quotation is not a full quotation, but an echo of the quotation on p. 280. So the verse : "No soul . . ." (XXXII, 17) is not given in full, and the tradition occurs in an ambiguous form. This shows that Macdonald's guess is an improbable possibility. And the Biblical source of the words is beside the point. For even if Ghazālī confused some extraneous matter with a Quranic verse, it was a Ḥadīth that he so confused. The Ḥadīth itself might have been borrowed from the Bible. But, then Ghazālī did not approach the Ḥadīth literature from the same point of view as in our times Goldziher did.

P. 241, *ll. 3-5*: "Think . . . provision."

Qur'ān ; III, 163.

ll. 7-9: "The spirits . . . Throne."

Apostolic tradition. A slightly different version is to be found in Baiḍāwī's Tafsīr :

و ما روى ابن عباس رضى عنها انه قال (رسول الله) عليه الصلاة والسلام ارواح الشهداء فى اجواف طير خضر ترد انهارالجنة و تاكل من ثمارها و تاوى الى قناديل معلقة فى ظل العرش - (انوارالتنزيل الجزء الثانى ص ٥٣) -

Ḥāfiẓ 'Irāqī has (in his notes on the traditions about Paradise quoted by Ghazālī towards the end of Iḥyā') brought out the two different versions of this

tradition. One has been given here (see note on ll. 18-20 of p. 1). The other one, related by Abū Hurairah, occurs in Ibn Mājah (Sunan, p. 11, p. 589) and Muslim. In both these sources, the Prophet's words (reproducing those of God) are supplemented by a reference to the Quranic verse: XXXII, 17. Following is Muslim's version :

حدثنا سعيد بن عمرو الا شعثى و زهير بن حرب قال زهير حدثنا و قال سعيد اخبرنا سفيان عن ابى الزناد عن الا عرج عن ابى هريرة عن النبى صلى الله عليه وسلم قال قال الله عز و جل اعددت لعبادى الصالحين ما لا عين رات ولا اذن سمعت ولا خطر على قلب بشر مصداق ذلك فى كتاب الله فلا تعلم نفس ما اخفى لهم من قرة اعين جزاء بما كانوا يعملون ـ

[صحيح مسلم الجزء الثامن كتاب (٥١) الجنة و صفة نعيمها و اهلها ص ١٤٢]۔

P. 245, *l. 11* : This is . . . disbelieve.
Qur'ān : LXXXIII, 17.
***ll. 26-27* : "Are we . . . bones."**
Qur'ān ; LXXIX, 11.
P. 246, *l. 4-6* : "The execution . . . eye."
Qur'ān : LIV, 50.
***ll. 6-7* : "Thou . . . God."**
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